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—Daniel Defoe, The True-Born Englishman
Thus from a mixture of all kinds began,
That Het’rogeneous Thing, An Englishman:
In eager Rapes, and furious Lust begot,
Betwixt a Painted Britton and a Scot:
Whose gend’ring Offspring quickly learned to bow,
And yoke their Heifers to the Roman Plough:
From whence a Mongrel Half-Bred Race there came,
With neither Name nor Nation, Speech or Fame.
In whose hot Veins new Mixtures quickly ran,
Infus’d betwixt a Saxon and a Dane.
While their Rank Daughters, to their Parents just,
Receiv’d all Nations with Promiscuous Lust.
This Nauseous Brood directly did contain
The well-extracted blood of Englishmen.
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The iconic image of post-1945 migration to Britain unwinds on a
grainy old Pathé newsreel. Standing on the wooden deck of a battered
troop carrier named the Empire Windrush as it docks at Tilbury on 21
June 1948, the calypso singer Lord Kitchener offers up a lyrical perfor-
mance of a song composed specially for the occasion. Lord Kitchener’s
“London Is the Place for Me” conveys the immense optimism felt by
this initial group of migrants to the colonial metropolis:
London is the place for me
London, this lovely city
You can go to France or America
India, Asia, or Australia
But you must come back to London City
Well believe me, I am speaking broad-mindedly
I am glad to know my mother country
I’ve been travelling to countries years ago
But this is the place I wanted to know
London, that’s the place for me
To live in London you’re really comfortable
Because the English people are very much sociable
They take you here and they take you there
And they make you feel like a millionaire
So London, that’s the place for me1
Lord Kitchener boarded the Empire Windrush with his fellow singer
Lord Beginner at Kingston docks, Jamaica, departing for Britain appro-
priately enough on Empire Day, the twenty-fourth of May. Four hun-
dred and ninety other predominantly male passengers from various
islands in the Caribbean accompanied the calypsonians. “London Is the
Place for Me,” which Lord Kitchener composed during the voyage
across the Atlantic, is the fantasy of a colonial subject who imagines
himself returning to the welcoming bosom of his mother country. In
retrospect, the song seems painfully naive. But, of course, there is a his-
tory behind this precarious innocence. Schoolchildren in Britain’s
many tropical colonies had been fed a diet of British literature for a half-
century or so by the time Lord Kitchener set sail for Britain.2 According
to colonial ideology, Britain originated democracy, the rule of law, and
the ethics of good sportsmanship.3 How could she fail to provide an
adequate welcome to her colonial sons and daughters? Sung in Standard
English rather than the Trinidadian creole that typi‹ed most calypso
songs, “London Is the Place for Me” dramatizes the crushing weight of
Britain’s colonial educational apparatus, which taught colonial subjects
that they should be proud members of such a great and bene‹cent
empire. Lord Kitchener’s own bombastic sobriquet itself appears to tes-
tify to the tenacious hold of this imperial mythology on members of the
colonial working classes.
Yet the buoyant optimism of the song also illustrates the powerful
feeling of agency inspired by this voyage to the metropolis. The
Caribbean men and women on board the Empire Windrush had, after
all, booked passage from the colonial periphery to London, the center of
the world at the time. In fact, a signi‹cant number of the boat’s passen-
gers had already been to Britain, helping to defend the motherland from
the Nazi onslaught during the Second World War.4 Walking down the
gangplank at Tilbury, many of these migrants from the Caribbean felt
that they were coming to collect the reward for their faithfulness as
British subjects.5 Others, intent on helping to rebuild the devastated
motherland, saw the voyage to Britain as a continuation of their
wartime sacri‹ce.6 Some, Lord Kitchener apparently among them, sim-
2 MONGREL NATION
ply sought the af›uent and cosmopolitan life represented by the Lon-
don of their dreams.
Would the British cities inhabited by these Caribbean migrants and
those who arrived later from Asia and Africa correspond to the glam-
orous image conjured up in Lord Kitchener’s calypso? In a poem pub-
lished early in the postwar period, Jamaican poet Louise Bennett poses
precisely this question. As the host of a BBC radio weekly focusing on
Anglophone Caribbean culture during the late 1940s and early 1950s,
Bennett was particularly well placed to address the issue of migration
from the colonies. Acting as a cultural broker, Bennett documented life
in the Caribbean for a British audience, recording the experiences of
migrants who arrived in the metropolis ‹lled with the high hopes
instilled by the colonial educational system. Her poem “Colonization in
Reverse,” written in a playful Creole vernacular voice that evokes the
lively oral culture of her island’s peasantry and working class, re›ects a
sense of excitement and ambition similar to that found in Lord Kitch-
ener’s work.7 As its title suggests, however, Bennett’s poem is also per-
meated by a witheringly ironic attitude toward the imperial legacy that
connects Caribbean colonial subjects to the British motherland. Migra-
tion to the metropolis is not simply a footloose escape from the
parochialism of the islands for Bennett. Her poem implicitly suggests
that this migration is also a willful and aggressive act, one that springs
from the bloodstained history of colonialism and slavery in the
Caribbean:
Wat a joyful news, Miss Mattie,
I feel like me heart gwine burs’
Jamaica people colonizin
Englan in reverse.
By de hundred, by de t’ousan
From country and from town,
By de ship-load, by de plane-load
Jamaica is Englan boun.
Dem a-pour out o’ Jamaica,
Everybody future plan
Is fe get a big-time job
An settle in de mother lan.
Introduction 3
Wat a islan! What a people!
Man an woman, old an young
Jusa pack dem bag an baggage
An tun history upside dung!8
Miss Lou, the opinionated and cantankerous persona whom Bennett
employed in many of her dramatic monologues, is clearly given to com-
ically hyperbolic accounts of contemporary events. Although her zeal-
ous description of the postwar exodus from Jamaica may magnify the
truth in order to impress her friend Miss Mattie, it nonetheless is shot
through with stinging insights concerning the historical conditions that
occasioned this migration. It is patently clear to Miss Lou, for instance,
that the relation between Britain and Jamaica is far from the benign one
conjured up by the cliché image of the motherland. Instead, that rela-
tion is grounded in exploitative and at times violent colonial power. To
migrate to the motherland is, then, to issue a radical challenge to this
history of subjugation. The passengers on the Empire Windrush, Miss
Lou says, turn history upside down.9
Like Lord Kitchener, Miss Lou acknowledges that Jamaicans are
packing their bags for economic reasons, participating in the cycles of
poverty-driven migration that the people of the Caribbean endured
after the abolition of slavery and the economic decline of the sugar plan-
tations. But the passage to Britain was not simply another arduous trek
in search of a decent wage, with all the pain of ruptured family relations
and cultural alienation that such a history implies. Rather, “Coloniza-
tion in Reverse” describes a mass migration that overturned the spatial
and cultural apartheid cementing colonial rule. For despite the power-
ful ‹ction of British subjecthood, which suggested that all the members
of the empire were equal in the eyes of the reigning king or queen, impe-
rial power was based on a ‹rm distinction between colonial metropolis
and colonized periphery. Subjecthood and citizenship were distinct and
uneven categories.
There was a tight economic logic to this unequal imperial dispensa-
tion.10 Resource extraction took place in the colonial periphery: slaves
from Africa, sugar from the Caribbean, cotton from India. Conversely,
manufacturing and the accumulation of capital took place primarily in
the metropolis.11 Both poles in this uneven relationship were essential
components of the system, but they had to be kept distinct. If the
colonies began to manufacture and sell ‹nished commodities outside
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the sphere of imperial preference, for instance, they would have a pow-
erful lever with which to pry themselves out of a subordinating colonial
relationship. By the 1930s, the campaign of India’s Congress Party for
precisely such economic and political autonomy, known as swaraj, had
gained critical momentum. In addition, waves of strikes and radical
union agitation spread across the Caribbean and Africa as the world-
wide economic depression hit home during the late 1930s, in many cases
unleashing movements for political independence.12 In all of these cases,
popular struggle focused not simply on national autonomy, but on
overcoming the underdevelopment that colonial power patently
imposed on the periphery. Driven by this history of uneven develop-
ment, the migration of colonial subjects to Britain brought the eco-
nomic subordination integral to the colonial system home to the
metropolis, sparking correspondingly intense political struggles.13
There was a potent cultural logic to this brutal arrangement as well.
Postwar Britain inherited a tradition of imperial arrogance. For
instance, during negotiations that led to the Atlantic Charter, Churchill
sought to diminish any suggestion that proclamations concerning the
Allies’ ‹ght for democracy in World War II might apply equally to the
colonies.14 Although there was certainly an element of cold political and
economic calculation in Churchill’s hypocritical stance, cultural atti-
tudes concerning the inferiority of colonial subjects played an equally
important role. The colonies were not suf‹ciently mature for self-rule,
British leaders such as Churchill believed. Implicit in this tutelary posi-
tion was a long history of racist state power and ideology. During the
middle to late Victorian era, the zenith of British power, European
imperialists legitimated their subjugation of other parts of the globe
using a variety of pseudoscienti‹c biological theories that ascribed nat-
ural dominance to northern Europeans. Racial theorists such as John
Knox drew on social Darwinist doctrines to argue for the supremacy of
the European racial “type,” which was conceived as absolutely distinct
from other human populations.15 This spurious appropriation of Dar-
winian theory assumed a linear, teleological model of temporal evolu-
tion and imposed this model on the space of the globe. The metropolis
was seen as the summit of a re‹gured Great Chain of Being, with the
colonies representing an evolutionary prehistory of modern human-
ity.16 A natural corollary of this spatiotemporal grid was a concern with
the possible degeneration of Europeans when they encountered the less
evolved peoples of the colonial periphery.17 Crystallizing in eugenics,
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late imperial concern with the purity of European bloodlines led to the
proliferation of campaigns for improved birthrates and selective steril-
ization under the aegis of the racial state. After 1945, state-mandated
management of sexuality in the quest to prevent the proliferation of
mongrel breeds was transferred from the colonies to postimperial
Britain.18
These ideologies of difference and innate superiority were far
harder to dismantle than the political-economic system of imperial
preference. Long after Britain lost its colonies, it retained its insular
sense of cultural superiority. Indeed, the more potency they lost on the
global stage after the eclipse of imperialism, the harder some Britons
clung to the illusory status symbol that covered their bodies—their
white skin—and the immutable cultural difference that it seemed to sig-
nify. Of course, this rei‹ed model of national identity had no historical
foundation. As long ago as 1700, Daniel Defoe described the English as
a “Mongrel Half-Bred Race.”19 Ethnic and national boundaries and the
legal de‹nitions that police them are mutable, and are always subject to
dispute and negotiation.20 The exclusionary and insular character of
British national self-de‹nition is in fact evidence of the unstable,
mixed-up identity of Britons. Stability, after all, is only sought in situa-
tions of signi‹cant ›ux.21 The migration of colonial subjects to the
British metropolis forced this mongrel nation to reckon with its long
history of imperialism and racism.22
It is far from clear that Britain has reconciled itself to this legacy.
Admittedly, the British government has acknowledged racial inequality
and persecution through legislation such as the Race Relations Act and
has engaged in remarkably candid examinations of institutional racism
in recent years such as the MacPherson Report. Nevertheless, over the
last half-century British political leaders have repeatedly resorted to the
scapegoating of so-called ethnic minority groups for the nation’s social
problems.23 Indeed, what Stuart Hall called “popular authoritarianism”
has become a fundamental characteristic of British political and cultural
life. Writing in the context of the manifold crises of the late 1970s, Hall
and his colleagues at Birmingham’s Center for Contemporary Cultural
Studies argued that British leaders were dismantling social democracy
and the redistributive role of the state. Both dominant parties legiti-
mated this transformation through an ideology of law and order that
singled out Britain’s nonwhite population as the cause of the nation’s
economic and social ills and that subjected them to punitive forms of
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policing that, in turn, catalyzed uprisings which tended to con‹rm
white stereotypes about black lawlessness.24 While this popular author-
itarianism may have been particularly evident during the crisis condi-
tions of the 1970s, Britain’s black and Asian populations were ostracized
and targeted for repressive policing and immigration legislation from
the onset of mass migration. They remain so today, as the behavior of
New Labour after 9/11, which I discuss in my conclusion, has made
clear. From the Notting Hill riots of the late 1950s to the murder of
Stephen Lawrence forty years later, Britain has a long tradition of both
institutional and popular racism that legitimates harsh treatment of
those who are not perceived as “native.” Such enduringly exclusionary
discourses of national identity and the popular authoritarian ideologies
they help legitimate are an integral element not simply of domestic poli-
cies such as refugee and asylum laws, but also of Britain’s enduringly
imperial stance in the world, as the nation’s role in the “War on Terror”
suggests.
Mongrel Nation documents the history of resistance by African,
Asian, Caribbean, and white Britons to such insular representations of
national identity.25 As was true of anticolonial culture in general, such
resistance was never exclusively reactive. Instead, antiracist struggles
galvanized the cultural resources of oppressed peoples, creating
dynamic new aesthetic and political constellations whose transforming
thrust exceeded the struggle immediately at hand.26 In postcolonial
Britain, resistance to exclusionary nationalism led immigrants and their
children to invoke the heritage of internationalism that developed dur-
ing anticolonial struggles in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. Diasporic
communities in Britain denaturalized the con‹ning boundaries of the
nation-state by marshaling these internationalist traditions. In addi-
tion, by enacting fresh ways of being British, members of the postcolo-
nial diaspora helped to recon‹gure social categories such as race, gen-
der, and sexuality that cemented conventional de‹nitions of national
identity.27 Although many white Britons found the novel cultural prac-
tices of postcolonial migrants profoundly threatening, the newness
introduced to Britain by members of the Asian and African diaspora
also offered important routes of escape for many from stultifying local
traditions. Investigating the legacy of Britain’s imperial past, Mongrel
Nation provides a historical account of the novel identities created in
the factories, dance halls, streets, and other contact zones of postcolo-
nial Britain.28
Introduction 7
The Political Economy of Racism in 
Twentieth-Century Britain
So-called ethnic minorities currently constitute less than 6 percent of
Britain’s total population.29 Approximately 30 percent of this number is
of African descent, 61 percent are of Asian descent, and 9 percent clas-
sify themselves as of mixed-race background. Of course, these groups
are disproportionately concentrated in urban areas, where they often
constitute the majority population of any particular borough, making
the designation “ethnic minority” particularly misleading. In addition,
a signi‹cant percentage of Britain’s African, Asian, and Caribbean pop-
ulation was born in Britain.30 Unlike the United States, which actively
encouraged skilled immigrants from around the world to settle within
its borders after 1965, Britain ended primary immigration from its for-
mer colonies in 1971. As a result of this policy, more people have left
Britain during the last ‹fty years than have immigrated into the country
during the same period. What then explains the moral panic over inun-
dation by foreigners that vexes postimperial Britain?
The increasingly restrictive immigration laws of the postcolonial
era have long been interpreted as a response to popular racism.31 Typi-
cally, the racial bigotry of substantial numbers of ordinary Britons is
seen as having placed pressure on the state to deal with civil discord.
Leading members of both liberal and conservative parties, it is argued,
responded to white racism such as the 1958 Notting Hill riots by enact-
ing increasingly restrictive immigration legislation. During the period
after 1948, such legislation gradually led to the transformation of British
subjecthood from a universal category based on the extensive geogra-
phy of the empire (ius soli) to an exclusionary identity based on notions
of racial purity (ius sanguinis).32 However, this reading of Britain’s post-
colonial racial politics ignores the driving force of the state and the elite
groups that dominate it in codifying forms of racial difference and in
catalyzing racist reactions to the presence of postcolonial subjects in
Britain. Indeed, state racism preceded popular antipathy to the presence
of nonwhite immigrants in Britain by at least a century.33 Postcolonial
racism in Britain has been seen by critics who ignore this lineage of state
racism as a product of the inherent xenophobia of individual Britons, a
phenomenon that is completely divorced from state policies and their
underlying economic motives.34 British society is consequently viewed
as an undifferentiated aggregate, a description that derives from stereo-
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typical discourses on national character. Against this ascription of mass
pathology, Mongrel Nation insists on the embedding of cultural phe-
nomena such as racism in a political-economic framework.35 Processes
of racialization in Britain were clearly initiated by the state after 1948
through particular government policies. Although policymakers often
clashed over the measures the government should adopt, their decisions
were always informed by the economic imperatives and crises produced
by Britain’s declining imperial power. By tracking the novel articula-
tions between culture, the state, and capital that arose as Britain lost its
imperial hegemony following 1948, Mongrel Nation captures the rela-
tional nature of the interlocking cultural, political, and economic
processes at play across contemporary geographic spaces.
The British state and the elite who dominated and directed it
reacted to their imperial subjects’ claims to freedom of movement and
equal opportunity after 1945 with hostility bred from the attitudes of
racial supremacy fostered by centuries of imperial power. The policies
they instituted after the arrival of the Empire Windrush played a pivotal
role in disseminating exclusionary de‹nitions of national belonging and
are hence directly culpable for the rise of racism and fascism in postim-
perial Britain.36 For example, when the Empire Windrush docked in
Tilbury, Clement Attlee, the prime minister, described the nonwhite
imperial subjects who disembarked as engaging in an “incursion” into
Britain and made minimal provision for their successful resettlement in
the metropolis.37 Another member of the Cabinet suggested transport-
ing those aboard the Empire Windrush to East Africa, where they might
be of economic utility without sullying the blood of Britain’s white pop-
ulation. Yet Attlee and his Cabinet ultimately made no attempt to ban
the entry of colonial subjects. This ambivalence on the part of the poli-
cymaking elite was a product of the economic and political contradic-
tions in which Britain found itself following the war. Of course, Britain
had just won a war against fascist powers whose doctrines of racial
supremacy formed an explicit and essential part of their national ideol-
ogy; in such a context, the British government could ill afford to adopt
overtly racist policies. In addition, deeply in debt and with a shattered
infrastructure, Britain needed the captive markets and opportunities for
capital accumulation afforded by imperial preferences and the sterling
area in order to rebuild its economy and shore up its eroding status as a
world power.38 Yet settler-populated dominions such as Canada and
Australia were growing increasingly restive with the forms of political
Introduction 9
and economic subordination required by the commonwealth system. In
addition, India’s long struggle for independence ‹nally bore fruit in
1947. Faced with such threats to the empire, Attlee’s government passed
a Nationality Act in 1948 that established the universality of British sub-
jecthood, offering a powerful symbolic reaf‹rmation of the imperial
system. By proclaiming formal equality throughout the empire, the 1948
Nationality Act sought to defuse anticolonial nationalist movements
and to placate the declared anti-imperialist position of the United
States, the preeminent capitalist power after the war.39 However, this
measure conformed to the system of global apartheid that had charac-
terized British imperialism: imperial subjects were to be formally equal
but geographically separate. As a consequence, the government moved
to ‹ll the postwar labor shortage by recruiting European—in other
words, white—workers rather than citizens from the colonies.40 When
colonial subjects like those aboard the Empire Windrush began to exer-
cise the rights the Nationality Act guaranteed to them by migrating
independently to the motherland, the forms of racial hierarchy and sub-
ordination that underpinned the empire and the government’s labor
recruitment scheme quickly surfaced. The government’s proclaimed
inclusive legal model of national belonging, it became clear, fundamen-
tally contradicted the exclusionary de‹nitions of national identity
developed during Britain’s colonial expansion and imperial rule.
Despite the small number of immigrants arriving from the colonies
during the early postwar years, the increasingly apparent hostility of
both Labour and Tory governments to their presence in Britain had a
signi‹cant impact on the conditions under which they lived.41 For
instance, despite the apparent clash of interests between employers
seeking workers and the government, which, as the 1949 Report of the
Royal Commission on Population made clear, feared racial hybridity,
of‹cial hostility toward nonwhite immigration had an economic func-
tionality. By eroding the political and social rights of migrants, govern-
ment policies made them more vulnerable to superexploitation. As it
had to a more limited extent during the interwar era, British capital
attempted to employ workers from abroad to further accumulation fol-
lowing 1945. Migrant labor in general is attractive to employers because
the state has to bear little of the cost of their social reproduction.42 With
the full employment that accompanied the economic boom of the 1950s
and early 1960s in Britain giving employers relatively small leverage on
workers, migrants from the colonies played the vital role of replacing
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white workers who refused to take up physically demanding and
socially undesirable forms of manual labor.43 Despite their impressive
quali‹cations on average, British employers and the state slotted these
nonwhite immigrants exclusively into unskilled positions. This policy
could only be legitimated on racist grounds: nonwhites were perceived
as simply un‹t for skilled tasks, despite their formal quali‹cations. By
failing to challenge such employment policies, the British government
implicitly gave its imprimatur to strategies of subordination derived
directly from colonial policy. In addition, as it did in European coun-
tries such as France and Germany that encouraged labor migration
from their colonies or poorer neighbors, migration to Britain played the
vital role of restraining wage increases during the postwar period.44 By
tacitly aiding employers in their search for a more “›exible” and hence
more easily exploitable workforce, the state helped undermine the
power of organized labor and advanced a strategy of accumulation
based on the fragmentation of the working class along racial lines.
Notwithstanding the utility of migrant labor in the postwar era, the
policymaking elite evinced signi‹cant resistance to the presence of colo-
nial and postcolonial subjects in Britain. Although the commitment to
maintaining imperial power initially prevented the state from moving
of‹cially to restrict nonwhite immigration, various administrative mea-
sures were adopted that were intended to discourage would-be
migrants. Colonial of‹cials, for example, were encouraged to make
passports far more dif‹cult to come by at points of embarkation. Such
measures did little to offset the economic pressures that encouraged
emigration, and, as migrants continued to arrive in the metropolis,
British policymakers became actively involved in legislating a transpar-
ently racial model of national identity that represented some British
subjects as more authentically British than others. In March 1954, a
small number of Tory members of Parliament began a debate by alleg-
ing that “immigrants” were abusing the welfare state and that “virile
young men” from the colonies posed a threat to law and order.45 Two
years later the Tory government established a working party on immi-
gration whose ‹nal report was not published since it failed to ‹nd sub-
stantial economic grounds to restrict immigration. However, when
racist riots erupted in 1958 in Nottingham and in London’s Notting Hill
neighborhood, the government found the excuse it needed to introduce
legislation restricting immigration. Although the rioters were univer-
sally condemned by the press and by members of the government as
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hooligans, Prime Minister Macmillan argued that their violence neces-
sitated the introduction of legislation that would maintain public order
by restricting immigration from the Caribbean and South Asia. The
sheer presence of nonwhite citizens was thus seen as a natural and
inevitable catalyst of white discontent, making black Britons responsi-
ble for the disorder produced by racist whites. By portraying the
Caribbean residents of British cities as the catalysts of racial con›ict, the
government conveniently brushed over its own role in fostering the
social conditions that helped generate con›icts such as the Notting Hill
riots. Cuts in spending for social services such as housing provision and
education during the post-Windrush era helped ensure competition
between Commonwealth migrants and the most marginalized sections
of the white working class. State policies thereby fostered con›icts that
exacerbated tensions deriving from the postwar strategy of capital accu-
mulation, which often pitted white and black workers against one
another.46 As it had in the colonies, this strategy of divide-and-conquer
produced predictable forms of con›ict along the rei‹ed racial lines that
the state itself had played the primary role in fostering.
Just over a decade after establishing the liberal Nationality Act of
1948, the British government effectively if not formally repealed the
right of imperial subjects to reside in Britain. The Commonwealth
Immigrants Act of 1962 subjected immigrants from the colonies to
numerical controls based on their skills and job prospects, notwith-
standing their formal citizenship as British subjects. No corresponding
effort was made to control migration from Ireland and other European
nations. This act thus codi‹ed the forms of racist discourse that had cir-
culated informally among members of both Labour and Tory govern-
ments since the arrival of the Empire Windrush.47 Ironically, the act pre-
cipitated a vast increase in the number of migrants, who sought to gain
entrance to the promised motherland before the gates were slammed
shut. Further measures to heighten the juridical insularity of British
nationality followed in short order. Despite having condemned the 1962
act as racist, the Labour Party shepherded its own restrictive legislation
through Parliament only six years later.
The xenophobic discourse that characterized demagogues such as
Enoch Powell, whose notorious speech of 1968 predicted “rivers of
blood” unless black Britons were rounded up and deported, was the
logical outcome of this competition between the mainstream political
parties to pass racially exclusionary immigration legislation. During the
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mid-1970s, for instance, the explicitly racist and fascist National Front
achieved signi‹cant electoral impact by calling for the repatriation of all
black British citizens, whether or not they had been born in the country.
In 1981, Margaret Thatcher effectively inverted this relationship between
the radical racist fringe and the mainstream by drafting a new National-
ity Act that formally rescinded the provisions of the 1948 act. British
national identity, long based on exclusionary informal parameters, at
last became a matter of blood belonging.48 While explicit talk of repatri-
ation died down following Thatcher’s politically astute co-option of the
fascist vote, exclusionary de‹nitions of national identity had been
codi‹ed that sanctioned myriad forms of racist denigration, harass-
ment, and inequality.
The Nationality Act of 1981 also bore the clear stamp of eugenically
tinged fears concerning the purity of British bloodlines. Since represen-
tations of the nation as a patriarchal family codi‹ed in the act of 1948
were no longer tenable because of their blatant gender discrimination,
the new act substituted an imagined community of gender equality that
was predicated on clearly de‹ned racial boundaries.49 As Louise Bennett
suggests in “Colonization in Reverse,” black women were a particularly
virulent problem to both these versions of community. As potential
reproducers of difference within the homogeneously conceived body
politic, black women as well as people who engaged in sexual relations
across cultural and racial lines threatened to transgress the assiduously
maintained boundaries that circumscribed the pure community of
Britishness. If, as Ranu Samantrai puts it, “nationality is lived in the
modality of gender,” de‹nitions of belonging were articulated during
the post-Windrush era in a manner that underlines the intersections
between gendered and racialized de‹nitions of national belonging.50
It was around the question of gendered representations of racial dif-
ference, then, that the historic compromise that extended full citizen-
ship—in the political, economic, and civil senses of the term—to all res-
idents of Britain during the post-1945 period was most clearly
unraveled.51 Unable to resolve the contradictions in conditions of capi-
talist production and reproduction, neoconservatives adopted a strat-
egy of racial scapegoating to cement their political hegemony. As the
state came to penetrate social life to an unparalleled degree after 1945, so
it became ever more split between the con›icting imperatives to satisfy
the economic conditions for capital accumulation, on the one hand,
and, on the other hand, to secure the social conditions for self-legit-
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imization. With the internationalization of signi‹cant sectors of British
capital after the 1960s, few incentives remained to stimulate the creation
of a national strategy for capital restructuring.52 Given the internation-
alization of capital after 1970 and the uneven impact of Britain’s decline,
the tendency of what Bob Jessop calls a two-nations project was to
expand privileges for those perceived as good citizens in areas such as
transport and housing where private property entrenched privilege. At
the same time, the “bad citizens,” who suffered the brunt of widening
differentials within the wage-earning classes and the shift of public
wealth to private hands through neoliberal privatization, were increas-
ingly stigmatized.53 Of course, black and Asian Britons suffered dispro-
portionately from the blighting economic and social impact of post-
Fordism.
The role of racial scapegoating in postcolonial Britain highlights the
links between cultural phenomena such as “race” and broader political-
economic currents. By unraveling such links, black British activists and
critics sought to debunk exclusionary de‹nitions of British identity. The
antiessentialist aspects of this critique have helped stimulate signi‹cant
interest in black British cultural studies. Too frequently, however, such
interest has focused exclusively on the cultural plane, ignoring the polit-
ical economy of racial subordination that was an important element in
the militant antiracism developed by African, Asian, Caribbean, and
white Britons in response to the scapegoating policies of the postimpe-
rial era.54 Mongrel Nation recuperates the radical critique of racial capi-
talism developed by black British activists and theorists. This recupera-
tion makes possible a political economy of culture and resistance that
spans the shift from Fordism to post-Fordism in Britain after 1945. In
addition, as its title suggests, Mongrel Nation emphasizes the enduring
saliency of the nation-state as the primary scale at which transnational
›ows of capital, culture, commodities, and people are regulated.
Through its emphasis on the consistency of postimperial British racial
politics and economics, Mongrel Nation helps challenge the elisions that
have characterized recent theories of diaspora and globalization.
Reading Resistance from Below
Louise Bennett’s “Colonization in Reverse” satirizes the essentialism
and ahistoricism of the British racial imaginary and, in doing so, offers
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a remarkably prescient overview of the speci‹c forms of xenophobia
that developed in Britain during the half-century after the arrival of the
Empire Windrush. To start with, Miss Lou, Bennett’s humorous
speaker, delivers a swift and cheeky jab to the common charge that
migrants from the Caribbean were stealing white people’s patrimony in
one way or another:
Oonoo [You] see how life is funny,
Oonoo see de tunabout,
Jamaica live fe box bread
Outa English people mout’.
For wen dem catch a [arrive in] Englan,
An start play dem different role,
Some will settle down to work
An some will settle fe de dole [public assistance].
Jane say de dole is not too bad
Because dey payin’ she
Two pounds a week fe seek a job
Dat suit her dignity.
Me say Jane will never ‹nd work
At the rate how she dah-look,
For all day she stay pon Aunt Fan couch
An read love-story book.
Wat a devilment a Englan!
Dem face war an brave de worse,
But I’m wonderin’ how dem gwine stan’
Colonizin’ in reverse.
If Caribbean people become parasites on the British welfare state, Miss
Lou argues implicitly, they are simply engaging in an inversion of the
long colonial history of expropriation and exploitation. In the metrop-
olis, former colonial subjects can refuse work that does not suit their
dignity, a luxury that was obviously seldom a possibility for the vast
majority of the colonized. The British public, masters of the art of tak-
ing bread out of other people’s mouths according to Bennett, now
protest hypocritically about competition from former colonial subjects.
Bennett may seem to homogenize the English here. Perhaps she should
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have spoken only of the ruling class. However, even the British working
class came to constitute a labor elite during the imperial period, with all
the relative entitlements in comparison with the working classes of the
colonies that this entailed. The empire thus helped to create a culture of
consolidation that united working and upper classes within Britain.55
After 1945, this imperial legacy was invoked to portray colonial and
postcolonial immigrants as aliens whose presence threatened funda-
mental British traditions. Miss Lou’s caustic exclamations over the
dif‹culty the British have in adjusting to migration from the colonies
satirizes precisely the kind of rhetoric deployed by ideologues of both
mainstream and fringe political parties after 1945.
The racist stereotypes conjured up by Miss Lou do not, however,
relate simply to economic issues. For while she sits at home collecting
public assistance, Jane is reading romance novels. This suggests that she
is not simply an unproductive subject, but is also endowed with an
active emotional and sexual imagination. Through the ‹gure of Jane,
“Colonization in Reverse” conjures up the phobic image of black
women’s reproductive capacity. The lingering, eugenically tinged con-
struction of national identity in postwar Britain ensured that black
maternity would be represented as irreconcilable with national belong-
ing.56 During the postwar period, the state’s focus on the reproduction
of a pure body politic in fact shifted from the empire to Britain itself. As
immigrants began arriving from the colonies, concerns about the con-
stitution of the British people were increasingly aired. In 1949, for
instance, the Royal Commission on Population declared in its report:
British traditions, manners, and ideas in the world have to be borne
in mind. Immigration is thus not a desirable means of keeping the
population at a replacement level as it would have in effect reduced
the proportion of home-bred stock in the population.57
Britain’s recent defeat of fascist powers like Germany and Italy—both of
which had placed a strong emphasis on control of women’s sexuality—
made it dif‹cult for policymakers to advance openly eugenicist policies.
However, cultural assumptions concerning the overlap of “race” and
nation did have pronounced effects. The specter of racial degeneration
was a driving force behind state immigration policies in the second half
of the twentieth century. These policies, in turn, had a strong in›uence
on popular consciousness in Britain, catalyzing increasingly harsh
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forms of racial prejudice, inequality, and, ultimately, violence as the
nation sank deeper into a postimperial funk. Using the disarmingly
satirical voice of Miss Lou, Louis Bennett’s “Colonization in Reverse”
charts the course that an increasingly exclusionary construction of
British identity would take during the next half century.
As Bennett suggests, migration to Britain was the initial, founda-
tional challenge to the imperial system that had heretofore structured
the world of the colonized.58 In laying claim to the rights of passage
from the periphery to the metropolis, colonized and postcolonial sub-
jects sought to dismantle the political, economic, and epistemological
hierarchies on which imperialism rested.59 Migrants from the Com-
monwealth forced former colonial nations to confront the decentering
experiences undergone by colonized peoples for centuries.60 This spa-
tial mobility was not, however, the only act of resistance engaged in by
migrants to Britain. Myriad other forms of insubordination necessarily
followed in the wake of this seizure of control over geographical move-
ment, as Britain’s racist imperial culture was imported back home. Not
all of these acts were political in the usual sense of the term. In fact, in
order to register the acts of quotidian resistance engaged in by former
colonial subjects in Britain, traditional de‹nitions of political action
need to be expanded radically. At least three generations of black and
Asian Britons have now encountered and fought back against various
forms of institutional and popular racism. Some of them have certainly
resorted to parliamentary agitation, organized social movements, and
demonstrations in the streets of Britain’s cities. But the resources that
enabled these communities to overcome racism have never been limited
to such institutional, state-oriented sites.61
“Colonization in Reverse” again proves prescient in this regard,
subtly suggesting some of the other cultural resources Britain’s black
and Asian communities have had at their disposal. Miss Lou’s young
friend Jane engages in the kind of everyday acts of sabotage that were
important weapons in the arsenal of the racially oppressed in Britain.62
She loafs. She refuses to look for a job that doesn’t satisfy her. She
brazenly exploits Britain’s relatively generous welfare state. This ability
to thrive while living without a wage became more rather than less
important to second-generation black and Asian women and men as
Britain’s postcolonial crisis spiraled out of political control after the
1960s.63 Other signi‹cant forms of opposition that Mongrel Nation dis-
cusses include subcultural sartorial styles, illicit sexuality, performative
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traditions such as carnival, calypso, reggae, dub poetry, bhangra, rock
music, and street riots.64 The subversive content in these traditions is
not always immediately apparent. As James Scott argues, forms of resis-
tance among subordinate individuals and groups are not always legible
by those in positions of power, and therefore constitute “hidden tran-
scripts” that intersect with the sphere of formal politics only on occa-
sion.65 Since history tends to be written either by or at the behest of
socially dominant groups, Scott turns to these hidden transcripts in
order to recuperate and record the experiences of subordinate people
whose lives would not otherwise be accessible.66
When intellectuals such as Louise Bennett migrated to Britain, they
brought radical anticolonial traditions of cultural recuperation and
expression along with them. British culture thereby came to be infused
with practices of internationalism that prominent British radicals of the
era overlooked, to their great detriment. Moreover, the work of writers
such as Bennett provides examples of precisely the kind of counterhege-
monic blend of aesthetics and politics that cultural studies scholars have
helped excavate in recent years. Louise Bennett’s “Colonization in
Reverse,” for example, does not simply document acts of sly sabotage
engaged in by recent immigrants. In addition, the poem itself is an act
of resistance. Bennett’s use of the Creole vernacular is part of a nation-
alism from the bottom up that has consistently animated diasporic
writers and artists in Britain over the last ‹fty years.
Mongrel Nation’s analysis of the making of postcolonial Britain
begins with discussion of Sam Selvon, one of the most important writ-
ers of the post-1945 Caribbean Renaissance to settle in London during
the 1950s. Unlike contemporaries of his such as V. S. Naipaul and
George Lamming, both of whom lived in London in this period but
wrote predominantly about life in the Caribbean, Selvon depicted con-
ditions for his countrymen and women in Britain in his groundbreaking
novel The Lonely Londoners. Following in the footsteps of earlier cul-
tural nationalists such as Trinidad’s Beacon Group, Selvon used vernac-
ular Caribbean speech patterns and scabrous popular cultural forms
such as calypso, documenting the struggles of the ‹rst generation of
migrants to Britain rather than looking back with nostalgia or anger to
life in the tropics. The veiled eugenicist concerns over the purity of
British blood that ‹gured in public policy of the era are mirrored, I
argue, in Selvon’s accounts of the sexual exploits of predominantly male
migrants in the metropolis. If his work offers a poignant depiction of
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the isolation and alienation black Britons faced during the early years of
settlement, Selvon’s poetic novel also limns the resources of resistance
transmitted through transnational expressive culture, resources that
empowered postcolonial settlers in Britain as they demanded access to
the pubs, the streets, the airwaves, and other important public spaces of
the nation.67
Once postcolonial subjects from the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia
settled in Britain, distinctions between migrants from different areas of
the former empire tended to melt away in the furnace of racial subordi-
nation. The signi‹cant disparities between people arriving in Britain
from independent island cultures such as Trinidad and Jamaica became
less important, for instance, as people from the Caribbean had to band
together against white lynch mobs such as those who roamed the streets
during the Notting Hill riots of 1958. Similarly, their considerable cul-
tural differences did not prevent people from the Caribbean, Africa, and
Asia from uniting in the face of exclusionary de‹nitions of national
identity that reduced all nonwhites in Britain to the status of illegitimate
“aliens.” Intent on blocking such divide-and-rule strategies, activists
among the immigrant communities in Britain adopted the unifying
label black in order to strengthen the bonds of solidarity among those
subjected to racism in the metropolis. As the contributors to The Empire
Strikes Back pointed out, it made little difference whether immigrants to
Britain were called “blacks, browns, darkies, nig-nogs, or Pakis.”68 The
goal of such derogatory racial labels was the same: to represent non-
whites as outsiders, an invading force of dangerous aliens who threat-
ened British identities that were conceived as pure and perpetual. Col-
lective action, postwar immigrants to Britain quickly learned, was the
only viable means of combating such forms of xenophobia given their
minority status. The label black thus came to operate primarily as a
political signi‹er, denoting experiences of racialization and resistance
shared by the African, Asian, and Caribbean settlers of the postwar
period.69 Unlike in the United States, in other words, where black refers
exclusively to people of African origin, in Britain the term functioned
less as a category of shared biological identity than as a form of con-
scious af‹liation based on political solidarity. This usage helped to high-
light the arbitrariness of racial categories. The political practices of black
Britons suggested that “race” was not based on primordial phenotypical
or other forms of biological difference, but was instead a mutable social
construction.70 Behind seemingly commonsense racial categories lay
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speci‹c histories of contested domination and subordination. By reject-
ing essentialist models of racial difference, the political solidarity of
Asian, Caribbean, and African communities dismantled monolithic
representations of national identity. Antiracist struggle thereby came to
function as a contact zone, a cultural space in which cosmopolitan cul-
tures interacted with one another to create new, radically composite
formations that enabled black Britons to militate against exclusionary
nationalist traditions in postcolonial Britain.71
Traditions of overtly internationalist cultural politics were most
evident in Britain during the 1960s and 1970s, when the Caribbean
Artists Movement and offshoot groups such as the Race Today collec-
tive were active. I discuss these groups and the cultural politics of inter-
nationalist antiracism in my second and third chapters. “Black Power in
a Transnational Frame” highlights the conversations that took place
between pivotal ‹gures of the period such the Trinidad-born civil rights
activist Stokely Carmichael (aka Kwame Ture) and the poet Edward
Kamau Brathwaite. These personal and political exchanges took place
against the backdrop of the global antiracist struggle during the 1960s, a
context that has come to seem increasingly relevant with the revival of
traditions of internationalism and anti-imperialism over the last
decade. Activists such as Carmichael drew explicit parallels between
anticolonial freedom ‹ghters in the Third World and antiracist mili-
tants in core nations such as Britain and the United States. Although
black Britons lacked mass-based formal national antiracist organiza-
tions such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)
of the United States, the proximity to colonial experience of ‹rst-gener-
ation immigrants to Britain meant that Black Power’s anticolonial lexi-
con had great resonance on both sides of the Atlantic. Cultural politics
played a crucial role in activating this transnational imaginary. Indeed,
a crucial component of the era’s radical internationalism was a political
and aesthetic populism grounded in the vernacular cultures of diasporic
groups in Britain. Thus, Stokely Carmichael helped articulate a transna-
tional black activist imaginary grounded in a signifying homology
between the racialized ghettos of the developed world and the colonies
of the Third World. By contrast, for Caribbean Artists Movement
cofounder Edward Kamau Brathwaite, whose epic poetic cycle Rights of
Passage traces the black Atlantic migrations of the peoples of the African
diaspora, the key to the subterranean unity of peoples of African
descent is to be found in “nation language” and other popular expres-
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sive forms that survived the Middle Passage. Drawing on their knowl-
edge of diasporic history and culture, Carmichael and Brathwaite
helped ›esh out the transnational antiracist imaginary invoked by radi-
cal young Black Power activists, models that have gained revived reso-
nance in the work of contemporary theorists such as Paul Gilroy.
Invocations of anticolonial struggle in the metropolis took on
increasing saliency during the 1970s. Britain avoided the massive urban
upheavals that took place in the United States during these years as well
as government-orchestrated surveillance of and attacks on activists such
as the FBI’s Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO). Nonethe-
less, as the serried crises of Britain’s welfare state unfolded, black and
Asian Britons’ access to public space was radically curtailed through a
number of draconian state policies. Perhaps most pivotal was the
con›ict between the British police force and black communities over
carnival celebrations during the mid-1970s. The work of dub poet Lin-
ton Kwesi Johnson, an active member of the Race Today collective and
one of the ‹rst artists to articulate a speci‹cally second-generation black
British idiom, lies at the center of my discussion of the politics of
belonging in this period. Johnson and the Race Today collective were
actively involved in the revival of carnival as a celebration of diasporic
culture in these years. Blending insurrectionary celebrations of
antiracist culture in the Caribbean with popular license in the streets of
Britain’s capital city, carnival was viewed by British authorities as a
menace to public order. They responded to carnival just as colonial
authorities had in Trinidad, attempting to suppress it by main force.
The battles that erupted around the annual carnival were symptomatic
of broader policies of harsh policing that were imposed on black com-
munities during these years. Linton Kwesi Johnson’s mobilization of
dub music and reggae poetry to document and intervene in these strug-
gles extended the tradition of vernacular cultural activism of previous
generations while offering a novel voice that appealed to young, second-
generation black Britons. As I document in this chapter, LKJ’s celebra-
tion of the Caribbean carnival tradition also inspired young Asian and
white activists, allowing them to jump the scale of the nation-state and
offer searing critiques of the contradictions of countries such as Britain
that proclaimed their liberalism while clinging tightly to imperial tradi-
tions.72
Despite their obvious merits for antiracist organizing, Black
Power–derived models of internationalist solidarity were challenged by
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the emergence of new voices within black British communities during
this period. By the late 1970s and 1980s, groups like the Organization of
Women of Asian and African Descent (OWAAD) disputed the patriar-
chal characteristics of black nationalism while asserting their loyalty to
the broader antiracist struggle.73 At the same time, a series of provoca-
tive ‹lms by independent black media collectives such as Sankofa high-
lighted the importance of sexuality and sexual orientation.74 In “New
Ethnicities,” Stuart Hall provides a theoretical overview of these shifts,
arguing that traditional, homogenizing de‹nitions of blackness were
being destabilized by other cultural af‹liations to class, gender, sexual-
ity, and ethnicity.75 Yet despite the decentering of the label black British,
Hall held that the term should not be jettisoned. Racism’s tenacious
grip on public life in Britain underlined for Hall the enduring necessity
of collective solidarity, notwithstanding an increasing sensitivity toward
cultural differences. The ‹ndings of the MacPherson report concerning
the breadth of institutional racism in British society have con‹rmed the
necessity of unity among Britain’s racialized groups during the new mil-
lennium.76
Hall’s acknowledgment of new ethnicities is, of course, a product of
the increasing strength of struggles by women and gay people for equal-
ity in Britain. Although these movements began to impact black and
Asian communities during the 1970s, gender and sexuality have been
important issues within ethnic minority communities since the incep-
tion of mass immigration after 1948. Louise Bennett’s “Colonization in
Reverse,” with its satirical invocation of colonial eugenicist discourse,
underlines the interarticulation of diverse axes of identity, including
gender and race, in postcolonial Britain. The reproductive capacity of
black women like Bennett’s character Jane was, as the poet implicitly
predicted, a target of both formal and informal regulation by British
authorities after 1948.77 Similarly, stereotypical and phobic representa-
tions of black male sexuality often sparked various forms of white terror
in postcolonial Britain. Processes of racialization cannot therefore be
understood without also examining the role of gender and sexuality in
constituting competing forms of black British identity and resistance.
Buchi Emecheta’s London trilogy anticipates many of the themes
developed by radical black and Asian feminist groups such as OWAAD.
By injecting perspectives and concerns derived from her Nigerian her-
itage into the parochial world of nascent British feminism during the
1970s, Emecheta was one of the ‹rst voices in what would grow to be a
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chorus interrogating Western feminism, pushing for a decolonized the-
ory and practice of transnational sisterhood. One of the ‹rst black
women novelists to be published after 1945, Emecheta documents her
experiences as a Nigerian immigrant to Britain isolated both by an
oppressive marriage and by popular and state racism in Britain.
Emecheta’s brutally frank depiction of her by turns parasitic and domi-
neering husband offered a direct challenge to unitary models of black
subjectivity by challenging their primary ground of articulation: the
family. Indeed, by exposing the patriarchal character of certain African
traditions, Emecheta disrupted facile Afrocentric philosophies of the
era. As I demonstrate in chapter 4, however, Emecheta also drew
strength from her Nigerian roots, and thereby offered an implicit
rebuke to the largely unchallenged universalistic tenets of the socialist
feminism that dominated in Britain during these years. In addition,
Emecheta used her documentary ‹ction to criticize the position of
dependency foisted on poor white and black British women by the post-
war welfare state. If she rebelled against the family-based oppression of
her marriage, Emecheta is just as critical of the infantilizing ministra-
tions of the welfare state. In place of both these institutions, her novels
call not simply for a more inclusive model of British national identity,
but for new forms of social citizenship grounded in radical democratic
practices among working-class women of all colors. Drawing strength
from the traditions of women’s solidarity she experiences while living
“in the ditch,” Emecheta ‹nds an experiential basis for the kind of
transnational feminist solidarity that theorists such as Hazel Carby sub-
sequently analyzed.
Despite the saliency of these issues for black and Asian Britons, his-
torians and cultural studies analysts have devoted relatively little atten-
tion to the relations between race, gender, and sexuality during the
postcolonial era.78 This should perhaps not be so surprising given the
fact that it is in the areas of gender and sexuality that the most intense
struggles within black working-class cultures have taken place in
Britain.79 Faced with persistent institutional and popular racism in
Britain, community leaders have often been tempted to play down class
and gender differences in order to close ranks and don the mantle of
community representatives.80 While such cultural nationalism may
help consolidate resistance to oppression, it tends to be underpinned by
a reactionary politics of authenticity. For instance, women are fre-
quently represented under such circumstances as pivotal symbols of
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autonomous cultural identity and tradition, placing enormous pressure
on them to conform to the dictates of conservative traditions.81 Strong
resistance has emerged from within black British communities to this
arrogation of authority and suppression of internal difference by lead-
ers who are often male and middle class. These struggles challenge the
tendency among both critics and policymakers to embrace monolithic
de‹nitions of community.82 By tracking clashes over gender and sexual-
ity, Mongrel Nation offers a history of black and Asian cultures in
Britain in all their vital and sometimes contradictory complexity, look-
ing at where ordinary people are rather than where it might seem polit-
ically desirable for them to be.83
If Emecheta’s feminism provoked criticism for undermining black
unity in the face of British racism, Salman Rushdie’s novel The Satanic
Verses de‹nitively disrupted any lingering illusions about simplistic
black-white binaries. Signi‹cant segments of the Asian community had
been cha‹ng against the black British label for some time before the
‹restorm over Rushdie’s novel erupted, arguing that it elided the
speci‹city of their experience.84 As prominent a theorist as Paul Gilroy,
for example, discusses resistant cultural traditions in relation to a geo-
graphical framework—the black Atlantic—that renders the colonial
experience of Asians invisible.85 By 1989, when the crisis over Salman
Rushdie’s novel The Satanic Verses tore the British public sphere apart,
the Asian community had itself begun to fragment along religious lines
that echoed the communal fractures on the subcontinent all too closely.
British Muslims felt that other Asians had done little to support their
efforts to challenge what they perceived as insulting and stereotyping
representations of Islam, and began to identify themselves through their
religious af‹liation rather than their geographical origin. This internal
cultural segmentation not only made it less likely that African, Asian,
and Caribbean communities in Britain would adopt a common politi-
cal identity by the 1990s, but also brought the politics of South Asian
communal boundary policing home to the postcolonial metropolis.86 If
earlier generations of activists were animated by links to anticolonial
nationalist movements around the world, by the late 1980s the exhaus-
tion and corruption of such movements and their displacement by the
insurgent force of religious fundamentalism became evident within
Britain itself. In my chapter on The Satanic Verses, I discuss the novel’s
depiction of the policing of women’s sexuality within these communal
con›icts in South Asia and, increasingly, in Britain. While Rushdie is
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certainly no paragon of feminism, his novel does spotlight the homol-
ogy between control of the Word and control of women that underpins
fundamentalist religious movements of all denominations. As
Rushdie’s work makes clear, transnational movements such as political
Islam are shaped signi‹cantly by their local articulations. Consequently,
this chapter explores the interarticulation of struggles over communal
identity and honor with policies advanced by the British state in the
name of multiculturalism and immigration control during the 1980s. If
Rushdie’s attempt to dismantle both nascent Islamist movements and
the racist British state helped catalyze a lamentably Manichaean culture
war, his project of developing critical voices within the main religious
traditions has been taken up by courageous British-based groups like
Women Against Fundamentalism.
As we have seen, British authorities and opinion-makers have a
long tradition of downplaying racial con›ict and inequalities while
simultaneously pursuing policies that foster such divisive forces. This
remains true in the postracial, multicultural Britain trumpeted by Tony
Blair’s New Labour Party. In my sixth chapter, I discuss the lingering
career of racial difference in Britain through the unlikely lens of Zadie
Smith’s White Teeth. Although this novel was justly celebrated for its
vivacious depiction of the hybrid cultural world of second- and third-
generation, mixed-race British youths, Smith’s novel focuses on the
novel forms of biopower that are the ›ip side of these sunny forms of
cosmopolitanism. Fittingly, Smith’s portrait of colliding multiracial
dynastic families over the last half-century is preoccupied with the his-
tory and contemporary return of eugenics. White Teeth offers a wither-
ingly satirical take on the overweening ambitions of contemporary
genetic engineering as well as the often-dogmatic beliefs of those who
would challenge new forces of biodeterminism. Smith’s work thus high-
lights the extent to which issues of racial difference continue to struc-
ture British identity in this supposedly “postracial” age.
Since the publication of Smith’s debut novel, Tony Blair has led
Britain into a “war on terror” that has seen the revival of many of the
imperial age’s hoary rhetorical chestnuts. Yet Britain’s renewed imper-
ial zeal has not simply surfaced out of the blue. Apologists for “human-
itarian intervention” abroad and the clampdown on civil liberties
within Britain have drawn on racialized discourses of national identity
that did not simply disappear when Britain lost its colonies. As Mongrel
Nation demonstrates, representations of insular and exclusionary
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British identity helped legitimate popular authoritarian ideologies and
practices throughout the period after 1945. Essentialist accounts of
Britishness have been at the bottom of practices as diverse as the infor-
mal “color bar,” racialized immigration policies, and draconian polic-
ing practices. Despite the gradual implementation of antiracist, multi-
cultural state policy, Britain has retained structures of racial inequality
and the popular authoritarian ideologies that legitimated them
throughout the last half-century. Recent celebrations of Britain’s
hybridity tend to highlight the cultural impact of black and Asian
Britons while ignoring the enduring obstacles they face. Indeed, the
effect of racial discourses is evident in the rei‹ed notion of a “clash of
civilizations” to which current leaders have recourse in order to legiti-
mate their policies of imperial invasion and occupation.87
Today, however, there is no neat distinction between the empire
and the “mother country.” The rhetorical convolutions of Tony Blair’s
opposition between “good” British Muslims and the “bad” Muslims of
Al Qaeda are an indication of the dif‹culty of legitimating imperial poli-
cies that results from the mongrelization of Britain. Such facile dis-
courses of assimilation to a homogeneous British national identity have
become increasingly untenable as the inequalities and consequent
con›icts of neoliberal globalization have come home to roost in Britain.
Just as the popular authoritarianism of Britain’s postcolonial period
was consistently criticized, opposed, and, at times, successfully disman-
tled by antiracist activists over the last half-century, so contemporary
opposition to the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq draws on reservoirs
of anticolonial internationalism illuminated by Mongrel Nation.
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1
“In the Big City the Sex Life Gone Wild”
Migration, Gender, and Identity in Sam Selvon’s 
The Lonely Londoners
On a Friday evening in late August 1958, a Swedish woman named
Majbritt Morrison fell into an argument with her Jamaican husband
Raymond as they left the Latimer Road underground station in Lon-
don’s Notting Dale neighborhood.1 People congregated as the Mor-
risons’ dispute grew more heated. The con›ict was suddenly trans-
formed when a man in the crowd began shouting racial slurs at
Raymond Morrison, apparently believing that it was his duty to protect
a white woman from a threatening-looking black man. Majbritt Morri-
son stopped arguing with her husband and began defending him from
this attack, leading some members of the crowd to turn on her, calling
her a “nigger lover.” A group of the Morrisons’ West Indian friends
arrived as the shouting escalated and a ‹ght broke out. Although no
serious injuries resulted from this scuf›e, it was the initial spark in the
‹rst major racial con›agration of postimperial Britain.
The night after the Morrisons’ ‹ght, crowds spilled out of local
pubs in Notting Hill, brimming with beer and antiblack feeling. Spot-
ting Majbritt Morrison on her way home down the high street, a crowd
chased her to her house, volleying taunts of “black man’s trollop!” and
throwing milk bottles. When Morrison stood her ground outside her
house and refused police orders to go inside, she—rather than the
members of the marauding crowd—was arrested. The mob made off
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down the road, smashing windows in a side street and preparing to
attack a house party organized by one of Britain’s ‹rst sound-system
operators, Count Suckle. The police, arriving just in time to stop this
attack, dealt with the con›ict by escorting Count Suckle and his friends
out of the neighborhood. This apparently con‹rmed the impression of
many in the crowd that their actions were helping purge West London
of blacks. Mobs numbering in the hundreds roamed the streets of Not-
ting Hill during the following nights, attacking any West Indians they
could lay their hands on. Despite the eerie calm that reined over the rest
of London during the rioting, groups of primarily young working-class
men ›ooded into the streets of Notting Hill from surrounding parts of
the city and began wreaking havoc. Although a few members of the
white community defended their black neighbors, during the rioting
the majority of the neighborhood’s whites kept a complicit silence as
lynch mobs roamed their streets. Neofascist organizers were quick to
capitalize on this quiescence. Oswald Mosley’s Union Movement circu-
lated lea›ets and held public rallies in the area. The perils of miscegena-
tion featured prominently in the propaganda disseminated by such
groups. For instance, National Labour Party leader John Steel was
quoted as saying: “We will be a nation of half-castes. The result is that
the nation will possess neither the rhythm of the coloured man, nor the
scienti‹c genius of the European. The only thing we will ever produce is
riots, just as do the mixed races of the world.”2
The Notting Hill riots, as this week of violent mayhem came to be
known, were a watershed for Britain. They shattered the long-standing
metropolitan illusion that racial con›ict was un-British. It suddenly
seemed that Britain was destined to face unrest on a scale not so differ-
ent from that experienced by former settler colonies like the United
States and South Africa during the late 1950s. Moreover, the riots estab-
lished some of the fundamental themes of racial antipathy that would
characterize postimperial Britain. The gender of immigrants (until 1955,
85% were male) was a pivotal issue in this regard. As the con›ict over
the Morrisons’ interracial marriage and the propaganda disseminated
by neofascist leaders demonstrates, anger over sexual relations between
black men and white women was a crucial catalyst of the riots. Agitators
such as John Steel played on fears that sex between Englishwomen and
black male immigrants from the Caribbean would create a mongrel
population in Britain. Notwithstanding their formal rights as British
subjects, in other words, black migrants were viewed by the neofascists,
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by many members of the political establishment, and by much of the
populace in general as a threat to racial purity and, consequently, to
national identity.3 White women such as Majbritt Morrison who con-
sorted with black men were likely to be stripped of their racial identity.4
As they had been in Britain’s colonies, black masculinity and sexuality
became the subject of lurid interest and concern during the initial
decade of mass migration from the Commonwealth, with particular
alarm concentrating on the charged erotic relations of black men and
white women.5 The profound anxiety created by the blurring of bound-
aries separating the metropole and the colonies that characterizes
postimperial Britain is, in other words, displayed in particularly stark
form in the arena of sexual relations.
Stereotypical images of black men’s potent sexuality and concerns
about white women’s potential in‹delity to the race-nation had a direct
impact on state policy during this period. The war against Nazism and
fascism, with their overtly biological constructions of racial hierarchy,
had rendered explicit racist appeals illegitimate in post-1948 Britain.
However, notions of sexual conduct helped blur the line between bio-
logical and cultural notions of difference. Parliamentary opponents of
immigration from the Commonwealth nations could avoid overt
racism by alluding to supposedly insuperable cultural differences
between postcolonial subjects and native Britons.6 Hoary stereotypes
dating back to antiquity that represented non-Europeans as given over
to sexual abandon so excessive that it bordered on the bestial permeated
public discourse in surprisingly frank terms. Sexual mores were seen as
a vital index of broader cultural differences, with critics objecting to the
“completely promiscuous method of breeding” that “tropical peoples”
imported into Britain.7 Through this focus on the sexual, the “culture
bar” was substituted for the color bar. In the process, the image of
Britain as an embattled nuclear family replaced that of imperial Britan-
nia as the mother of a geographically dispersed extended family of colo-
nial peoples. Racist violence such as the Notting Hill riots was viewed by
many mainstream commentators and legislators as the logical outcome
of aversion to the foreign cultural practices of colonial subjects.8 The
deplorable racist attacks that took place during the riots could only be
prevented, it was argued, through the diminution of Britain’s black
population. By 1962, when an immigration act that effectively trans-
formed postcolonial migrants into second-class citizens was passed,
such arguments had largely prevailed.
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The evident continuities between colonial and postcolonial subor-
dination in Britain ensured that heterosexual self-assertion was a crucial
component of the immigrant experience for many West Indian men.9
Moreover, Britain offered male migrants occasions to assert their self-
worth in the arms of white women, opportunities for experiences of
sexual and emotional intercourse that were far more severely policed on
colonial terrain. As Frantz Fanon put it, “When my restless hands caress
those white breasts, they grasp white civilization and dignity and make
them mine.”10 This urge to self-realization through sexual entanglement
was particularly strong for Anglophone Caribbean male migrants, who
had been exposed to the powerful assimilatory pedagogy of the British
colonial education system without encountering the full panoply of
racial terror to which African-American men were regularly submit-
ted.11 For Fanon, however, this strategy of revenging oneself on the colo-
nial apparatus through sexual conquest, predicated as it was on the
desire to merge with or at least be validated by whiteness, is animated at
bottom by dependency and deep self-alienation.12 Like many recent
critics of metropolitan racism, however, Fanon largely neglected to con-
sider the impact such attitudes would have on women.13
To what extent is Fanon’s gloomy portrait of mental colonization
borne out by the experience of migrants to Britain? Published contem-
poraneously with Fanon’s work and two years before the Notting Hill
riots, Samuel Selvon’s The Lonely Londoners depicts the ‹rst generation
of overwhelmingly male immigrants from the Caribbean struggling to
cope with the stereotypes and prejudices they encountered in Britain.
Of late, Selvon’s work has been celebrated for its account of West Indian
resiliency within the urban metropolis. Recent critics have argued that
British cultural hegemony was signi‹cantly unsettled and undermined
through the postimperial encounter with migrants from the colonies.14
Selvon’s work is certainly noteworthy for the con‹dence with which it
draws on the creolized forms of Caribbean vernacular culture, calypso
foremost among them. Yet celebratory readings of Selvon’s work in par-
ticular and of the impact of early waves of migration in general tend to
underemphasize the forms of institutional racism and structural exclu-
sion faced by migrants to Britain.15 The Lonely Londoners depicts the
impact not simply of racism in housing and the workplace but of racial
fetishism in the sexual arena. Selvon thereby underlines the damaging
effects of racism on immigrant cultures on both a material and a psy-
chological plane. Moreover, Selvon’s jocular accounts of the escapades
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of “the boys” in the face of such racism encouraged his overwhelmingly
British readership to empathize and even identify with West Indian
people such as those found in The Lonely Londoners. To stress the
hybridizing impact of migration alone is therefore to miss the role of
Selvon’s novel as an intervention in an increasingly racist public sphere
in Britain during the mid-1950s.
In contrast with the relentlessly misogynist writing of the so-called
Angry Young Men, Selvon’s depiction of the pathos of macho values
among the black immigrant community prepares the ground for a cri-
tique of black men’s complicity with structures of patriarchal subordi-
nation in Britain and its colonies.16 As is true at present, popular culture
was the most important site for the articulation of such attitudes.17 After
World War II, calypso music became one of the dominant forms of
popular culture on a global scale, fostering pan-Caribbean exchanges,
rejuvenating the recording industry in both the United States and
Britain, and catalyzing the growth of Hi-Life music in colonial West
Africa. This chapter therefore begins with a discussion of representa-
tions of black male identity in calypso music of the 1940s and 1950s. My
discussion of the speci‹c historical roots of the extravagant braggadocio
of the period challenges pathologizing assumptions of a timeless black
machismo. When calypso artists and their audiences traveled from the
Caribbean to Britain, they brought their attitudes about gender power
with them, values that Sam Selvon represents with great clarity and
pathos in The Lonely Londoners. Selvon’s work foreshadows many sub-
sequent texts that deal with issues of masculinity, sexuality, and identity
fragmentation, including George Lamming’s The Emigrants and The
Pleasures of Exile, Tayeb Salih’s Season of Migration to the North, and
Andrew Salkey’s The Adventures of Catullus Kelley. Through its explo-
ration of racial inequality and gender power, Selvon’s The Lonely Lon-
doners offers a powerful call for an egalitarian and postimperial Britain.
Calypso, Masculinity, and Power
Calypso music has its origins in the stick ‹ghting that accompanied the
canboulay festival in colonial Trinidad. Centering on the ritual burning
of cane ‹elds during the era of plantation slavery, canboulay also
included ‹ghts between rival groups of slaves using long sticks or staves.
These street skirmishes were propelled by secret African martial soci-
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eties as well as by the plantation-based fraternities that succeeded them
following the Middle Passage.18 Indeed, the most frequently cited
derivation for calypso is kaiso, which is in turn a corruption of an
expression of approval similar to “bravo” in the West African Hausa
language.19 Stick ‹ghts were preceded by ritual boasts in which a griot-
like ‹gure called a chantwell taunted members of the opposing band
with stories of his leader’s physical prowess. The ‹ghts themselves were
accompanied by kalindas, bitingly satirical songs sung by the chantwell
and a chorus that belittled their opponents and promoted their own
band. The by turns outrageously boastful and wittily barbed verses of
the kalinda were traditionally composed extempore by the chantwell.
This tradition of improvised bravado and satire remained a core of
calypso music following emancipation in the mid–nineteenth century,
becoming known in Creole as picong, from the French term piquant
(stinging, insulting). The calypso is thus grounded in hyperbolic asser-
tions of masculinity that were forged in the context of the systematic
emasculation administered by the institutions of racial slavery.
After emancipation, calypso songs became an integral component
of the carnival tradition, which consisted of a mas’ band or group of
revelers wearing masquerade costumes. These bands paraded through
the streets accompanied by a chantwell and chorus singing the band’s
praises and mocking rival groups. British colonial authorities, who
repeatedly sought to suppress the Creole institution of carnival during
the second half of the nineteenth century, not surprisingly became the
butt of the chantwells’ satirical verses. Calypso songs increasingly
addressed topical and potentially in›ammatory subjects such as the
dif‹culty of life for the denizens of the urban slums known as barrack
yards. In 1883, for example, the colonial government passed a ban on
drumming, an Afro-Creole practice on which kalinda depended, in an
effort to abolish practices associated with carnival. Kalinda singers sub-
verted this proscription, however, by substituting bamboo instruments
that provided rhythmic accompaniment to the kalinda for traditional
drumming practices. By the end of the nineteenth century, the calypso
tradition had become a central venue for the expression of popular dis-
content with colonial subjugation, often using forms of satire and indi-
rect insult to challenge British cultural and institutional power.
At the same time, calypso songs gained increasing autonomy from
the carnival itself with the establishment of the tent, an informal arena
set up so that a mas’ band could practice its songs prior to the annual
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carnival parades. Just as pioneering ‹gures of the Trinidadian literary
scene such as Alfred Mendes and C. L. R. James began writing about the
barrack yards, calypso singers expanded the topicality of their material
by focusing in more detail on the everyday lives and vicissitudes of the
poor.20 Calypso singers, or calypsonians, were by this time singing
mainly in English, re›ecting the Anglicization of Trinidadian society in
general, although the English spoken in the tents was a highly creolized
form that included many elements of French and West Africa patois.
One of the greatest of these calypsonians, Chieftain Douglas, was also
responsible for the transformation of calypso from impromptu sessions
held in mas’ camp tents to formalized, programmed, and commercially
sponsored events.21 Competition among the calypsonians, deriving
from the days of the chantwells, was institutionalized in 1939, when the
‹rst island-wide Calypso King competition was held. Although the
British colonial population and the small black middle class remained
aloof, French Creole intellectuals began supporting calypso, seeing it as
a genuine expression of indigenous national identity.
The calypso aesthetic saturates The Lonely Londoners.22 Selvon’s
debt to the genre is most evident in the novel’s apparently loose-knit
string of humorous anecdotes depicting the lives of ›amboyant charac-
ters in London’s Caribbean immigrant community.23 To this appropri-
ation of the structure of calypso ballads, Selvon adds adaptation of the
pervasive use of melodrama, satire, and irony that characterized the
calypso tradition. In addition, in The Lonely Londoners Selvon creates a
narrator whose synthetic Creole dialect overcomes the dichotomy
between popular and literary tradition that marked his ‹rst two,
Trinidad-based novels.24 Selvon’s creolized narrative voice and adapta-
tion of the calypso tradition served as a beacon to Caribbean intellectu-
als of the period, many of whom joined Selvon in exile in Britain during
the 1950s.25 If residence in the colonial metropolis magni‹ed the legacy
of cultural schizophrenia bequeathed by colonialism, Selvon’s calypso
aesthetic offered a paradigm for a populist cultural nationalism that res-
onated strongly with the intellectuals of his generation.26 Selvon’s
appropriation of calypso allowed him to commandeer the British novel
and transform it into a vehicle for the expression of postcolonial
Caribbean identity.
While The Lonely Londoners pioneers the creolizing strategies with
which members of the West Indian renaissance of the 1950s and 1960s
reworked the English language and the metropolitan literary tradition,
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it also depicts the mutability of British identity. Selvon’s protagonists
inhabit the capital city, using the famous sites of the metropolis as con-
jure words to de‹ne their upward mobility.27 Britain does not, however,
offer the boundless opportunity that in many cases inspired the immi-
grants’ departure from the Caribbean. Confronted with London’s
numbingly cold winters and the institutional racism of the color bar in
housing and employment, Selvon’s characters band together in the
basement ›at of his protagonist, Moses Aloetta, in order to swap tall
tales of their misadventures in the metropolis. The social solidarity
embodied by the men’s storytelling circle is an important antidote to
the isolation and frequent humiliation they experience in their everyday
lives in Britain. Indeed, Selvon’s characters overcome the petty loyalties
to their natal islands in the Caribbean and to Africa in the name of a
more cosmopolitan sense of diasporic unity forged through the
picaresque tales they tell one another in Moses’ basement. Although
their rambunctious camaraderie cannot be equated with the kind of
political organizing that unfolded following the Notting Hill riots, the
social solidarity depicted in the novel establishes the bonds of trust and
mutuality upon which such organizing would be built in the following
two decades. This small community of men therefore constitutes a kind
of seed or microcosm of the unity developed by black Britons in the face
of racism.
Although The Lonely Londoners celebrates the resiliency of Moses
and his comrades, the novel also lays out the ›aws of a resistant cultural
nationalism grounded in misogynistic, homophobic bonding between
men.28 Confronted by pervasive forms of racist stereotyping and dis-
crimination, the community of male immigrants depicted in the novel
all too often responds with forms of masculine self-aggrandizement that
hinge on the debasement of women, both white and black, as well as on
overt forms of homophobia. Like many other aspects of the novel that
have been celebrated by critics, this re›ex is grounded in the calypso
aesthetic.29 Indeed, there are strong parallels between the braggadocio
of calypso songs of the era and the treatment of women in the novel by
male characters. Selvon’s depiction of masculine bonding, misogyny,
and homophobia in The Lonely Londoners testi‹es to the potent
in›uence of popular traditions such as calypso on the identity of immi-
grants to Britain.
Despite the gradual commercialization of calypso during the early
twentieth century, calypso singers themselves lived precariously in
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Trinidad. Although calypso music was beginning to be recorded, there
was no system of copyright through which calypso artists could gain
royalties for their songs. Lacking access to such revenues, calypsonians’
primary regular source of income was the prize money available during
the annual carnival competitions. However, since the carnival took
place only once a year, calypsonians—an almost exclusively male
group—often relied on female backers of the tent or mas’ band for eco-
nomic support during the rest of the year. They were consequently seen
by much of the conservative Trinidadian middle class as ne’er-do-wells,
despite their ability to articulate social grievances in scurrilously amus-
ing terms. While they were only one component of a notably heteroge-
neous genre, the exaggerated sexual innuendo and rodomontade that
had by this time become a standard part of the calypso repertoire
re›ected these contradictory material and social conditions. Economi-
cally dependent on calypso audiences in general as well as on their girl-
friends, calypsonians relied on their verbal facility and boastful self-
con‹dence to garner the popularity necessary to survive from one
carnival season to the next. Since they tended to be an economic drain
on the women who supported them, calypsonians could seldom depend
on stable or long-term relationships, let alone on marriage, for eco-
nomic and emotional support. The braggadocio of calypso music
papered over the conditions of economic dependency and insecurity to
which the calypsonians were consigned.
If calypsonians tended to cast themselves in in›ated terms in reac-
tion to the damaging psychological residues of plantation slavery and
colonial underdevelopment, they offered no such boon to women in
their songs. Self-in›ating descriptions of masculine sexual superhero-
ism were instead twinned in the calypso music of the ‹rst half of the
century with stinging attacks on women. Calypsonians often sang of
their insatiable sexual appetites, describing the many women they left
prostrate in ecstasy, begging for more or groaning in agony in response
to the powerful lovemaking they had experienced.30 Women were con-
sistently treated solely as sexual objects and denigrated with wittily
cloaked put-downs and punning scatological catalogs of their supposed
physical and hygienic de‹ciencies. If a woman sought to assert herself
by abandoning her philandering boyfriend, she was subjected to harsh
attacks and violent threats for her perceived in‹delity. The calypso song
thus became a way of disciplining women, who feared the opprobrium
that would be brought upon them were they to become the subject of a
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blisteringly satirical attack. Such assaults were seldom challenged by
society at large; as Trinidadian novelist and critic Merle Hodge notes,
“The calypsonian, the folk poet, is assured of heartfelt, howling
approval when he devotes his talent to the degradation of women.”31
Where did this strong streak of misogyny come from? Of course, colo-
nized and enslaved women were, with virtually no exceptions, severely
disadvantaged within their societies prior to the advent of colonial rule
and enslavement.32 Colonial hierarchies impinged on, grew entangled
with, and were to a certain extent transformed by the forms of gender
power they encountered. Yet, while the misogyny evident in preinde-
pendence calypso lyrics may have re›ected interlocking traditions of
male gender power, the phallic self-assertion of the calypsonians was a
painfully ironic re›ection of their acceptance of white supremacist rep-
resentations of their economic and social castration.33 The extravagant
sexual machismo of the calypsonians can thus be seen as a form of com-
pensatory disavowal. Once dominant notions of castration had been
accepted, male potency tended to be asserted through anxiety-ridden
and excessive demonstrations of mastery over black women.
Far from being simply heterosexist, however, Selvon’s The Lonely
Londoners offers an explicit and prescient critique of these modes of
black male style and the cultural nationalism they embody. Selvon
engages in this critique by rendering the forms of objecti‹cation and
fetishization that attended black male immigrants’ sexual relations with
white English women far more explicit than in calypso music of the
time. Sexual relations, often represented as a form of aggressive con-
quest, are nevertheless accompanied in the novel by a sense of ambiva-
lence and defensiveness. In addition, The Lonely Londoners also stresses
the hollow character of the sexual adventurism of “the boys,” suggesting
that their triumphs in the bedroom fail to create truly egalitarian and
postimperial relations among the novel’s characters. Instead of disman-
tling colonial power relations, that is, the boys’ conquests simply invert
those relations through the creation of gender hierarchy. Black male
self-assertion ends up mirroring the forms of violence that characterize
white supremacist patriarchy. To drive this critique home, Selvon’s
novel documents instances of domestic violence within the black com-
munity and offers an example of a strong black woman who challenges
such forms of abuse.
The ballad of Cap, a dissolute Nigerian native who spends his nights
partying and his days sleeping, illustrates many of these themes. Cap is
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an unrepentant freeloader, a man who hoodwinks a string of European
women into supporting him using his personal charm and the women’s
stereotypical notions of black masculinity. Moses’ grudging admiration
for Cap stems from the fact that he is able to thrive without submitting
himself to the disciplined workday of industrial capitalism. As a kind of
sexual con man and trickster, he rejects the dehumanizing routine of
manual labor, offering the spectacle of seemingly endless leisure to a
man like Moses, who, despite working for nearly a decade in Britain, has
little to show for his labors.34 It is no coincidence that Cap’s ballad is
immediately preceded by Moses’ visit with the recently arrived Galahad
to the employment of‹ce. Like the vast majority of immigrants from the
Caribbean, Galahad is a skilled worker, yet the employment of‹ce has
nothing to offer him.35 Instead, he is banished to an adjoining building
to register for unemployment insurance. This place is a devastating
reminder of the vulnerability of Caribbean men to the whims of British
employers. Black workers were consistently downgraded and deskilled
following their arrival in Britain. In addition, British labor unions were
uniformly hostile toward black workers, despite the rhetoric of work-
ing-class solidarity articulated by national union leaders. Black workers
tended to be accused of undermining the unions’ closed shop policy
and of helping employers break strikes by working as “black legs.”36 The
sense of identity and stability guaranteed by a good job was conse-
quently denied to many migrants.37 As Moses comments when he and
Galahad stand surveying the depressing spectacle in the National Assis-
tance of‹ce, “When a man out of work he like a ‹sh out of water gasp-
ing for breath” (45). Adding to this prejudice in the private and union
sectors, the state itself often railroaded black workers into the least
desirable jobs. As Galahad’s application is processed, Moses reveals that
his colonial origin will be noted in red ink on top of the form. This is to
save time, Moses says, so employers who don’t want black men working
for them won’t be bothered with job applicants from the Caribbean.
This apparent lack of anger at the exclusion of blacks from all but the
least desirable jobs is quali‹ed by Moses’ revelation that most of the job
announcements were stripped from the walls after a Jamaican man tore
up the of‹ce in a ‹t of rage (46). If working-class men’s identity was
often intimately tied to their pride in manual labor, employment condi-
tions in Britain systematically undermined black men’s sense of self-
worth, leading to levels of despair and incandescent anger that The
Lonely Londoners communicates despite its overriding comic tone.38
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Cap’s ›agrant sexual opportunism thus needs to be seen within the
context of the systematic humiliation meted out to migrants in the
workplace and elsewhere.39 His ability to survive without wages offers a
striking challenge to racism in the workplace, not to mention the
diverse other forms of prejudice previously anatomized by Moses. Yet
Cap’s life of apparent leisure is the product of strenuous, increasingly
desperate hustling. A promising son of the educated Nigerian elite, Cap
drops out of law school in London in order to devote all of his attention
to the seduction of English women. After his father cuts him off, Cap
lives a totally unstable, itinerant life, dodging from one hotel room to
another using his ability to con people into believing that he is the rep-
utable student he once was. Moses calls him “the wandering Nigerian.”
This nomadic life cuts Cap adrift from the network of black friends he
initially made in London. As a result, he comes to depend increasingly
on the women he seduces.
Why is Cap so consumed by sexual desire? As Moses describes his
antics, Cap is driven not simply by physical need, much less by a han-
kering for genuine intimacy and mutuality. Instead, Cap achieves a
symbolic victory over colonial racial subordination by making his girl-
friends dependent on him. His Austrian girlfriend sells off most of her
material possessions, for instance, in order to support Cap. She also
puts up with his blatant, chronic in‹delity. Cap has evidently decided
that the arms of a white woman offer a far more immediate form of
grati‹cation than laborious and protracted legal studies. Yet this con-
quest of European femininity fails to confer any sense of self-worth on
Cap.40 Instead, Cap’s sexual drive becomes increasingly compulsive as
he wears out his sole suit of clothes, loses his friends, and leaves the life
of bourgeois respectability he came to London to achieve further and
further behind. When his Austrian girlfriend eventually tires of his par-
asitism and pushes him to get a job, for example, Cap pretends to have
found work but actually goes off hustling other women when he’s sup-
posed to be at work (53).41 He eventually dumps this Austrian for a
French girl, whom he marries and then abandons since he has no place
to take her on their wedding night. When his friend Daniel—whose
address Cap has given the girl—‹nds Cap, he is paralyzed. Although
Moses describes Cap as a kind of hapless, comic trickster ‹gure, his
compulsive sexual drive nevertheless indicates the dire need Cap feels to
af‹rm his sense of manhood through predatory sexual relations.42 Sit-
ting in the café trying to hustle women, Cap suffers through a dissocia-
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tion of sensibility that allows him to forget the new bride who waits for
him at Daniel’s apartment completely. Like Galahad, Cap’s psyche
becomes fragmented, his past split off from his present as he strives
repeatedly and obsessively to ‹nd new sexual partners. Of course, the
women he seduces are nothing more than objects in the service of his
quest for fresh ›esh, a status that the novel underlines through its fre-
quent references to women as “things” and as “cat.” Yet in seeking vali-
dation through European women, Cap ironically places himself in a
position of dependency. Each new sexual conquest holds out a promise
of af‹rmation that is necessarily withdrawn continually since such vali-
dation is premised on Cap’s self-alienation in the ‹rst place. Cap’s com-
pulsive hustling may free him from the deadening routines of the work-
day and may represent a super‹cial conquest of white femininity, but,
as Moses’ account makes clear, it does not constitute a triumph over
racialized dependency, still less a rejection of gender hierarchy.
Cap is hardly alone in his search for sexual grati‹cation. Admit-
tedly, none of Selvon’s characters ever articulate a conception of sexual
relations as a form of revenge on a par with Eldridge Cleaver’s theory of
the political use of rape. Nonetheless, for virtually all the characters, the
seduction of European women offers an implicit reclamation of their
masculinity, belittled in so many other ways in Britain. Indeed, the
majority of the ballads that compose the novel detail the misadventures
of Moses and his friends as they search for the “bags of white pussy”
they imagine the metropolis offers. Yet by choosing sex as one of their
primary means of self-assertion, the characters conform to stereotypical
representations imposed on colonized men by Europeans across the
centuries. As many theorists of colonial discourse have emphasized, in
the “porno-tropics” of empire, black men were represented with dra-
matically exaggerated phalluses that reduced black masculinity to the
level of the genital.43 Such representations were marked by deep
ambivalence and splitting. On the one hand, the supposed phallic
power of black men produced dramatic levels of anxiety that were often
at the root of campaigns of white terror such as lynching. The specter of
miscegenation, stemming in colonial contexts from fears over the loss
of control of property and labor, produced anxiety-‹lled, vituperative
discourses concerning the mutual attraction of black men and white
women. On the other hand, the reduction of black men to sexual
fetishes placed them in the passive position of the sex object.44 Colonial
and racist discourses, in other words, rendered black men as both
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hypermasculine and feminine at one and the same time. According to
Fanon’s nuanced historical materialist analysis of the dependency com-
plex, the chronic ambivalence of these dominant discourses left black
men in constant combat with their own self-images.
These ambivalent discourses concerning black masculinity had a
dramatic impact on race relations during the early years of migration to
Britain, as the sexual escapades of Selvon’s characters underline.
Recounting his sexual adventures in London, for instance, Moses
remarks:
In the big city the sex life gone wild you would meet women who
beg you to go with them one night a Jamaican with a woman in
Chelsea in a smart ›at with all sorts of surrealistic painting on the
walls and contemporary furniture in the G-plan the poor fellar
bewildered and asking questions to improve himself because the
set-up look like the World of Art but the number not interested in
passing on any knowledge she only interested in one thing and in
the heat of emotion she call the Jamaican a black bastard though she
didn’t mean it as an insult but as a compliment under the circum-
stances but the Jamaican fellar get vex and he stop and say why the
hell you call me a black bastard and he thump the woman and went
away. (109)
The Jamaican man described by Moses confronts objecti‹cation at the
hands of a wealthy British woman. As Moses notes, the white woman’s
avant-garde artistic inclinations ironically make her particularly prone
to indulge in fetishizing fantasies concerning black masculinity.45
Despite her passing enthusiasm for her lover, this woman is thoroughly
complicit with subordinating discourses of racial difference.46 Indeed,
as Moses’ narrative suggests, there is little chance that the Jamaican will
be able to parlay his treatment as a sexual fetish into class mobility or
even the acquisition of cultural knowledge. Instead, he is reduced to the
level of the genital in an exchange that is, ultimately, emasculating. This
objecti‹cation elicits a particularly violent reaction not simply because
it participates in the racism so evident in other quarters of British soci-
ety. In addition, the Jamaican ‹nds himself placed in precisely the posi-
tion that so many of Selvon’s migrants attempt to vacate. By reducing
women through slang terms such as cat and thing to their sexual organs,
Moses and company treat them not just as objects of exchange between
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competing, racialized patriarchies but as split-off, butchered aspects of
themselves. Women become the receptacles of disavowed aspects of the
men’s femininity in forms of gender power intimately tied to racial
hierarchy.47 When women such as the wealthy artist described above
treat Moses and his friends purely as sex objects, they undo this dis-
avowal, forcing the men to confront their emasculated status in the
most immediate terms. Expanding on this theme, The Lonely Londoners
also depicts encounters between Cap and a transvestite (56) and
between Moses and a gay man (107–8). Despite being treated in comic
terms, both these encounters threaten to unman Moses and Cap by
interrupting the position of masculine dominance that they struggle to
establish in London. There are certainly signi‹cant differences between
Moses, Cap, and the other characters, with Cap demonstrating the limit
case for the instrumental treatment of women. However, when Moses
and his friends perceive themselves as passive and feminized sexual
objects as a result of racial fetishism, their response is typically articu-
lated through strong compensatory assertions of their masculinity.
Alternative Discourses of Gender and Race
The late 1950s and early 1960s were an era of rampant male insecurity in
Britain. The established Left dealt with its historical setbacks through
the ›agrant misogyny evident in works such as John Osborne’s play
Look Back in Anger. The behavior of characters such as Cap is not so
extraordinary when juxtaposed with works such as Alan Sillitoe’s Satur-
day Night and Sunday Morning, with its philandering young protago-
nist. Although this kind of behavior was celebrated in calypso songs
composed in Britain such as Lord Kitchener’s hit “Nora,” this was not
the only model of male behavior available. Traveling with Lord Kitch-
ener to Britain aboard the Empire Windrush, Lord Beginner also
recorded songs inspired by the taboo topic of interracial relations. Lord
Beginner, a member of the so-called Old Guard, often took interna-
tional events as a subject of his songs, as his song “Mix Up Matrimony”
demonstrates:
Racial segregation gone to hell,
They happenin’ nowadays I can tell
Mixed marriage seems to have a stronger tide than the pure one
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For I don’t know why
The races are blendin’ harmoniously
White and coloured people are binding neutrally
It doesn’t take no class to see how it come to pass
Coloured Britons are risin’ fast
(Chorus)
The organs are always playing
And the preachers are saying:
“Please cooperate and amalgamate”
Oh some are seeing well and the others catchin’ hell
“Please cooperate and amalgamate”
The great part that Seretse Khama played
We appreciate the move that he made
The Bangamwato tribe he always thinking of
He lost his throne for the girl that he love
For he knew that a good wife today is hard to ‹nd
So he ‹nd one so he had to treat her kind
So if you’re in your prime run to the preacher any time
For your love it is not a crime.48
Lord Beginner’s song demonstrates the resonance of events in Africa for
members of the diaspora resident in Britain, even after the departure of
important anticolonial nationalists such as Jomo Kenyatta, Kwame
Nkrumah, and C. L. R. James.49 In 1948, the heir to the Bamangwato
throne in Botswana, Seretse Khama, married a white Englishwoman
named Ruth Williams while completing his studies in London.50
Khama’s unorthodox marriage threatened his succession to the throne
and generated an international diplomatic crisis. Khama’s uncle and
guardian, Tshekedi, declared the marriage a breach of Bamangwato cus-
tom and, along with other in›uential elders who feared the tainting of
bloodlines and potential erosion of territorial sovereignty, threatened to
disinherit Seretse. When the Bamangwato nevertheless granted Seretse
the chieftaincy in 1949, Tshekedi led a group of dissenters into voluntary
exile. The British government, anxious not to alienate South Africa’s
recently elected apartheid regime, from whom it wished to purchase
uranium for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, sided with Tshekedi
and banished Seretse and his wife. The diplomatic storm that erupted
over Seretse’s marriage nearly brought down the British government at
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the time, but was ultimately resolved in the name of personal love
instead of ethnically pure succession.
“Mix Up Marriage” suggests that Seretse’s ultimate triumph res-
onated powerfully with some members of the diasporic community in
Britain. Defying not only the customs of his own people but also the
forms of racial segregation being installed in South Africa at the time,
Seretse offered a model of individual devotion rising above the in›exi-
ble and exclusionary dictates of blood, belonging, and bureaucracy.
This is not to say that the issue of dependency was not a factor in
Seretse’s marriage, but rather that Lord Beginner chooses to emphasize
Seretse’s courage and devotion to his wife rather than the Manichaean
vision of racialized sexual relations presented by other calypsonians in
Britain. Indeed, “Mix Up Matrimony” extrapolates from the Khama
affair to cast mixed-race relationships as a form of antiracist activism.
Yet, although Lord Beginner’s song stresses the liberty to choose a
romantic partner exempli‹ed by Seretse Khama and experienced to a
certain extent by black men in Britain during the early and middle
1950s, the song cannot fully escape the issue of gendered power rela-
tions. If, in the utopian rhetoric of the song, “white and coloured people
are binding neutrally,” such relations constitute a form of upward
mobility for black men in Britain, who consequently “are risin’ fast.”
This reference to what Fanon called “lacti‹cation” inevitably raises con-
cerns about the injunction to “cooperate and amalgamate.” Is this a
form of racial suicide? Does the song, with its belief in the racial good-
will of the established church, not re›ect the naive faith of colonials in
the “mother country?” While these concerns are subordinated to the
song’s message of free choice and refusal of ethnic essentialism, ques-
tions of assimilation and identity nevertheless lie not very deep below
the surface of Lord Beginner’s song.
Unlike Lord Beginner’s work, Selvon’s The Lonely Londoners con-
tains not one example of an interracial couple able to overcome the bar-
riers introduced by the combination of gender power and racial hierar-
chy. For Selvon, discourses of difference apparently seemed insuperable
during the 1950s. Even Galahad, whose name connotes sexual purity,
describes his encounter with a white girlfriend using the violent, domi-
nating metaphor of a “battle royal” (93). The equation of domination
and sexuality is most evident, however, not in relation to white women
such as Galahad’s girlfriend but in relation to black women. If white
women offer an ambivalently regarded avenue to assimilation or
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revenge on British society for its racial discrimination, black women’s
sexuality is openly perceived as a threat in Selvon’s text. Not only can
black women potentially cuckold their partners, but their sexual
agency can also rupture the binary oppositions that are integral to
racial antagonism and the exclusionary dynamics of ethnic solidarity.51
Although very few black women are represented in Selvon’s novel,
when they do appear, their sexuality is a pivotal issue and is closely
policed. The novel thus demonstrates the extent to which incipient
black male nationalism reproduces the violent gestures of white
supremacist patriarchy.
The ballad of Lewis is crucial in this regard. Rather than simply act-
ing as narrator for this ballad, Moses takes an active hand by persuading
his gullible friend Lewis that women in London habitually engage in
adulterous trysts while their husbands are at work (68). Lewis responds
by going home and beating up his wife, Agnes. Each time Moses equates
the cosmopolitan life of the metropolis with women’s sexual in‹delity,
Lewis resorts to unprovoked domestic violence. When Lewis eventually
asks Moses whether he’s doing the right thing, Moses replies that he
never claimed that Agnes was herself engaging in this kind of behavior.
“Women in this country are not like Jamaica, you know,” Moses
announces, “they have rights over here, and they always shouting for
something” (69). Moses thus seems to spur Lewis to gratuitous violence
solely in order to gull his friend, perhaps teaching him not to be so
trusting, and consequently passive and effeminate, in the future. Yet
this ugly incident of masculine assertion allows Selvon to demonstrate
women’s solidarity in the face of domestic violence. Tolroy’s aunt,
Tanty, who appears to be completely naive during the Waterloo Station
scene at the beginning of the novel, intervenes repeatedly on behalf of
Agnes, offering her shelter after she’s been attacked by Lewis, encourag-
ing her to leave him after his unwarranted beatings, and ultimately
advising her to bring him up on charges of assault. As far as she is con-
cerned, Tanty says, legal action is the only measure that will make Lewis
stop his abusive behavior (72). Tanty’s advise to Agnes is particularly
signi‹cant since black women in Britain have often been told to keep
quiet about their personal affairs and accept domestic violence in the
name of family and community unity in a racist milieu. By using the
British legal system against such abuse, Tanty suggests that challenging
patriarchal violence, rather than undermining solidarity, is an integral
aspect of defending the black community.52
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Conclusion
The Notting Hill riots of 1958 offer a now nearly forgotten ›ash point
that illuminates the birth of modern British racism. During the ten
years that preceded the riots, colonial discourses of racial difference had
been redeployed and ‹ne-tuned in the metropolis, establishing the
foundation for manifestations of British racism to this day.53 In his
account of the riots in Absolute Beginners, Colin MacInnes creates a
‹ctional editorial that typi‹es this redeployment of racist discourse.
Although the editorial, written by a toffee-nosed journalist who snubs
the working-class narrator earlier in the novel, begins with complaints
against black immigrants who scrounge off National Assistance, it
clinches its case through an argument that highlights the centrality of
sexuality to racial discourse:
Then there was the question of women (Old Amberly certainly
went to town on this woman question!) To begin with, he said,
mixed marriages—as responsible coloured persons would be the
very ‹rst to agree themselves—were most undesirable. They led to a
mongrel race, inferior physically and mentally, and rejected by both
of the unadulterated communities. . . . The well-known propensity
and predilection of coloured males for securing intimate relations
with white women—unfortunately, by now, a generally observed
phenomenon in countries where the opportunities existed—led to
serious friction between the immigrants and the men of stock so
coveted, whose natural—and, he would add—sound and proper
instinct, was to protect their women-folk from this contamination,
even if this led to violence which, in normal circumstances, all
would ‹nd most regrettable. But this was not all: it was time for
plain speaking, and this had to be said. The record of the courts had
shown—let alone the personal observations of any attentive and
anxious observer—that living off the immoral earnings of white
prostitutes, had now become all too prevalent among the immi-
grant community.54
Written in response to rioting in Nottingham, Amberly Drove’s editor-
ial is clearly part of a groundswell of racism that led one week later to the
Notting Hill riots in London. The key ingredient of such racial dis-
courses was the representation of black men as an internal threat whose
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sexual liaisons with white women promised to make Britain a mongre-
lized nation. Black men were not simply reduced to the realm of the
physical but were explicitly associated with contamination. By suggest-
ing that black men are not simply responsible for miscegenation but
also for the pimping out of white women, Drove’s editorial adapts par-
adigmatically colonial discourses concerning racial purity to a urban,
working-class, metropolitan context. Two years prior to the Notting
Hill riots, the Suez Crisis had signaled the de‹nitive de›ation of
Britain’s pretense to postwar imperial stature by the new global hege-
mon, the United States. When the riots tore apart the working-class
zones of West London, the colonial chickens ‹nally came home to roost
in Britain.
The riots had a galvanizing impact on Britain’s black community.
The vague sense of futility and despondency with which Selvon closes
The Lonely Londoners was transformed by crowds of marauding white
youths. During the riots, informal neighborhood groups such as the
clutch of men who gather to “coast lime” in Moses’ basement were gal-
vanized to form self-defense organizations. The turning point in the
riots occurred when a group of West Indian men and women, orga-
nized by Frances Ezzrecco, Michael de Freitas, and Frank Critchlow,
burst out of a building under siege wielding improvised weapons such
as knives and Molotov cocktails and chased off the marauding white
crowd. This counterattack, which took place on the fourth day of riot-
ing, ‹nally pushed the police to take a more active role in suppressing
the lynch mobs that had previously roamed the neighborhood virtually
unmolested.55
In addition to challenging the tacit acquiescence of the police, the
successful self-defense effort led by Ezzrecco, de Freitas, and Critchlow
underlined the need for new forms of autonomous organizing within
the black community. In his account of the riots, George Lamming
states: “The West Indian, until then, had an implicit faith in the Law,
and some ancient certainty that the police would be on his side. Where
the Law was concerned, the West Indian was colour blind. . . . I recall a
feeling of utter stupefaction; for I had argued in America—a year
before—that it was dif‹cult to draw parallels in spite of prejudice, for
Georgia or Alabama just could not happen anywhere in England.”56 The
naive trust in the justice of British law that the Caribbean community
harbored was shattered by the riots of 1958. This led to a renaissance of
political organizing after the hiatus following the departure of anticolo-
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nial activists such as C. L. R. James and George Padmore after World
War II. Frances Ezzrecco and Michael de Freitas formed the Coloured
People’s Progressive Association and went on to be two of the most
important exponents of black nationalism in Britain during the 1960s.
Claudia Jones, the Caribbean-born radical who arrived in Britain after
being deported from the United States for her activities on behalf of the
Communist Party, used the recently founded monthly West Indian
Gazette as a mouthpiece for these organizations. Faced with the failure
of Britain’s liberal establishment to condemn and defend them from
racism, black communities began questioning their allegiance to the
“mother country.” Their faith in British justice sorely tried by the con-
duct of the police, magistrates, and government during the Notting Hill
riots, black activists and intellectuals turned away from the project of
assimilation and began the search for forms of commonality that came
to be known as Black Power.57 Self-defense and pride in black culture
were thus intimately connected. The Notting Hill carnival, founded by
Claudia Jones in the months following the riots of 1958, exempli‹es this
blend of autonomous cultural and political organizing.
The Lonely Londoners is an important document of immigrant life
in Britain prior to the galvanizing events of 1958. Selvon’s novel contains
an exhaustive catalog of the forms of discrimination endured by
Caribbean migrants as they sought housing and employment in Britain.
Perhaps more signi‹cantly, however, The Lonely Londoners also docu-
ments the impact of racist discourse on migrants’ attitudes toward the
“mother country.” Arriving in Britain ‹lled with illusions about gaining
access to metropolitan capital and culture, migrants quickly found that
discourses of colonial difference had not disappeared, as the rhetoric of
British “fair play” suggested they would. This process of disillusionment
was nowhere more apparent than in the charged arena of sexual rela-
tions. The Lonely Londoners suggests that success in the metropolis was
signi‹ed for many of the predominantly male migrants during the ‹rst
decade of mass immigration from the Caribbean to Britain by sexual
conquest. Drawing brilliantly on the calypso tradition, Selvon’s novel
sets out a series of ballads that depict the picaresque adventures of “the
boys” as they attempt to conquer white womanhood. Although the
novel does not offer a substantial account of working-class white
women’s subjectivity, it does document the travails of their black male
lovers. For the men Selvon depicts, sexual conquest was the paradig-
matic way of asserting their masculinity in the face of the myriad forms
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of humiliation and alienation meted out by racist discourses and insti-
tutions in Britain. Moreover, accounts of their sexual adventures with
white women were an important vehicle for male bonding. Moses’ nar-
rative is, in fact, an extended example of the kinds of calypso-in›uenced
ballads exchanged among “the boys,” who meet in his basement and
attempt to stave off the chill of London’s weather and social conditions
through amusing stories.
Like many calypso singers, most of Selvon’s male characters
approach sexual relations as a form of anticolonial struggle. Cap, Gala-
had, and Moses thus see white women as symbolic embodiments of
dominant European culture. By gaining mastery over white women,
Selvon’s characters strive to overcome the forms of racist denigration
they experience in everyday life in the metropolis. These conquests are
necessarily marked by ambivalence and anxiety. By choosing the terrain
of sexuality on which to assert themselves, the characters of The Lonely
Londoners often fall victim to the very objectifying and emasculating
discourses that they seek to invert. In addition, all too often their sexual
adventures reproduce hegemonic patriarchal masculinity. The implica-
tions of this ultimately misogynistic strategy become most clear when
the binary relations of black men and white women are interrupted
through the presence of black women. Although Selvon’s novel is a pro-
foundly androcentric text, it does gesture toward the destructive impact
of patriarchal violence within the black community. As a result, while
documenting forms of alienation that characterize the period before the
advent of Black Power, The Lonely Londoners also suggests the impor-
tance of challenging hegemonic gender roles within the nascent
autonomous black public sphere.
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Black Power in a Transnational Frame
Radical Populism and the Caribbean Artists Movement
After taking the stage at the Round House in North London,
Stokely Carmichael (aka Kwame Ture) asked the audience to rise and
remain silent for a moment in memory of John Coltrane, who had died
the previous day.1 Into the silence created by this commemoration of
the great jazz musician and “cultural warrior,” Carmichael proceeded
to pour words more combustible than gasoline. The “Congress on the
Dialectics of Liberation” whose stage he occupied had, according to the
Trinidad-born leader of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Com-
mittee (SNCC), little relevance either for black struggle in the United
States or for the oppressed masses around the world with which the
movement identi‹ed. How could a conference organized around the
notion of individual alienation, Carmichael asked, shed any light on the
circumstances of black people, who are exploited and despised as a
class?2 Convened in July 1967 by a group of radical psychiatrists that
included R. D. Laing, the “Congress on the Dialectics of Liberation”
aimed to link “the internalized violence said to be characteristic of psy-
chotic mental illness with the mentality which fuelled the US war in
Vietnam.”3 The congress, in other words, was intended to extend the
New Left’s exploration of the cultural components of hegemony in late
capitalism, and featured, among others, Frankfurt School luminary
Herbert Marcuse discoursing on the manufacturing of ersatz needs in
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the consumer society.4 By reducing oppression to a purely psychologi-
cal level, however, the congress organizers unwittingly directed atten-
tion away from the institutional character of racial inequality and impe-
rialism. Carmichael, one of the only black people invited to attend the
congress, offered a blunt reminder of the parochial character of the
British Left at a time when, with the Vietnam War heating up and the
U.S. ghettos on ‹re, questions of international solidarity should have
been paramount.5
For the members of Britain’s black community in attendance at the
congress, Carmichael’s words were electrifying. Barbadian-born poet
and historian Edward Kamau Brathwaite later wrote that the speech was
one of the most important moments of the decade. For Brathwaite,
Carmichael’s words “magnetized a whole set of splintered feelings that
had for a long time been seeking a node.”6 Carmichael’s speech, that is,
transformed the isolation experienced by intellectuals such as Brath-
waite by limning the material and cultural connections between mem-
bers of the black diaspora and the colonized peoples of the Third World.
According to Brathwaite, Carmichael “enunciated a way of seeing the
Black West Indian that seemed to many to make sense of the entire his-
tory of slavery and colonial suppression, of the African diaspora in the
New World.”7 Like previous Pan-Africanist activists, Stokely
Carmichael offered his audience a transnational perspective that trans-
formed them from an isolated and outnumbered national minority to
an integral part of a militant global majority. For Brathwaite, this unify-
ing perspective meant not only that “a Black international was possi-
ble,” but also that “links of sympathy . . . were set up between laboring
immigrant, artist/intellectual, and student.”8 Black Power thus over-
came the alienation of displaced West Indian writers such as Brathwaite
by simultaneously reviving a heritage of transnational solidarity and by
grounding intellectuals in the rich cultural traditions of communities
throughout the black diaspora.9
The resonance of Stokely Carmichael’s black nationalism suggests
that a transatlantic convergence of diasporic politics and culture took
place during the late 1960s.10 Elective af‹nities that developed between
diasporic communities during this period, however, were signi‹cantly
different from the idealist return to African roots that characterized
previous waves of Pan-African mobilization.11 While these af‹nities
were elicited by a common experience of racial slavery and capitalism
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that linked the continents abutting the black Atlantic, there were
speci‹c historical and material conditions that stimulated black nation-
alism’s transatlantic resonance during this period. The Black Power
movement has commonly been represented as arising in the United
States during the late 1960s with a revolt against the implicit self-abne-
gation that oriented the integrationist leadership of the civil rights
movement.12 Militant leaders such as Carmichael and, most famously,
Malcolm X, refused to surrender their own cultural traditions in order
to gain admission to the strati‹ed class society of the U.S. mainstream.
Instead, they insisted on their prerogative to power on their own terms.
This demand was truly threatening, for it promised to transform U.S.
culture on a fundamental level, as the integrationist tenets of the civil
rights movement never had.
In Britain, by contrast, there was no signi‹cant national civil rights
movement by the late 1960s.13 In addition, while Britain lacked the tra-
dition of pervasive racial terror that characterized the United States,
during the course of imperial expansion it had developed a potent ped-
agogical apparatus in the colonies that emphasized the bene‹ts of cul-
tural assimilation for the colonized.14 When members of the Common-
wealth nations migrated to Britain, however, they quickly found that
the notions of British fair play they’d absorbed from the colonial educa-
tion apparatus were pure ‹ction. In addition to experiencing institu-
tional racism in housing, employment, and education, black immi-
grants also witnessed the passage of a series of patently racist
immigration laws in the course of the 1960s that dramatically under-
mined the mythical notion of universal British subjecthood. In one
watershed decade, Britain thus moved from putatively accepting post-
colonial immigrants with open arms to codifying explicitly biased laws
designed to exclude all nonwhite British citizens from residence in the
“motherland.”
Shorn of their illusions by dint of bitter experience in the postimpe-
rial metropolis, black Britons were primed for Stokely Carmichael’s
militant insistence on self-de‹nition and transnational black solidarity.
Yet Carmichael’s message of black autonomy was contradicted, to a cer-
tain extent, by the “telescope effect,” which led many black Britons to
look to the antiracist movement in the United States as a vanguard.15
The role of the U.S. struggle as a model is made particularly apparent by
the strong impact of visits to Britain by American leaders such as Dr.
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Martin Luther King Jr., Malcolm X, and Carmichael, each of whom
stimulated signi‹cant institutional and ideological transformation in
the movement for racial equality in Britain. If, as Carmichael empha-
sized, cultural autonomy was key to political self-reliance, surely this
ideal should militate against dependence on other black nationalisms as
much as it applied to mimicry of white culture. In fact, the cultural tra-
ditions of black Britons differed signi‹cantly from those of African-
Americans, despite the common matrix of racial oppression out of
which cultures of solidarity sprang in the Black Power era. As a result,
the political culture of Black Power was articulated along parallel but
signi‹cantly different lines in Britain and the United States.16 To put it
another way, while important transatlantic convergences took place
under the aegis of Black Power during the late 1960s and early 1970s,
these forms of solidarity were not simply examples of cultural and polit-
ical mimicry, but rather instances of what Edward Kamau Brathwaite at
the time called inter/culturation—“unplanned, unstructured but
osmotic relations” that transformed the putatively authentic and
autonomous signs of transnational black cultural solidarity based on
local needs and cultures.17
Stokely Carmichael’s visit to Britain provides a clear example of
such local appropriation of Black Power discourse. Although the
absence of a signi‹cant British civil rights movement helped generate
radical, nonintegrationist sentiment at the grass roots, the speci‹c char-
acter of Britain’s “colonization in reverse” after 1948 shaped the charac-
ter of this militancy, as Carmichael was to ‹nd out. Before delivering his
speech at the congress, Carmichael was introduced to Michael Abdul
Malik, a fellow Trinidadian and founder of the Racial Adjustment
Action Society (RAAS), Britain’s ‹rst Black Power organization. Abdul
Malik, popularly known as Michael X since becoming a con‹dant of
Malcolm X during the latter’s visit to Britain in 1965, was, like his men-
tor, an ex-hustler and consequently knew the British ghettos inti-
mately.18 As Michael X escorted him around impoverished black com-
munities, Carmichael was surprised to ‹nd that British Asians were just
as galvanized by the Black Power movement as members of the African
diaspora. Increasingly subject to violent attacks by members of the neo-
fascist National Front, second-generation Asian youths, Michael X
explained, were highly receptive to the Black Power message of self-
defense. The recent visit of Muhammad Ali, who had heroically refused
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to enlist for service in Vietnam, had made a particularly strong impres-
sion on Pakistani youths, according to Carmichael: “Here comes the
heavyweight champion of all the world, Black, sassy, and lo and behold,
a Muslim, like them, and royally kicking white butt all over the place.”19
Britain’s Black Power movement, then, although seemingly riding
the coattails of developments in the United States, had a far more
cross-cultural character at the grass roots than did its American coun-
terpart. As Michael X explained to Stokely Carmichael, British racism
was at no pains to distinguish between different immigrant groups,
and, consequently, antiracism was developing along lines of multicul-
tural solidarity rather than reactive ethnic speci‹city, as it tended to do
in the United States.20 In addition, since Britain’s immigrant popula-
tion was separated by no more than one generation from the experi-
ence of colonial domination, the anticolonial rhetoric that was such an
integral aspect of Black Power’s model of convergence had particular
relevance in Britain. Indeed, struggles for independence, federation,
and Black Power in the West Indies and elsewhere had an impact on
the black community in Britain analogous to that of the Vietnam War
in the United States. Of course, Britain’s nonwhite population was
numerically much smaller than that of the United States, and the con-
vulsions caused in the body politic by antiracist mobilization were cor-
respondingly less intense.21 Yet, despite its limitations, the Black Power
movement in Britain offers a particularly powerful instance of dias-
poric internationalism as a result of the black community’s relatively
direct connections to antiracist and anticolonial movements in the
United States, the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia.
Stokely Carmichael tapped these speci‹cally black British reservoirs
of anti-imperial sentiment during his blistering speech at the “Congress
on the Dialectics of Liberation.” Drawing on his youth in Trinidad,
Carmichael recounted his experience of being forced to recite Rudyard
Kipling’s “The White Man’s Burden” in school. His main memory of
this experience, Carmichael explained to his audience, was wishing that
the white man would simply leave him the hell alone.22 If, as this anec-
dote suggests, the struggle for cultural integrity was a primary compo-
nent of the Black Power movement, the lineaments of that autonomous
culture were shaped by the particular processes of interculturation that
took place in speci‹c nodes of the black Atlantic. In the Caribbean,
power relations were determined not so much by the Manichaean
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con›ict between white and black (as they were in the United States) as
by what Brathwaite called the creole continuum generated by a far more
multiracial society, in which racial mixing was the norm rather than the
exception.23 Black nationalism in the Caribbean consequently pivoted
less on notions of racial authenticity than on the tense relations between
a metropolitan-identi‹ed neocolonial elite and the non-European cul-
ture of the subaltern masses.24 This meant that the Pan-African theories
that emerged from the Caribbean placed particular weight on recuper-
ating the autonomous cultures of the region’s popular classes rather
than on simply opposing white hegemony.25
If Stokely Carmichael’s “Dialectics of Liberation” speech, for which
he was declared persona non grata by Britain’s supposedly socialist
Labour government, offered a galvanizing political perspective on the
black diaspora, Edward Kamau Brathwaite’s public reading of his epic
poem Rights of Passage three months earlier had a similarly dramatic
impact on an aesthetic plane.26 Like Carmichael, Brathwaite articulated
a vision of black suffering and struggle that linked three continents.
Brathwaite innovated not simply in terms of his thematic focus on the
black diaspora in the Caribbean, the United States, and Britain, but also
by using the vernacular speech forms of the black masses that he called
nation language. Black political internationalism thus not only shaped
artistic expression but was given concrete form through aesthetic exper-
imentation such as Brathwaite’s. While his work therefore shares much
with antecedent and contemporary movements such as negritude and
Black Arts, Rights of Passage is distinguished by its emphasis on distinc-
tively Caribbean processes of interculturation. Spawned by his extensive
research into the history of creole culture in the Caribbean as well as his
experience living on the three continents that surround the black
Atlantic, Brathwaite’s aesthetic of interculturation not only escaped the
ethnic essentialism that often characterized aesthetic work af‹liated
with black nationalism during the late 1960s, but also resonated partic-
ularly strongly with the cross-cultural character of Black Power in
Britain. Grounded in the strati‹ed creole societies of the Caribbean,
Brathwaite’s aesthetic is particularly suggestive today, when the suc-
cesses of antiracist and anticolonialist movements of the 1960s have led
many to believe that we are “beyond race” even while racially based dis-
parities are intensifying both between the North and the South and
within the overdeveloped nations.27
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Convergence and Autonomy in 
Black Power Discourse
Five years before Stokely Carmichael addressed the “Dialectics of Liber-
ation” conference, the political project of a federated West Indies col-
lapsed. Set up by Britain in 1958 as a way of placating regional move-
ments for independence, the West Indies Federation splintered in 1962
when the premier of Jamaica, Norman Manley, organized a referendum
on secession. Passage of this referendum led to full independence for
Jamaica; other relatively strong Caribbean nations such as Trinidad and
Tobago followed quickly in Jamaica’s wake. Although this declaration
of independence from Britain was signi‹cant, the death of the federa-
tion was, as the black British West Indian Gazette opined at the time, a
retrograde step in hopes for political solidarity against the colonial pow-
ers.28 As nations in Africa and the Caribbean gained their independence
in the 1960s, the long-standing dream of Pan-African unity foundered
on the shoals of uneven economic development and ‹ssiparous regional
politics. What grounds, then, did Black Power leaders such as Stokely
Carmichael have for invoking notions of transnational black solidarity?
Didn’t anticolonial nationalism around the world tend to undermine
such claims to transnational unity? Was there any substance to the
model of a convergence of interests between oppressed people in the
metropolitan core and the peripheral colonized nations?29
In his speech at the “Dialectics of Liberation” Congress, Stokely
Carmichael focused not so much on the political vagaries of Pan-
Africanism in Africa and elsewhere, as on analysis of the institutional
forces that structured the lives of blacks living in the urban zones of the
United States and Britain. It was in the forms of political, economic, and
cultural dependency and disenfranchisement that characterized the
ghettos in developed nations that Carmichael found a correspondence
with colonial conditions around the world:
Now in the United States—and England isn’t far behind—it is esti-
mated that in another ‹ve to ten years, two-thirds of the twenty
million Black people who inhabit the United States will be living in
the ghettos in the heart of the cities. Joining us are going to be hun-
dreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans, Mexican-Americans, and
American Indians. The American city, in essence, is going to be
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populated by peoples of the Third World, while the white middle
classes will ›ee to the suburbs. Now the Black people do not con-
trol, nor do we own, the resources—we do not control the land, the
houses, or the stores. These are all owned by whites who live outside
the community. These are very real colonies, in the sense that they
are capital and cheap labor exploited by those who live outside the
cities.30
At a moment when many white liberals were bemoaning the eclipse of
nonviolent leaders in the civil rights movement, Carmichael reminds
his listeners of the structural violence that produced racially polarized
cities throughout the United States during the twentieth century.31 Like
the apartheid system in South Africa, white supremacy in the United
States and, he implies, the UK, effectively prevented the free movement
of people of color in order to further the extraction of labor from this
racialized industrial reserve army.32 Carmichael makes this analogy with
South African apartheid explicit in Black Power, published the same
year as his address at the “Dialectics of Liberation.”33 South Africa is a
particularly important point of comparison because, like other white
settler colonies such as Australia and the United States, colonizer and
colonized live in close geographical proximity. Of course, the corre-
spondence between the United States and apartheid South Africa was
not perfect. Carmichael admits that the decentralized, informal
apartheid of the American system was signi‹cantly different from South
Africa’s formal policies of apartheid, but this fact, he argues, renders
conditions in the United States even more alarming since it underlines
the organic continuities in white supremacy across the different geo-
graphical and political spaces of America.
Carmichael’s description of U.S. ghettos as internal colonies had a
strong theoretical precedent, one that had, however, lain dormant for at
least a generation as a result of the anti-Communist purges of the
McCarthy era.34 Carmichael’s theory of convergence harked back to
analyses of imperialism developed by the global Communist movement
during the interwar decades. During the Sixth World Congress of the
Comintern in 1928, for example, a resolution was passed asserting that
African-Americans in the southern states of the United States and
Africans in South Africa constituted oppressed nations rather than
racial minorities or majorities without power. As oppressed nations,
American and South African blacks possessed an inherent right to self-
56 MONGREL NATION
determination. The Comintern’s position on black autonomy was the
product of a series of debates earlier in the decade between Lenin and
Indian Communist M. N. Roy.35 For black revolutionaries such as
George Padmore, the “black republic” scheme that resulted was a
botched attempt to capture the remnants of the Garveyite movement in
the United States.36 Yet, despite the impracticalities of the “black repub-
lic” policy, in adopting Lenin’s theses on black autonomy, the Com-
intern committed itself to supporting anticolonial and antiracist move-
ments around the world during the late 1920s and 1930s. Perhaps equally
importantly, it also lent the Communist Party’s ideological validation to
traditions of independent black revolutionary struggle both in devel-
oped nations such as the United States and throughout the colonial
world. Blacks were seen as a vanguard whose struggles in the belly of the
capitalist beast would awaken the rest of the proletariat and forge links
with unfolding anticolonial struggles in Africa, Asia, and the
Caribbean.37 As C. L. R. James argued in an address on Black Power
delivered in August 1967, it was this tradition of connection between
independent black struggles around the world that Stokely Carmichael
and predecessors such as Malcolm X had revived.38
James was particularly impressed to ‹nd that the Black Power strug-
gles of the late 1960s adopted an inherently anticapitalist character. In
Black Power, Carmichael argued that it is in the “objective relationship”
between races rather than “rhetoric (such as constitutions articulating
equal rights) or geography” that colonial relations could be discerned.39
In pointing to the gap between the constitutional rhetoric of equal rights
and entrenched material forms of racial inequality in the United States,
Carmichael challenged an emerging normative narrative of the civil
rights movement that emphasized a march toward racial progress.40 In
order to challenge the liberal outlook of some civil rights leaders, in
other words, Carmichael adopted a historical materialist perspective
that saw black oppression as a product of the inherently racial character
of capitalism in the United States and elsewhere; as he put it during the
“Dialectics of Liberation” conference, “A capitalist system automatically
includes racism, whether by design or not.”41 The American ghetto for
Carmichael thus highlighted the limits of the “‹ctitious universalism” of
the liberal-democratic nation-state and of antisystemic movements that
adopted this entity as their horizon of possibility.42 While proclaiming
itself a vehicle for universal equality, the liberal-democratic nation-state
has been structured by and continues to perpetuate forms of racial dif-
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ferentiation. The framework of black consciousness should not, then, be
the liberal constitutional order of the United States but rather structures
of racial oppression and resistance that operate on the transnational
plane of historical capitalism.
Far from being undermined by black unrest in urban areas, the con-
cessions granted to integrationist civil rights leaders, according to
Carmichael, were super‹cial and would not transform the institutional
racism that was responsible for urban uprisings. These concessions to
middle-class leaders were analogous, Carmichael argued, with the indi-
rect rule policies deployed by Britain and other colonial powers in order
to decapitate resistance to foreign rule through the creation of a stratum
of pliable indigenous leaders.43 Leaders who capitulated to such co-
optation, Carmichael argued bluntly, betrayed the black masses, whose
lives would not be transformed by the granting of hollow civil rights and
economic perquisites to a privileged elite. Carmichael’s approach to the
urban unrest of the late 1960s sought, in other words, to emphasize the
extent to which these uprisings re›ected class divisions within black
communities as much as broader anger with the lack of social transfor-
mation in the wake of civil rights agitation.
In addition, in his “Dialectics of Liberation” address, Carmichael
suggested that historical precedent underlined the unwillingness of the
ruling classes to engage in signi‹cant internal reform. Thus, when chal-
lenged by the labor movement earlier in the century, the United States
and other capitalist powers sought to bribe the white working class
using the surplus created by imperial pillage rather than investing sur-
plus in domestic reforms: “United States capitalists never cut down on
their domestic pro‹ts to share with the workers—instead, they
expanded internationally, and threw the crumbs from their pro‹ts to
the American working class, who lapped them up. The American work-
ing class enjoys the fruits of the labors of the Third World workers. The
proletariat has become the Third World, and the bourgeoisie is white
Western society.”44 By generating surplus capital and jingoistic rhetoric,
imperial expansion had effectively blunted the radical thrust of the
white working class.45 The internal colonies of the United States per-
formed a similar economic and ideological function of binding together
a cross-class white supremacist coalition. Yet if the class compromise
that headed off revolutionary politics in liberal-democratic capitalist
nations was built on the backs of internal and external colonies, the
post-1945 era had witnessed large-scale rebellion by the oppressed at
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both poles of this exploitative world system: the Third World and the
ghettos of the advanced capitalist countries. The antiracist struggle in
the United States was therefore integrally related to revolutionary anti-
colonial struggles in the Third World.
For Carmichael, the ghettos were particularly strategic sites due to
their proximity to the vital functions of the capitalist core:
The struggle to free these internal colonies relates to the struggles of
imperialism around the world. We realistically survey our numbers,
and know that it is not possible for Black people to take over the
whole of the United States militarily, and hold large areas of land; in
a highly industrialized nation, the struggle is different. The heart of
production, and the heart of commercial trade, is in the cities. We
are in the cities. We can become, and are becoming, a disruptive
force in the ›ow of services, goods, and capital. While we disrupt
internally and aim for the eye of the octopus, we are hoping that our
brothers are disrupting externally to sever the tentacles of the
United States.46
Carmichael’s assessment of the violent upheavals in cities such as Bir-
mingham in 1963, New York in 1964, and Los Angeles in 1965 revived the
Communist Party’s “black republic” thesis, situating black efforts to
assert self-control not in the so-called Black Belt region of the southern
states as they had been during the 1930s but in the ghettos of urban
America.47 His analysis of the American ghetto as an internal colony
anticipates the high-pro‹le struggles of groups such as the Black Pan-
thers to organize the black “lumpen-proletariat” and to establish tradi-
tions of autonomy among the urban black masses. The violent response
of the state to such efforts, evident in the use of national guardsmen to
quell urban riots and the COINTELPRO targeting of the Black Pan-
thers, lent dramatic support to Carmichael’s perception of a correspon-
dence between external and internal colonies.48
In hindsight, Carmichael’s hopes for this revolutionary alignment
against the “octopus” of imperialism seem tragically utopian. First of
all, he and other radical activists of the era seriously underestimated the
full power of state repression that would be leveled against those seek-
ing to strike the eye of this octopus. In addition, over the next decade, a
signi‹cant political realignment took place in which what Stuart Hall
called “popular authoritarianism” would come to form the core of a
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new, radically conservative hegemonic project in the United States and
Britain.49 As the axis of state power tipped increasingly toward explicit
repression of dissenting elements of the population, so resources once
devoted to securing consent would be progressively scaled back. Less
than half a decade after Carmichael’s speech, cities with substantial
black populations like New York would pioneer neoliberal strategies
such as the privileging of markets and the reorientation of government
‹nance away from public services.50 In Britain, a parallel process
unfolded when the Thatcher regime cut off funding for radical local
authorities such as the Greater London Council during the 1980s. Paral-
lel with the dismantling of the Keynesian welfare state, the outsourcing
of industrial production to offshore factories helped create a new inter-
national division of labor. These novel, intertwined strategies of capital
accumulation and social regulation effectively obliterated the revolu-
tionary energies and alignments hailed by Carmichael. Rather than
occupying an empowering location in ghettos as he and others imag-
ined they would, blacks in the United States and Britain were subjected
over the following decades to further rounds of spatial apartheid whose
most brutal realization is in America’s prison-industrial complex.51 The
denizens of U.S. ghettos were rendered a form of surplus humanity,
whose primary social utility lies in legitimating ever-intensifying levels
of racially coded backlash. These tremendous setbacks have, however,
further underlined the urgency of internationalist approaches to black
liberation.
Representing the Creole Continuum
During the Black Power era, perhaps the crucial question for cultural
activists of West Indian background in Britain was the issue of what
Orlando Patterson called “an absence of ruins”: the apparent lack of
precolonial traditions that might legitimate viable independent political
and cultural movements in the Caribbean.52 Like Carmichael, in other
words, cultural activists of the day were intent on elaborating interna-
tional linkages that would help leverage otherwise isolated liberation
movements. Patterson’s perspective catalyzed heated debate among the
members of the British-based Caribbean Artists Movement, many of
whom saw his arguments as disempowering.53 For a writer such as
Edward Kamau Brathwaite, Patterson and previous writers such as
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George Lamming and V. S. Naipaul had anatomized the fragmented,
alienated condition of Caribbean modernity.54 The task was to ‹nd
ways to transcend and heal this condition.55 This ambitious work of
healing would, however, require a detailed investigation of the Creole
societies of the Caribbean. In working out his theories of intercultura-
tion, Brathwaite was also developing important models of collective
identity and agency for contemporary black Britons.
If the project of Caribbean modernist writers was to make what
Simon Gikandi terms a “forced entry” into history, Edward Kamau
Brathwaite’s work has been particularly informed by historical and
ethnographic counterdiscourse.56 Brathwaite’s work demonstrates that
historiography and anthropology could be appropriated and used
against the very colonial discourses that they had traditionally helped
legitimate. More speci‹cally, anthropological discourse furnished a
means to challenge the linear, progressive European account of
Caribbean history by focusing on the disjunctive and multiple temporal
frames that characterize postcolonial Caribbean culture. In other
words, while anthropological discourse denied coevalness to the colo-
nized Other, this very temporal alterity allowed writers such as Brath-
waite to introduce dissident cultural voices that exploded the putatively
uni‹ed time-space continuum of the nation.57 Like Latin American
writers such as Alejo Carpentier, José María Arguedas, and Miguel
Angel Asturias, Brathwaite drew on ethnographic research to engage
with and reanimate the indigenous and non-Western cultural practices
suppressed in the course of colonial conquest and domination. In the
case of traditions such as negritude, celebration of the indigenous
Other’s resilient traditions as an alternative to the corrupt and empty
culture of Western modernity tended to perpetuate binary oppositions
between the European Self and indigenous Other.58 For a writer such as
Brathwaite, however, this sort of primitivist embrace of alterity was
impossible. In his historiographic work, Brathwaite was forced to con-
front head-on the “absence of ruins” postulated by Orlando Patterson
and other Caribbean writers such as V. S. Naipaul.
Brathwaite approached this problem of Caribbean modernity using
a vocabulary drawn from the pioneering ethnographic research of
scholars like Melville Herskovitz and Jean Price-Mars, who, Brathwaite
argued, had exploded the “myth of the Negro (non) past.”59 For Brath-
waite, the notion of the Middle Passage as a traumatic, total break was
the product of a typically Eurocentric cultural perspective. Writing of
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the folk culture of Jamaican slaves, Brathwaite sought to explain the
apparent lack of cultural tradition in the Caribbean through a discus-
sion of the unique signifying practices of African religious culture:
The signi‹cant feature of African religious culture was that it was
(is) immanent: carried within the individual/community, not (as in
Europe) existentially externalized in buildings, monuments, books.
So that in a sense, African societies did appear to European
observers to have “no culture,” because there were no externally
visible signs of a “civilization.” That dance was African architecture,
that history was not printed but recited, the contemporary Pros-
pero could not understand. And yet it was the immanent nature of
this culture that made its amazing and successful transfer from
Africa to the New World/Caribbean, even under the extraordinary
conditions of slavery[,] possible. The slave ship became a kind of
psycho-physical space capsule, carrying intact the carriers of a kind
of invisible/atomic culture.60
Brathwaite ingeniously suggests that it is the limited epistemological
orientation of Eurocentric observers that explains theories of social
death and mimicry such as those of Patterson and Naipaul.61 Combined
with the highly developed codes of cultural racism, this orientation
killed off awareness of the living tradition of immanent culture that sur-
vived among the black masses in the Caribbean.62 Like both James and
Carmichael, in other words, Brathwaite is intent on attacking the cul-
tural assimilation of colonial and postcolonial elites to Eurocentric val-
ues, suggesting that this internalization is an obstacle to the develop-
ment of truly autochthonous cultural/political traditions. Yet while
Brathwaite’s analysis of what he dubs an African-derived “great tradi-
tion” is grounded in a model of colonially in›ected class con›ict within
the Caribbean, he also acknowledges that European hegemony has
forced this tradition underground for much of the region’s history.63
Submerged in order to survive, the immanent tradition has, according
to Brathwaite, “suffered a slow but steady process of fragmentation and
deformation.”64 Despite this fragmentation, this immanent tradition
never completely disappears but rather wells up, Brathwaite suggests,
like a subterranean spring during moments of particularly intense social
con›ict.
How can this “great tradition” survive the dominance of what
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Brathwaite elsewhere calls “bastard metropolitanism” in the Caribbean?
The answer lies in the fact that these two traditions cannot be seen as
homogenous, monolithic opposites. In order to challenges ideas of the
derivative character of Caribbean culture, Brathwaite developed a
nuanced theory of creolization that undermines such Manichaean
models of cultural difference. Central to Brathwaite’s work is the repu-
diation of a totalizing synthesis of the composite traditions of the
region.65 For Brathwaite, creolization is characterized by two, inter-
twined processes: ac/culturation, or “the yoking (by force and example,
deriving from power/prestige) of one culture to another,” and inter/cul-
turation, or the “unplanned, unstructured but osmotic relation pro-
ceeding from this yoke.”66 Brathwaite’s model of creolization attempts
to account for the hegemony of European cultural norms while also
invoking the forms of reciprocal exchange between different ethnic
groups that took place in the long history of modernity in the
Caribbean. The result is not so much a model of cultural schizophrenia
in which aesthetic and political movements oscillate between European
and African traditions, as an “osmotic” process of cultural interpenetra-
tion in which each of these poles is itself transformed.67 Emerging from
his detailed analysis of Caribbean history, Brathwaite’s model of cre-
olization offered a pointed riposte to the nihilistic theories of Naipaul
and Patterson. Thus, for Brathwaite, rather than simple mimicry, “Our
real/apparent imitation involves at the same time a signi‹cant element
of creativity, while our creativity involves a signi‹cant element of imita-
tion.”68
In addition to challenging notions of cultural mimicry, Brathwaite’s
osmotic model of creolization also had strong political implications.
Although, as Frantz Fanon noted, binary forms of thought could be a
galvanizing force for anticolonial nationalism, they were predicated on
simplistic models of popular culture that offered little cognitive pur-
chase on the heterogeneous composition of Caribbean cultures such as
those of Jamaica and Trinidad.69 For Brathwaite, lateral creolization
between subaltern groups such as people of African and Asian ancestry
was an important factor on such islands, one that became particularly
prominent following decolonization.70 While Brathwaite discusses tra-
ditions of creolization between ethnic groups such as the incorporation
of people of African descent into the Asian Hosein festivities, he also
points with great foresight to the intensi‹cation of ethnic con›ict
between such groups that characterizes the postcolonial scene in
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nations such as Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. Brathwaite’s analysis
of creolization works against such exclusionary forms of ethnic identity
by focusing on the osmotic character of cultural identities and on pat-
terns of lateral as well as horizontal exchange.
Yet if the model of the creole continuum stresses mutability and
fragility, Brathwaite seeks throughout his historical and poetic work to
articulate the enduring character of the popular culture of the black
diaspora. He therefore closes Contradictory Omens by arguing that the
true cultural matrix of the Caribbean may be found not in the “bastard
metropolitanism” of the elite but in the cultural traditions of the poor.
Unlike many theorists of Black Power, however, Brathwaite’s depiction
of black popular culture is grounded in an understanding of the ›uidity
and dynamism of such cultural forms: “For the Caribbean, the basis of
culture lies in the folk, by which we mean not in-culturated, static
groups, giving little; but a people who, from the center of an oppressive
system, have been able to survive, adapt, recreate. The unity is subma-
rine.”71 Brathwaite’s oceanic metaphor for black culture references the
terrible suffering and loss of the Middle Passage. Yet if the Atlantic is lit-
erally the watery grave of myriad black lives, the ocean also offers a
painful but potent reminder of the wonderfully mobile, adaptable char-
acter of black culture. Brathwaite returns frequently to this metaphor in
his poetic corpus to render the dynamic connections that link the cul-
tures of the black Atlantic.72
The Arrivants, the Caribbean’s ‹rst epic poetic cycle, is a virtuoso
evocation of the ties that bind the black diaspora across time and
space.73 Initially recited publicly in London on 3 March 1967 at the ‹rst
of CAM’s public readings, the opening section of the trilogy, Rights of
Passage, traces an arc from loss and alienation to a revivifying reconnec-
tion to tradition and identity. The poem is divided into four sections,
each of which is further subdivided into a number of long poems that
together draw on a stunning variety of vernacular black cultural tradi-
tions and historical references. Beginning with a narrative re-creation of
the westward migration of African peoples across the continent, Rights
of Passage quickly picks up the theme of exile and the traumatic Middle
Passage.74 Written predominantly in Jamaica during the early to mid-
1960s, the middle sections of Brathwaite’s poem betray the impact of the
generation of Caribbean writers who stressed black existential alien-
ation. Yet while acknowledging and depicting these forms of cultural
loss and crisis, Brathwaite offers a powerful riposte: the poem is itself a
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performative embodiment of precisely the historical and geographical
webs of contact that the alienation thesis tended to negate.75 Most
signi‹cantly, Rights of Passage, as its title suggests, focuses on the tradi-
tion of migration that links diasporic communities in the Caribbean,
the United States, and Britain. Through its verbal evocation of the his-
torical and cultural convergences that weave together communities in
urban nodes like Chicago, London, and Kingston, Brathwaite’s epic
conjures a black Atlantic imaginary into being in the teeth of historical
suffering and loss.
The opening section of Rights of Passage focuses on the ‹gure of
Tom, an obvious reference to the integrationist Uncle Tom ‹gures who
were so reviled during the heyday of Black Power.76 Yet Brathwaite’s
Tom is a complex character, one who embodies memories of African
glory as well as the devastating loss and self-pity that followed the Mid-
dle Passage. Nonetheless, despite remembering the uni‹cation of the
Ashanti peoples with pride, Tom is trapped in an empty present in
which he has “created / nothing but these worthless / weeds” and who is
only capable of uttering the paradigmatic words of utter servility:
“Massa, yes / Boss, yes / Baas” (15). As well as offering an icon of sub-
servience to white power that is represented as spanning centuries and
continents, Tom also signi‹es the loss of intergenerational connection.
“All God’s Chillun” describes the mocking contempt with which Tom’s
children address him: crushed by poverty, his memories of Africa mean
nothing to his sons. Educated in a white world and brimming with self-
contempt, Tom’s sons urge him to conform to racist stereotypes and
play the “Black buttin’ ram” of white racial fantasy that stretches from
Othello to Super›y and beyond.77 Tom’s melancholy reaction to his sons’
internalization of such caricatures emphasizes his feeling of utter pow-
erlessness: “when release / from further journey? / Ease / up, Lord” (21).
Yet even in Tom’s seeming admission of crushing defeat, Brath-
waite embeds a form of af‹rmation. For central to the challenge
sounded by Rights of Passage to the thesis of black “social death” is the
poem’s use of what Brathwaite termed nation language, the diverse
forms of creolized English spoken throughout the black diaspora.78
Brathwaite’s epic poem was one of the ‹rst Caribbean works to break
away from the use of Standard English and from the clockwork beat of
iambic pentameter. In the place of these European forms, Brathwaite
substitutes myriad diverse poetic forms, all of them interconnected,
however, through their relation to black vernacular cultural forms.
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While composing Rights of Passage, Brathwaite had been experimenting
with poetic forms derived from the African American jazz tradition.79
In his epic poem, Brathwaite expands his range of technical citation and
adaptation, including, as previous references suggest, other African-
American musical forms such as the blues and gospel. Thus, even while
he invokes traditions of white appropriation of black culture in a poem
such as “Folkways,” Brathwaite reawakens the immanent cultural tradi-
tions of black America through virtuouso verbal performance: “I am a
fuck- / in’ negro, / man, hole / in my head / brains in / my belly” (30).
Moreover, in addition to expanding his generic reach, Brathwaite also
juxtaposes these African-American vernacular speech forms with exam-
ples of Caribbean nation language. The poem “Wings of a Dove,” for
instance, is written in a rhythm that mimics the heavy beats of reggae
poetry and that adopts the Rastafarian lingo that radical Jamaican poets
like Bongo Jerry and Linton Kwesi Johnson would use so effectively in
the following decade. Grounded in Brathwaite’s pathbreaking recuper-
ation of nation language, the forms of creative diasporic stylistic appro-
priation and contamination of Standard English provide a concrete
instance of creolization and give voice to the circuits of popular cultural
exchange that link diasporic groups across geographic space.80
If these technical experiments instantiate the “subterranean unity”
of the black diaspora, the theme of migration that permeates and struc-
tures Rights of Passage suggests further historical continuities. Black
migration is, of course, a product of desperate attempts to escape the
conditions of grinding poverty and exploitation meted out by structures
of racial supremacy around the world. The resulting patterns of migra-
tion and urbanization link black populations in the Caribbean, the
United States, Britain, and elsewhere. Brathwaite references these mate-
rials conditions as well as the signi‹cant social and artistic movements
that emerged from black migrations around the world in poems such as
“The Journeys” and “The Emigrants,” the central poem in his epic’s
third section.81 This latter poem embodies the kind of “magnetization”
and uni‹catory vision that Brathwaite described Stokely Carmichael’s
speech effecting. The emigrants Brathwaite describes are driven by eco-
nomic necessity into migrations that have little of the glamour associ-
ated with travel to exotic locations in a poem such as “The Journeys,”
with its sly references to Langston Hughes and the Harlem Renaissance.
In contrast to the jazzed-up vision of the New Negro offered by the
writers of the Harlem Renaissance, Brathwaite depicts a drab popula-
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tion with few aspirations and even fewer opportunities despite their
ceaseless displacement. The poem’s reference to these people as
“Columbus coursing kaf‹rs” is laden with painful irony, since it implic-
itly suggests that diasporic migrants continue the colonial voyages of
explorers such as Columbus while also referring to such migrants using
the pejorative South African term for blacks. The implication is that
dreams of wealth such as those Columbus harbored are illusions, par-
ticularly for a population whose movements continue to be controlled
by structures of inequality equivalent to a form of global apartheid.
What would be the outcome of the aborted dreams of these
migrants in search of their own Cathay? For Brathwaite, these restless
journeys have created festering sores in the cities of the overdeveloped
world. Brathwaite imagines urbanization creating a deprived mass
poised to take radical action in the streets of cities around the world.
Written in Rastafarian dialect, “Wings of the Dove” articulates the
anger of the black masses against economic elites, no matter what their
skin color, and looks forward to a ‹ery day of judgment in which the
people will rise up and earthly injustice will be razed. Drawing on the
dread rhythms of reggae, the voice of the Rastafarian prophet in this
poem records the anger of the black masses living in ghettos such as
Kingston’s Trench Town. The warning Brathwaite issues is just as
strong as that of activists such as Stokely Carmichael. Before the table of
contents in Black Power, Carmichael and his cowriter, Charles Hamil-
ton, offered a controversial prophecy that the conditions they were
about to describe would lead to massive civil strife if the United States
did not change course. In “Wings of the Dove,” Brathwaite predicts a
similar outcome, and thereby offers an indictment of the limited
progress obtained during the era of civil rights and decolonization.
Yet to suggest that the ‹ery Rastafarian rhetoric of “Wings of the
Dove” is Brathwaite’s sole or even central response to the black condi-
tion would be to traduce the multivoiced quality of his epic. While he is
anxious to record the righteous, revolutionary anger emerging from
Rastafarianism and other militant Black Power groups, Brathwaite is
equally intent on dramatizing the quotidian endurance that has helped
members of the black diaspora survive four centuries of oppression.
Thus, in “The Dust,” Brathwaite captures the speech rhythms of poor
women from the islands. The central narrative poem of Rights of Pas-
sage’s ‹nal section, “The Dust” centers on the exchange that takes place
between a group of friends as they gather in a rural shop to make their
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purchases. Written in Caribbean nation language, the poem highlights
the ancient herbal knowledge preserved by such women as well as the
traditions of mutual aid through which the women keep their meager
domestic economies a›oat. Most importantly, however, “The Dust”
highlights the women’s attempts to survive in the face of often inex-
plicable and irresistible forces. The main speaker of the poem, Olive,
attempts to explain a recent bout of illness on her island by recounting
the tale of an eruption on a distant island of the archipelago that sends
a cloud of volcanic ash into the atmosphere, blighting crops, swallow-
ing up the sun’s rays, and destroying the people’s hope. Women such as
Olive are the victims of what they see as the inscrutable gestures of a
malevolent god. Although the other women remain skeptical about
Olive’s explanation for the “pestilence” that has af›icted them, Olive’s
narrative of woe demonstrates her ability to cope with everything,
short, that is, of such apocalyptic natural events. Like the rest of this
‹nal section of the poem, “The Dust” offers a return to the Caribbean
after the many journeys taken by the emigrants, signifying a reterritori-
alization for the exiled intellectual as well. Brathwaite grounds this
return in popular cultural forms such as Olive and her friends’ religious
awareness. It is in such cultural resources that Brathwaite locates not
only the inspiration for endurance in the face of adversity but also the
creolized forms and practices that characterize Caribbean culture. In
later books of The Arrivants, Brathwaite extends this analysis of black
popular culture, turning to synchretic religious rituals of the Caribbean
such as vodun, Santeria/lucumi/shango/kele/etu, koromanti
play/winti/kumfa, nation dance, and kumina, as well as to the practices
of more nominally Christian sects like Zion, Revival, Pukumina,
Shouter, Shaker, and Spiritual Baptist. Within such quotidian sites,
Brathwaite’s epic cycle traces a genealogy of origins that leads from the
Caribbean, across other nodes of the black diaspora in the United States
and Britain, to Africa.82 It is in Rights of Passage, however, that Brath-
waite most powerfully articulates the migrations that link the black
Atlantic. Brathwaite thereby offers a powerful aesthetic corollary to
Black Power’s most crucial argument: the convergence of urban black
consciousness across a transnational space. Despite the extraordinary
suffering and loss narrated in Rights of Passage, Brathwaite’s epic poem
creates a veritable chorus of voices whose collective utterances consti-
tute a revived black diasporic imaginary.83
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Conclusion
Despite many activists’ feelings of being behind the curve, events in
Britain during the 1960s foreshadowed the dystopian aspects of the civil
rights movement. Unlike in the United States, where the civil rights
movement seemed to be dismantling structures of juridical discrimina-
tion, in Britain both Tory and Labour governments repeatedly refused
to pass antidiscrimination legislation in the 1960s. In addition, the Com-
monwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 effectively stripped blacks of their
citizenship, torpedoing liberal hopes for integration such as those kin-
dled in the United States during the civil rights era. Writing of the act in
1964, the Trinidad-born activist Claudia Jones argued that the implicit
racial discrimination in the act effectively rendered nonwhite Common-
wealth immigrants to Britain second-class citizens.84 Rather than tend-
ing toward at least the illusion of racial reform, as the United States
seemed to be under pressure from the civil rights movement, Britain was
sliding toward neofascist policies of ethnic cleansing in the form of calls
for the repatriation of black Britons by the late 1960s.85 Claudia Jones’s
analysis of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act suggested that, far from
being halting, incorporated into the liberal-democratic nation-state,
blacks were essentially turned into scapegoats whose fear-inducing pres-
ence legitimated the dismantling of social democracy.86
Claudia Jones was well placed to assess this turn toward neofascism
in Britain. A former head of the Young Communist League in New
York and editor of the CPUSA’s newspaper, the Daily Worker, Jones had
lived through the worst years of the anti-Communist backlash in the
United States during the Cold War. Her writings for radical organs fol-
lowing World War II stressed the link between European fascism and
manifestations of white supremacy within the United States, making
the argument that the U.S. claims to hegemony as a leader of the “free
world” would only resonate with movements for decolonization if
America succeeded in eradicating manifestations of domestic “Hit-
lerism” such as lynching.87 For her efforts to eradicate racial terror,
Jones was arrested and charged with seeking the violent overthrow of
the U.S. government following the passage of the McCarran Act in 1948.
During her hearing, however, Claudia Jones placed the U.S. govern-
ment itself on trial, arguing, in a letter sent to the recently created
United Nations, for an international investigation into the way in which
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immigrants were being treated under the McCarran security laws.88 Her
fate, Jones argued, was symptomatic of a broader struggle: “If we can be
denied all rights and incarcerated in concentration camps, then trade
unionists are next; then the Negro people, the Jewish people, all foreign-
born, and all progressives who love peace and cherish freedom will face
the bestiality and torment of fascism. Our fate is the fate of American
democracy.”89 Jones’s letter to the UN suggests that, while she might
have invoked notions of U.S. global leadership predicated on the Tru-
man Doctrine like other leaders of the period, she retained a strong
sense of internationalism in the face of Cold War isolationist senti-
ments.90 The chain of af‹liations she establishes in her letter to the UN
between antiracist activists and American democracy in general effec-
tively highlights the danger represented by McCarthy-era purges, which
she quite explicitly compares to Nazism.
Notwithstanding her powerful self-defense, Jones was imprisoned
for several years and eventually deported to Britain in 1955. Once there,
she quickly became involved in radical politics of a decidedly interna-
tionalist ilk. In an interview given shortly after her arrival in Britain, for
example, she pointed out the domestic rami‹cations of U.S. militarism
and imperialism by saying, “I was deported . . . because I fought for
peace, against the huge arms budget which funds [sic] should be
directed to improving the social needs of the people.”91 She also cam-
paigned against apartheid, going on a hunger strike outside the South
African embassy in 1962 to protest the incarceration of Nelson Mandela.
In addition, Jones quickly immersed herself in the cultural life of
Britain’s diasporic community. Following the Notting Hill riots of 1958,
she organized the ‹rst Caribbean Carnival to help revive the black com-
munity’s spirits. Perhaps most important, however, was her founding
and editorship of the West Indian Gazette, the ‹rst truly community-
based publishing effort of the post-1948 era and the primary political
and cultural organ for black Britons from the late 1950s until Jones’s
death in 1964. Jones used the pages of the West Indian Gazette not only
to keep the black community in Britain abreast of political develop-
ments in the Caribbean, Africa, and the United States, but also to chal-
lenge the turn of the British establishment toward increasingly explicit
forms of racism.
In the pages of the West Indian Gazette, for instance, Jones repeated
the warning given by Dr. Martin Luther King following his visit to
Britain in 1965. Challenging the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, King
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argued that “as far as housing is restricted and ghettoes of a minority are
allowed to develop, you are promoting a festering sore of bitterness and
deprivation to pollute your national health.”92 Jones maintained in her
article that the answer to the growth of ghettos in Britain was not, as
many members of the political establishment held, the termination of
immigration, but rather the banning of discrimination in housing and
elsewhere. Despite such calls for institutional reform, Jones, unlike
many of her compatriots, was not under any illusions about the
bene‹cence of the British liberal tradition.93 Instead, she argued that an
elaborate ideological apparatus had been constructed to legitimate
British imperialism, condemning the British working classes to an insu-
lar and racist outlook concerning their brothers and sisters in the
colonies:
All the resources of of‹cial propaganda and education, the super-
structure of British imperialism, were permeated with projecting
the oppressed colonial peoples as “lesser breeds,” as “inferior
coloured peoples,” “natives,” “savages,” and the like—in short, “the
white man’s burden.” These rationalizations served to build a
justi‹cation for wholesale exploitation, extermination, and looting
of the islands by British imperialism. . . . These arti‹cial divisions
and antagonisms between British and colonial workers, already
costly in toll of generations of colonial wars and ever-recurrent
crises, have delayed fundamental social change in Britain, and form
the very basis of colour prejudice.94
Jones’s sensitivity to the links between culture and imperialism was evi-
dent not only in such explicitly political passages as this one, but also in
her editorship of the West Indian Gazette, which she used as a vehicle for
inspiring black pride and autonomy. Crucial to this sense of self-
esteem, Jones observed, was pride in the growth of national liberation
movements in the colonial territories that many black Britons had until
recently called home.95 Britain’s “Afro-Asian-Caribbean peoples,”
whom Jones saw as increasingly united by their common experience in
Britain, therefore promised to reintroduce a radical internationalist
consciousness into the parochial world of British politics, challenging
several centuries of racist imperial ideology.
The political experiences of the embryonic black British commu-
nity during the 1960s hammered home the urgency of an international-
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ist outlook. Pioneering organizations such as the Campaign Against
Racism and Discrimination (CARD), established following Dr. King’s
visit by Jones and other progressives as a multiracial coalition, splin-
tered when the group’s black leaders offended white liberals by seeking
to establish control of the organization.96 As such multiracial coalitions
foundered, younger leaders of the black community looked to the
United States and anticolonial nationalist organizations in the colonies
for inspiration. By the time of Stokely Carmichael’s visit to Britain in
1967, groups dedicated to the autonomous organization of the black
community such as the Michael X’s Racial Adjustment Action Society
(RAAS) had already been formed.97 Heavily in›uenced by Black Power
currents in the United States, RAAS and organizations such as Nigerian
playwright and activist Obi Egbuna’s United Coloured People’s Associ-
ation adopted militant postures of black autonomy, grassroots pop-
ulism, and anti-imperialist, antiracist unity.98 Carmichael’s visit further
underlined the vanguard character of developments in the black com-
munities of America. Yet despite the apparently derivative character of
many of these British political groupings, the Black Power imperative to
decolonize the mind led to the evolution of genuinely novel cultural ini-
tiatives that ›owed from the strong ties of Britain’s black communities
to their former homelands in the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia.
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Buchi Emecheta’s London Novels and Black British
Women’s Emancipation
In 1979, the year that Margaret Thatcher became prime minister
of a demoralized and fractious nation, a groundbreaking national fem-
inist group was formed at a conference in London. The Organization of
Women of African and Asian Descent (OWAAD) held a series of
important annual conferences and generated a great deal of energy
among activists before it split apart in 1983 over the group’s failure to
adopt an inclusive stance towards its lesbian members. Despite the
brevity of OWAAD’s life and its signi‹cant shortcomings, many black
feminists now regard the group as a decisive formative in›uence
because of its high pro‹le as the ‹rst autonomous national organization
for women of color in Britain. Among the organization’s resonant posi-
tion statements was the call for unity between women of African and
Asian descent. While embracing expansive notions of solidarity derived
from the Black Power movement in Britain, OWAAD nonetheless chal-
lenged the oppressive aspects of patriarchal black cultural traditions. In
additional to interrogating sexism within the ranks of the antiracist
movement, OWAAD activists also mounted a searing critique of the
failure on the part of white feminists to address the forms of race and
class oppression endured by black women in Britain.1 The multifaceted
nature of OWAAD’s criticism angered many within both the antiracist
and feminist movements, who believed the organization was creating
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dangerous divisions that undermined the struggle against racism and
sexism at a particularly trying time.2
Notwithstanding such opposition, OWAAD and af‹liated organi-
zations such as Southall Black Sisters (SBS) made a strong impact not
only on the feminist movement but also on progressive politics in gen-
eral in Britain during the 1980s. Essays like Hazel Carby’s “White
Woman Listen!” offered a galvanizing challenge to both liberal and
socialist feminists in Britain, pointing to the ethnocentrism of analytical
terms such as patriarchy and to the consequent marginalization of black
women’s experience.3 Carby’s ringing call for autonomous organizing
by black women emerged from and helped legitimate forums like
OWAAD. In addition, Stuart Hall’s important essay “New Ethnicities,”
which outlines the “end of the innocent black subject,” similarly re›ects
the rise of black feminism.4 Hall’s response to groups such as OWAAD
acknowledges the need for a new theoretical take on the nature of both
subjectivity and political movements. Rather than seeing identity, black
and otherwise, as a ‹xed category, Hall’s work emphasizes the process
of articulation through which diverse elements such as race, class, gen-
der, and sexuality cohered to create composite but continuously evolv-
ing selves and political formations. This analytical perspective played an
important role in challenging exclusionary de‹nitions of citizenship
popularized by politicians such as Margaret Thatcher, suggesting that
national identity had to be rede‹ned in terms of cultural difference
rather than insular stability.
Yet despite Hall’s theoretical recognition of the implications of
black feminism and Carby’s clarion call for independent organizing,
there have been few attempts to engage with the historical lineaments
and legacy of the black British feminist movement until very recently.
White historians and activists typically worried about why black women
were alienated by mainstream feminism rather than concentrating on
the autonomous achievements of women’s groups like OWAAD.5 This
emphasis re›ects the pervasive ethnocentrism that helped spark inde-
pendent black feminist organizing in the ‹rst place. Even less attention
has been devoted to the everyday life experiences of black women in
Britain that contributed to the formation of feminist groups. If histori-
ans have now begun to document the legacy of groups like OWAAD
and SBS, what is the prehistory to such organizations of autonomous
collective mobilization? What barriers prevented black women from
coming together in collective forums prior to the formation of OWAAD
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and similar groups in the 1970s? Similarly, what links might be traced
between the culture of political activism that developed among black
women in the 1970s and 1980s and the efforts to discover individual
voice and collective solidarity that preceded such activism?
Buchi Emecheta’s London novels offer a particularly powerful
point of departure to investigate such questions.6 These novels are
explicitly conceptualized as a form of documentary ‹ction that records
the travails and coming-to-voice of a black woman in the metropolis
during the late 1960s and early 1970s. In her novels Second-Class Citizen
and In the Ditch and in the memoir Head Above Water, Emecheta offers
a detailed portrait of everyday life in Britain prior to the emergence of
the black feminist movement. Her work should not, however, be taken
to represent the experience of all black women in Britain. Of course,
there is always a temptation to place a burden of representation on a
pioneer such as Emecheta, and to castigate her for depictions that may
seem to af‹rm racist stereotypes of black identity. Some critics have, for
instance, attacked this early work of Emecheta’s, suggesting that its
withering representation of African masculinity is a form of pandering
to Western feminism.7 While it is of course important to acknowledge
that the black family is often an important site for refuge from a racist
society, such objections tend to ignore the central burden of Emecheta’s
work—to reject images of black women as passive victims—and impose
a homogeneous model of communal solidarity. This reaction foreshad-
ows the nationalist response to black feminist attacks on inequality and
gender power within the black community.8 Emecheta’s work and its
reception thus anticipates one of the central con›icts faced by black
feminism in the following decades.
In addition to challenging the oppressive aspects of certain African
traditions, Emecheta is also unsparingly critical of the racism that char-
acterized public life in Britain. Her work therefore offers an important
record of the multiple forms of marginalization to which black women
in the postcolonial metropolis were subjected. However, this double
colonization was effected not simply through encounters with speci‹c
individuals, but also through the raced and gendered character of social
citizenship in Britain. As the London trilogy documents, the British
state sought to regulate poor women through the provision of social
welfare bene‹ts in ways that exacerbated gender- and race-based
inequalities. As feminist critics were to argue subsequently, the post-
1945 welfare state has a two-tiered character, treating men as workers
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entitled to social insurance and women as “mothers” entitled to welfare
bene‹ts.9 This bifurcated structure reinscribes the dominant organiza-
tion of gender relations, as well as the public-private split, in family,
community, and workforce. In an analogous way, welfare racism splits
society along racial lines, denying black families access to even the mea-
ger protection offered by the social safety net.10 Black and Asian women
bear the brunt of both of these forms of institutional discrimination,
lending extremely concrete de‹nition to the concept of double colo-
nization. 
If, in other words, part of the aim of Emecheta’s London novels is to
depict the efforts of her protagonist Adah to escape victimization within
her marriage, an equally signi‹cant goal of the trilogy is to indict the
institutional structure of social citizenship in Britain. The novels of the
London trilogy do this by documenting the inequalities of access to wel-
fare rights experienced by diasporic subjects. In addition, Emecheta’s
work also depicts the dependency that the paternalistic British welfare
state imposes on poor black women such as Adah when they do manage
to gain access to bene‹ts. Therefore, although Adah does not participate
in any organized social movement, the ‹ctional record of her experi-
ence includes a critique of key institutions such as the family and the
state that were to ‹gure prominently as targets of black feminist theory
and activism in subsequent decades. Buchi Emecheta’s documentary
‹ction thus offers important insights into the way in which the political
and theoretical priorities of black feminism emerged from the quotid-
ian concerns of diasporic women in Britain. Implicit in the novels of
Emecheta’s London trilogy is a critique that calls not simply for a more
inclusive model of the imagined community of the nation, but also for
the wholesale reformulation of social citizenship in a manner that
intended to transform the institutional character of British identity.
Second-Class Citizen: The Struggle to Escape
Emotional Dependency
Although the bulk of Second-Class Citizen, Emecheta’s second novel, is
set in Britain, the narrative begins with the birth of Adah O‹li in the
growing postcolonial metropolis of Lagos, Nigeria.11 Almost immedi-
ately, Emecheta’s narrator Adah informs us that she is not sure of her
age. Adah calmly explains on the ‹rst page of her narrative that her fam-
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ily had been expecting a boy; their disillusionment was so profound
when a girl materialized instead that they failed to record the date of her
birth (7). Emecheta uses this striking initial note to convey the sexist
character of the O‹li clan’s values, which are predicated on thorough-
going male domination. But the iniquities that Adah endures as she
grows up are not simply the product of African patriarchy, as the ideo-
logues of colonialism tended to suggest as they sought to pulverize tra-
ditional kinship systems.12 Ironically, the meritocracy established by the
new postcolonial state, in which preference is given to those educated
according to European standards, exacerbates the gender-based
inequalities of the traditions that Adah’s family brings with it when her
parents migrate from rural Ibuza to Lagos. As a result, the family mobi-
lizes its relatively scarce resources in order to educate Adah’s brother
rather than her, since it is assumed that, upon reaching maturity, she
will be married off to another family (9). Any economic bene‹ts that
might accrue from Adah’s education, Emecheta explains, will enrich her
husband’s family rather than the O‹li clan. Adah’s travails therefore
offer a postcolonial update of “The Traf‹c in Women,” Gayle Rubin’s
classic account of the structural logic behind marriage and the com-
modi‹cation of women’s reproductive labor in traditional patriarchal
kinship structures.13 Emecheta’s narrative demonstrates that, within the
terms established by the conjunction of traditional patriarchal kinship
patterns and a modernizing postcolonial state, there was an ironclad
economic rationale behind women’s subordination. 
The experiences depicted in Second-Class Citizen suggest that struc-
tures of gender asymmetry are culturally speci‹c, predicated on speci‹c
collisions between local kinship patterns and particular colonial and
postcolonial states. It follows, then, that there can be no universal
model of women’s identity and oppression; Adah’s experiences would
not necessarily have been the same in another postcolonial country, or
even in another part of Africa. This element of Second-Class Citizen
underlines the distortions created by universalizing categories of
women’s identity. Dismantling the unitary category of “woman” was
one of the central concerns of black feminism in Britain, for this model
of identity allowed middle-class, white feminists to purport to speak for
their oppressed “sisters” around the world. As Hazel Carby has
remarked, such well-intentioned notions of solidarity were an ironic
expression of the Enlightenment model of the universal human subject.
Though supposedly liberatory, in practice this model of subjectivity
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legitimated the suppression of all those aspects of culture and identity
that did not conform to the norms established by the colonial power.14
The different varieties of feminism that developed in Britain during the
1960s and 1970 inherited these attitudes, leading many white, middle-
class feminists to adopt positions that mimicked colonial discourse. For
example, mainstream feminist discourse tended to pathologize the
black family in ways that evoked the eugenic discourses of imperial cul-
ture. This stance moved dominant feminism disturbingly close to the
rhetoric of the right wing during the 1970s. In challenging such imperial
feminism, writers like Emecheta and Carby underlined the differential
impact of gender- and class-inequality on black and white women. 
Imperial feminist models of universal sisterhood obscure the vastly
different priorities not simply of af›uent women in the developed
nations and of poor women in developing countries, but of black and
white women in Britain. Such issues are particularly important in the
context of quasi-autobiographical work such as Emecheta’s London
novels since the genre was initially treated as a transparent vehicle for
articulating an undifferentiated feminine identity.15 Yet if Emecheta’s
depiction of postcolonial African sexism indicts the uni‹ed model of
subjectivity that undergirded white, middle-class Western feminist
models of sisterhood during the 1970s, Second-Class Citizen also chal-
lenges romantic representations of precolonial African tradition such as
those cultivated by prominent advocates of negritude like Léopold
Sédar Senghor. During the era of decolonization, Senghor and other
male intellectuals advanced an idealized representation of precolonial
Africa, one in which women, seen as repositories of inviolable cultural
tradition, were consigned to the role of fecund mothers of the nation.16
Emecheta’s depiction of the oppression encountered by Adah lays bare
the costs of negritude’s ideological subordination of women. In chal-
lenging such depictions, Emecheta anticipates the critiques that black
feminists were to articulate a decade later when they began to contest
representations of their identity not simply in racist discourse but also
in the patriarchal traditions of the black community. 
The opening chapters of Second-Class Citizen offer a veritable pil-
grim’s progress of obstacles and setbacks. However, while describing
the structures of subordination Adah encounters, the novel refuses to
represent her purely as a victim. Instead, from the novel’s ‹rst page,
Adah speaks of a mysterious sense of Presence that directs her actions
and often inspires her to engage in acts of de‹ance. We learn later that
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Adah’s father perceives her as the returned spirit of his beloved mother
(13). The Presence that guides her throughout her life can thus be read
as a link to previous generations of African women. This sense of a guid-
ing presence prevents Adah from suffering the complete loss of self we
witness in a novel such as Joan Riley’s The Unbelonging, in which the
protagonist migrates to Britain as a young woman and, once there,
crumbles under the weight of racism and sexism.17 Unlike Riley’s pro-
tagonist, whose identity crisis leaves her disoriented and paralyzed,
Adah struggles endlessly to assert herself against great odds. 
Foremost in the years of her youth is her determination to acquire
an education. As a child, she absconds from home, walks to a local
school, and de‹antly informs the teacher that she’s decided to attend
classes (11). After her father dies, Adah’s mother is inherited by her
father’s brother—a common practice among Ibos at the time—and
Adah herself is sent to live in the household of her mother’s elder
brother. Here she must work to earn her keep, waking at 4:30 A.M. to
fetch water from the public pump. Despite such obstacles, she keeps up
her studies, permitted to do so by her uncle since her education will
increase the dowry she fetches when she’s eventually married off (17).
Nevertheless, Adah must still defy authority in order to progress to
higher levels of study. By drawing on the religious narratives to which
she has been exposed while attending missionary schools, Adah is able
to invert her sense of culpability for such de‹ance into a feeling of
heroic martyrdom. Adah’s pattern of steadfast striving amid tremen-
dous suffering as a young girl is one that will characterize her experience
throughout the novel. In spite of her later assertion that the Bible
teaches women passivity and thereby exacerbates patriarchal African
traditions (28), Christian tradition can evidently be appropriated in
order to license acts of de‹ance. Adah’s self-‹guration as a heroic mar-
tyr parallels the transformation of biblical narratives that takes place
within activist black religious traditions such as Rastafarianism, but this
time with an expressly feminist twist.18
Adah’s inversion of the dominant narrative of womanly submission
is also exempli‹ed in her marriage. Once she reaches adolescence, she
must endure a barrage of elderly, overweight suitors as a result of the
relatively high bride price her greedy family has set. Although they have
done nothing to further her education, they now wish to capitalize on
her accomplishments by collecting a fat dowry (23). In addition to limn-
ing the dif‹culty of escaping the grip of patriarchal tradition,
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Emecheta’s depiction of Adah also challenges notions of facile access to
an autochthonous African feminism. Although her sense of an abiding
Presence that guides her rebellion seems to suggest a link to such a fem-
inist essence, it must be remembered that Adah gains this bond through
her father. Similarly, in much of the rest of the novel, we see Adah strug-
gling ceaselessly against structures of male supremacy while neverthe-
less identifying with and placing her trust in individual men. Indeed, so
deeply does Adah internalize notions of male supremacy that she ends
up directing much of her anger at the women who surround her rather
than at the men who bene‹t most from the patriarchal structures of the
extended Ibo family. This is due in part to the fact that, among extended
kin groups, it is older women who are charged with social reproduction,
which includes preparing their daughter for lives of domestic servi-
tude.19 Thus, Adah’s rebellion against her allotted place in life initially
targets her mother, whom she sees as complicit in perpetuating her sub-
ordination. “If it were not for Ma,” Adah says, “Pa would have seen to it
that I started school with Boy” (9). She evinces a surprising degree of
satisfaction when the police, whom her mother has noti‹ed after Adah
runs off to school, physically abuse her mother and berate her for her
lax parenting. This incident may seem simply to exemplify Adah’s
growing sense of her own power and ability to effect change in the
world. However, her animosity toward her mother is an attitude that is
repeated frequently in Second-Class Citizen, contributing to a pattern of
hostility toward other women that leaves Adah isolated and, conse-
quently, far more easily subjected to the whims of her increasingly
tyrannical husband. Emecheta’s depiction of Adah thus grates against
idealistic notions of women’s inherent orientation toward community
and solidarity with other women.20 The bonds that Adah forges with
women outside her immediate family in Second-Class Citizen are tenu-
ous and extremely hard won.
Adah’s isolation is evident as soon as she sets foot in Britain.21 While
living in Lagos, she has grown used to the life of an elite, educated
woman, with many servants and a great deal of social status, despite her
subordination within the Obi clan. When she arrives in London, how-
ever, Adah learns from her husband that British racism has ›attened out
the Nigerian class system, and that all postcolonial Africans are thrown
together as second-class citizens in the motherland. Adah is appalled
not simply at the squalid apartment block Francis has found for them to
live in, but also at the fact that she must share these accommodations
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with working-class Nigerians. This theme in Second-Class Citizen chal-
lenges the tendency among some black feminists to treat the black com-
munity as undifferentiated in terms of class, and thereby to create a
monolithic representation of oppression.22 Although Francis nearly hits
her when she scolds him for not ‹nding a better situation, demonstrat-
ing to Adah that, free of the restrains exercised by the extended family,
there is little to rein in Francis’s abusive behavior, she ‹nds no surrogate
kin to turn to for support. Yet if her classism forces her into a self-
imposed exile from the working-class Nigerians in proximity to whom
she is forced to live by the racism of British landlords, her refusal to
internalize racist British attitudes is also a crucial factor in her solitude.
If other black Britons are willing to settle for second-class citizenship,
Adah kicks valiantly against this designation. For instance, when Fran-
cis presses her to seek work in a factory like other Nigerian women, she
obstinately refuses and instead applies for jobs in which she can employ
her university education. Since there were precious few other educated
black people occupying such professional positions in Britain at the
time, however, Adah’s successful application ironically leaves her iso-
lated from other black women both at home and at work. 
Adah’s relationship with her husband decays precipitously once she
arrives in Britain. Despite her refusal to be subordinated in virtually
every other walk of life, she demonstrates a virtually masochistic
propensity to put up with the humiliation and abuse meted out by
Francis.23 The night after their stormy reunion, for example, Francis
forces Adah to have sex with him in “an attack, as savage as that of any
animal” (40). When she becomes pregnant as a result of this marital
rape, Francis blames her for the baby and sends her off to a doctor to
deal with her “frigidity.” Although Adah quickly realizes that for Fran-
cis, “marriage was sex and lots of it, nothing more” (41), she not only
remains in the marriage, but declares that she has discovered that she
loves Francis and wants him to succeed in life (42). Dissatis‹ed with
Adah’s failure to service him sexually, Francis begins shopping around
for other women to take as lovers; rather than challenging this behavior,
Adah encourages it since, she says, in an act of spectacular denial, it
means she will have some peace at night. So abject is her subordination
that she is quite aware that her husband remains with her simply
because she keeps “laying golden eggs” as a result of her quali‹cations
and the well-paying jobs they help her land. Thus, her ‹erce ambition to
escape the oppressive con‹nes of her extended family in Nigeria
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becomes a vehicle to salvage a hollow and exploitative marriage in
Britain.
Despite her apparent strength in other walks of life, Adah conforms
to many of the characteristics of the abused woman who clings to her
batterer. Women like Adah often remain within abusive relationships
because their identity is de‹ned through their attachment to an appar-
ently stronger—but also deeply needy—partner.24 For example, Adah
continues to hand over her pay packet to Francis long after it becomes
obvious that he has no real intention of helping to support the family. In
addition, despite his blatant philandering, which extends even to an
affair with the child-minder Adah hires to help care for their children
while she’s out working, Emecheta’s heroine stays glued in a marriage
that she herself admits offers her nothing other than the affection of her
children. She represses this knowledge, which comes to her during cycli-
cal explosive crisis points such as the confrontation over the child-min-
der, continuing her slavish submission to Francis in the grooves of
everyday oppression that separate the occasional beatings. When Fran-
cis becomes a Jehovah’s Witness, he ‹nds a perfect excuse to cut his wife
off from contact with the mass media, where she might ‹nd examples of
women who refuse to endure such subordination. Emecheta writes that
Adah “simply accepted her role as de‹ned for her by her husband” (95).
Finally, Adah submits to Francis’s jealous behavior, internalizing his
irrational attacks on her character. When, for instance, she attempts to
control the frequent pregnancies for which he blames her by getting
access to contraception, Francis attacks her, saying that since she’s gone
behind his back to get a cervical cap she’ll now also ‹nd ways to have sex
with other men without his knowledge. Despite the injustice of this
accusation and the savage beating that follows it, Adah stays with Fran-
cis. Indeed, she apathetically resigns herself to the loneliness that follows
after Francis writes to his family about her behavior. Like many women
in abusive relationships, in other words, Adah’s individual passivity is
partially a product of the stigma attached to perceptions of inadequate
comportment by married women, who are often perceived as upholders
of community honor.25 So defeated is she by Francis’s accusations that
Adah submits herself to yet another pregnancy when her husband
refuses to use the contraceptive devices she has procured (149). It is only
when she goes to the hospital to deliver her baby and, while there, begins
comparing her situation with that of other women, that Adah begins to
adopt a more critical and autonomous attitude towards Francis.
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Adah’s dependency on Francis is never, however, a purely psycho-
logical affair, for their relationship does not occur in a vacuum. As she
did when representing the articulation of masculinist African traditions
with those brought to Nigeria by the British, Emecheta is at pains to
demonstrate the ways in which patriarchal institutions in Britain aug-
ment Francis’s abusive behavior. For example, from the moment she
sets foot on British soil, Adah is aware that the legal system makes her an
appendage of her husband (40). The racially in›ected changes in British
immigration laws during the 1960s thus had a particularly adverse
impact on women, who became dependent on their husbands for con-
tinued residence in Britain.26 To leave Francis would mean possible
deportation, a risk Adah is not willing to take; as a result, she remains
trapped by the state in her abusive relationship. This issue, identi‹ed so
early by Emecheta, remains a cardinal point in antiracist feminist cam-
paigns.27 The extent of her legal dependency on her husband is brought
home to Adah when she attempts, near the end of the novel, to gain
access to birth control. To her consternation, she ‹nds out that she
must have her husband’s signature on a consent form before she is given
the materials. This apparently bizarre state practice is a product of the
long-standing British legal principle of coverture, which speci‹es that
women legally owe both their domestic and their reproductive labor to
men.28 If Adah is unable to control her body, in other words, it is not
simply because Francis refuses to use birth control, but also because the
state legislates that he controls his wife’s body. Emecheta’s emphasis on
basic issues of access to marital and reproductive choice remains highly
salient around the world today and should therefore be a primary con-
cern of feminists interested in building transnational coalitions.29
The institutional sexism Adah confronts is augmented by the
racism of individual Britons. Although Adah is fortunate to have
extremely supportive colleagues during her stint as a librarian, her
search for housing exposes her to the fear and bigotry with which many
Britons reacted to postcolonial immigrants. In a tragicomic scene, Adah
disguises her voice while speaking on the phone to a potential landlady
in order to arrange an initial interview. When Adah and Francis even-
tually turn up outside the dilapidated building in a run-down part of
town to make their application as tenants, the landlady takes one look at
them and has what looks to Adah like an epileptic ‹t (77). Adah’s hopes
to salvage her marriage by orchestrating a move into better digs are
thereby scuttled. Of course, when she eventually decides to leave Fran-
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cis, the dif‹culty of ‹nding accommodation is a signi‹cant impedi-
ment. As a result of her isolation, Adah is ignorant not simply of her
right to state income support for her children, but also of the state’s
provision of public housing to those in need.30 Once she is aware of
these resources, Adah feels far more empowered to leave Francis, sug-
gesting that her dependency on him is not a function of purely psycho-
logical factors but also has a pragmatic material component: poverty.
Adah’s ultimate emancipation comes not as a result of the interven-
tion of any bene‹cent outside forces. Instead, she engineers her own lib-
eration through the rediscovery of her voice. While staying at home to
care for her recently born fourth child, Adah writes a novel, which she
regards as a literal brainchild (166). Francis of course refuses to read the
novel and tells her scornfully that she will never succeed as a writer
because she is an African woman. Although Adah once again demon-
strates her subordination to Francis by accepting his criticism, she is
pushed out of her thralldom when Francis maliciously destroys her
manuscript. When he burns Adah’s book, Francis seeks to immolate
what he perceives as a threatening expression of her autonomy. His per-
ception is quite accurate. Adah’s writing is an important site through
which she can reengage with the independent identity—her Presence—
that was so prominent during the years of her childhood. As feminist
theories of women’s writing have long stressed, narratives, particularly
autobiographical ones, offer a space for self-discovery through which
women—traditionally marginalized from the public sphere—may stake
claims as speaking subjects.31 For Adah, however, this process of eman-
cipation is de‹ned not simply as the discovery of an autonomous, sov-
ereign self. Instead, since her conception of writing explicitly parallels
the act of intellectual creation to childbirth, her self-discovery takes
place through development of her caring powers. By emphasizing this
maternal creativity, Emecheta’s protagonist explicitly repudiates the
denigration of black women’s life-giving capacity that characterizes
social relations in contemporary Britain.32 In subsequent writing,
Emecheta has questioned not simply the moral panic over single black
mothers, but also the distaste of many af›uent white feminists for
women’s caring work.33 As Eva Kittay has written, Western political the-
orists have largely failed to acknowledge dependency and the care of
dependents in their conceptions of equality and justice.34 When he
burns her manuscript, Francis attempts to destroy this fundamental
aspect of Adah’s identity as an African woman. If she is willing to forgive
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Francis all his other forms of soul-killing behavior, Adah will not con-
done this attack on the nurturing role through which she de‹nes her-
self. One page after narrating this incident, Adah describes her depar-
ture from her husband’s life with nothing but her four children, a box
of clothes, and a broken ‹nger. 
In the Ditch: Working-Class Women’s Solidarity
and the Welfare State
Published two years before Second-Class Citizen, Emecheta’s novel In
the Ditch ‹rst appeared in serial form in the leftist monthly New States-
man.35 This success came after years of failure for Emecheta, who tire-
lessly submitted ‹ction based on her African experience to British pub-
lishers with nothing to show for her efforts. At the time, Emecheta later
wrote, mainstream British publishers felt there was no market for nar-
ratives set in Africa, and by a woman to boot.36 Among members of the
New Left, however, the publication of The Making of the English Work-
ing Class, E. P. Thompson’s landmark history of British working-class
formation, had opened avenues for exploration of the everyday life
experience of the nonelite segments of British society.37 Groups such as
the History Workshop at Oxford’s Ruskin College began pioneering
new nonhierarchical educational practices based on the recording of
history by members of the working class themselves.38 When Buchi
Emecheta decided to begin documenting her own life experience
among the British lumpen following her escape from her marriage, rad-
ical groups such as History Workshop had prepared the ground for the
publication of her work by drawing attention to the many silences in the
of‹cial historical record. Emecheta’s work may therefore be seen as inti-
mately linked to the tradition that bore fruit in postcolonial initiatives
such as the Subaltern Studies Group in India.39
Emecheta’s In the Ditch was particularly groundbreaking, however,
in its focus on the lives of poor women. If Second-Class Citizen docu-
mented the forms of control exerted within the context of a patriarchal
marriage, Emecheta’s ‹rst-published novel records her struggle to
retain a sense of dignity and autonomy as a single parent subjected to
the ministrations of the welfare state. This focus on institutional issues
is an important supplement to the apparently personal problems high-
lighted in Second-Class Citizen, for it underlines the need to tackle the
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articulation of patriarchal family patterns with the discriminatory state
structures that help consign black women to second-class citizenship in
Britain. Furthermore, In the Ditch highlights the extent to which the
struggles of signi‹cant numbers of black women in Britain take place
not through organized political groups but around issues of family and
social reproduction. The attempts of Emecheta’s protagonist Adah to
carve out a sense of autonomy and to establish community in the midst
of great poverty offer important insights into the regulatory maneuvers
of the British welfare state.
In the Ditch’s documentation of poor women’s experience opened
important new lines of feminist inquiry. Even as feminists in Britain
began to recuperate the life histories of important foremothers such as
Virginia Woolf, Sylvia Pankhurst, and Rosa Luxemburg, scant attention
was paid to the plight of less illustrious women. Ironically, at precisely
the moment when the neoliberal onslaught on the post-1945 social con-
tract was being prepared, the experience of poor women at the hands of
the welfare state was highly underrepresented and ill understood. The
predominantly middle-class, white leaders of the feminist movement
were relatively unaware of such issues, despite their heavily socialist ori-
entation in Britain.40 The struggle of poor women for entitlement
remains underacknowledged by mainstream (middle class) feminism,
which, having insisted on women’s autonomy, continues to have
dif‹culty engaging the issue of women’s dependency on the state. Wel-
fare “reform” and the attendant war on poor women over the last
twenty years has consequently been largely ignored by mainstream fem-
inist organizations and theorists in both Britain and North America.41
This lack of solidarity helps perpetuate the enduring preoccupation
among policymakers and other elites with the family ethic.42 According
to the precepts of this sacrosanct ethic, women’s proper role was to
marry and have children while being supported by and subordinated to
a male breadwinner. If social welfare policy dictated to men that their
proper place was in the labor market, regardless of the prevailing wages
and work conditions, it sequestered women in the domestic sphere irre-
spective of their safety there and punished those who threatened to dis-
rupt the nuclear family.43 Although feminists subjected the family ethic
to withering critique, their predominantly middle-class origins led
them to largely ignore the role of the family ethic and social welfare pol-
icy in regulating the lives of poor women. As a result, little attention was
devoted to the oppressive aspects of the welfare state, and an opportu-
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nity for solidarity with those subjected to its disciplinary mechanisms
was lost. The history of the everyday struggle for survival recorded by In
the Ditch therefore offers an important record of poor women’s resis-
tance to the family ethic and to the welfare state’s attempts at oppressive
regulation. As the social safety net is ruthlessly cut back, women’s
autonomy from abusive relationships and domestic violence is increas-
ingly curtailed, a point that Buchi Emecheta’s documentary ‹ction 
drives home with great force.
In the Ditch begins with a scene of squalor, as Adah struggles to pro-
tect her newborn baby from a huge rat who boldly reconnoiters near the
infant’s cot. Having ›ed her husband’s oppressive behavior, Adah is
subjected to yet another tyrannical male ‹gure: her Nigerian landlord.
Taking advantage of her weak position as a single parent, her landlord
has doubled the rent he charges normally, berates Adah for even the
slightest noises made by her children, and even switches off her electric-
ity when he learns she has applied for public housing.44 Although
Emecheta relates in a comic vein her landlord’s ultimate turn to magi-
cal incantations in the middle of the night in order to expel her from his
building, her underlying point is a serious one. Without access to state
housing resources, Adah, pregnant again after Francis breaks into her
apartment and rapes her, stands little chance of establishing her auton-
omy. As a result of the racism of most British property owners, a single
parent such as Adah is cast back on the untender mercies of landlords
such as her juju-practicing compatriot.45 Therefore, when the local
council eventually ‹nds her an apartment in the run-down Pussy Cat
Mansions, Adah says that, though the place looks like a prison, it
brought her three essential things: independence, freedom, and peace of
mind (15).
But Adah quickly learns that Britain’s socialized housing schemes
come with strings attached, particularly for single parents. Pussy Cat
Mansions, Adah ‹nds out shortly after moving in, is reserved for “prob-
lem” families (17). This categorization implies that women engaged in
single parenting are aberrant, a thorn in the foot of the social order that
needs to be plucked out as soon as possible. Such autonomous women
represent a danger to any society that predicates its smooth functioning
on the subordination of women to a family ethic. In the course of the
twentieth century, however, con›icting demands for women’s home
and market work led to the creation of government programs that
shifted the locus of patriarchal authority from the male head-of-house-
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hold to the state. As it gained control of efforts to mediate women’s
reproductive and market labor, the state developed a panoply of regula-
tory mechanisms that intervened in the lives of women who challenged
the family ethic.46 Such women were subjected to social stigmatization
as well as strict government supervision of their lives and sexuality.
These trends came to a head during the 1970s, when broader preoccu-
pations caused by the social crises of the previous decade and by the fal-
tering of Britain’s economy led to the emergence of a moral panic over
child abuse.47 Deep anxieties about the decline of the traditional family
and the crisis of conventional morality fostered a creeping state pater-
nalism, which took the explicit form of strong child protection legisla-
tion that encouraged social workers to intervene actively in the parent-
ing practices of poor women.
As the head of just such a “problem” family, Adah is subjected to
many of the disciplinary controls of the regulatory paternal state. Thus,
in short order after her arrival at Pussy Cat Mansions, the complex’s
“family adviser,” Carol, pays a visit to Adah. “People here,” Carol
informs Adah, “say that your children make too much noise, and that
you leave them all by themselves in the evenings” (24). Adah immedi-
ately understands that her aggressively racist neighbors have reported
her to Carol. Assuming the worst, Adah replies to Carol’s accusation,
“So you come to take them away from me, lady?” (24). Faced with
Carol’s probing questions, Adah caves in completely, wondering with
resignation whether the social worker is going to take her to jail. Carol’s
behavior, however, is more dif‹cult to predict than Adah initially sus-
pects. Rather than punishing her, Carol adopts a conciliatory if patron-
izing attitude towards Adah. After establishing her role as a minatory
authority, Carol adopts the guise of state aid worker and offers to help
‹nd sitters to look after Adah’s children during the evenings. Adah is
well aware of the disciplinary role inherent in this apparently bene‹cent
stance.48 She therefore observes of Carol that “the lady was a true diplo-
mat, a trained and experienced social worker, one of a race of women
whom one was never sure whether to treat as friends or as members of
the social police” (25).
For Adah, Carol’s offers of aid are a poisoned chalice. Despite her
dif‹cult economic circumstances, Adah is determined to avoid the dole,
the state aid provided in Britain to women with children. This resistance
to state charity is partially a result of Adah’s internalization of classist
stereotypes concerning those who are forced to accept state aid. When
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she ‹rst arrives in Pussy Cat Mansions, where almost all the women are
on the dole, Adah initially views those who depend on state aid as lazy
and parasitic (33). Yet this is not the sole reason for her resistance. Hav-
ing only just escaped a crippling dependency on her husband, Adah is
loath to lean on anyone else, the welfare state included. Such depen-
dency of course exacerbates perceptions of poor women as problems,
subjected to the state’s remedial programs, thereby shifting attention
away from the discriminatory behavior and structures that marginalize
poor women in the ‹rst place. While Adah may not be aware of this
political background, the condescension with which Carol speaks to her
and her ability to strip Adah of her children make the power dynamic
inherent in her relation with Carol quite clear. As a result, like many
women, Adah views dependency on either a man or state bene‹ts as
equally damaging to her prospects for self-actualization.49 Despite her
determination to remain autonomous, however, Adah cannot keep up
the “double shift” called for by waged and domestic labor.50 Scolded
again by Carol for leaving her kids early at school so that she has time to
get to work, Adah gives up her job and resigns herself to life “in the
ditch.”
Adah learns quickly that staying alive while on the dole is a full-time
occupation. Although the welfare state helps poor women avoid unsafe
and insecure jobs and marriages, in other words, aid programs are
implemented in a manner designed to minimize the social costs of such
women. This makes survival on the dole extremely arduous. After
queuing for her ‹rst payment, for instance, Adah goes shopping, only to
‹nd that the weekly allowance for groceries does not cover the items
she’s placed in her shopping basket during this single excursion. The
money to pay for her groceries, she decides, will have to come from the
allotment given her for heating (38). The indignities to which the dole’s
inadequate payments reduce poor women had hardly ‹gured in Adah’s
views of dole recipients as lazy parasites. As she settles into dependency,
however, Adah learns ‹rst hand about the daily doses of humiliation
dispensed by Britain’s welfare state. Since there is no ‹xed allotment,
women like Adah have to beg ministry of‹cers for funds to adequately
clothe their children. On one such occasion, Adah sits at home all day
waiting for the of‹cials to visit her to see about a shoe allowance for her
children. While she waits, Adah explains that her children frequently
wet their beds since it’s too cold to get up and go to the bathroom. Adah
has been buying paraf‹n on credit and cannot afford to heat her kids’
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rooms. In addition, although her children are fed at school, Adah her-
self is not so lucky. By ten o’clock, she is experiencing pangs of hunger
as she waits for the of‹cials, and decides to cook the ration of rice that
she had been saving for dinner. “Blast balanced meals! You can think of
balancing meals when you have enough food,” she comments bitterly
(51). Finally, Adah has been allowing herself only three baths per week
in order to save money on gas. In order to be presentable before the
ministry of‹cials arrive, she takes one of these carefully rationed baths.
When her friend Whoopey arrives to ‹nd her getting dressed up for the
of‹cials’ visit, she advises Adah that this is precisely the wrong course of
action: “We are poor, and the bastards want us to look poor” (53). As
Whoopey explains, the dole requires poor women to abandon their
aspirations not simply for material comforts, but also for the forms of
dignity that are taken for granted among less poverty stricken people.
Not only does the dole drain poor women of all their energy as they
carefully ration themselves and struggle to make ends meet on an inad-
equate social wage. In addition, it also systematically robs them of their
dignity and enforces an infantilizing form of dependency on the stern
authority of the usually middle-class, male state of‹cials who supervise
aid programs.
Adah also ‹nds out that the dole is intended to keep women
trapped in this humiliating dependency. Emecheta’s protagonist ini-
tially articulates criticism of state aid that anticipates the arguments fre-
quently heard from conservative quarters during the subsequent
neoliberal era: the dole robs people of their dignity by encouraging
them not to work (47). This criticism offers little sense that the dole is a
kind of social wage that puts a ›oor below wages, a Keynesian welfare
state strategy calculated to tighten labor markets and thereby generate
higher wages for those who are employed.51 In such a reading, assaults
on the welfare state over the last two decades are not so much an
attempt to reconnect poor people with the ennobling effect of work as
they are ploys to loosen labor markets and depress wages. Emecheta is
not, however, concerned with these structural economic issues so much
as she is with the psychological and emotional impact of dependency on
women. As a result, it is the shame and despair that life in the ditch
encourages that is the principal focus of her attention. 
The strength of Emecheta’s depiction of life on the dole therefore
lies in its challenge to the pathologizing representations of the poor that
have gained hegemony in discussions of urban poverty. According to
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such perspectives, the behavior of the poor is a product of an “under-
class” mentality rooted in dependency on welfare.52 The key to social
transformation is not, then, an attack on the structural inequality that
encourages dependency on welfare, but a tough-love approach that
forces the poor to stand on their own feet regardless of the vicissitudes
of the labor market. Against such pathologizing portraits of the poor,
Emecheta’s rendering of life on the dole demonstrates the tremendous
initiative necessary to survive with a modicum of dignity. As Adah
points out after a cheap paraf‹n heater nearly torches her apartment
and her sleeping children, the dole keeps poor women on the edge of
survival. Although Emecheta’s writing acknowledges the demoralizing
impact of welfare, it does not support an “underclass” view of poor
neighborhoods as isolated, dysfunctional social enclaves, but instead
focuses criticism on the inequalities and suffering that the inadequacies
of the welfare state help perpetuate.
In the Ditch also dramatizes the hollowness of contemporary
rhetoric concerning employment-based self-suf‹ciency for those rele-
gated to the low-wage sector of the labor force. Desperate to earn some
money in order to buy Christmas presents for her children, Adah inter-
views for a part-time job as a cleaner in a factory. Although she’s offered
a wage of six pounds a week by the manager who interviews her, Adah
is desperately afraid of having her bene‹ts cut if it’s discovered that she’s
working for more than the amount stipulated by Social Security. Of
course, if she’s booted off the dole, she’ll be in far worse economic
straits as a result of the inadequacy of the rate initially offered by the
manager. Instead of chancing this, she offers to work for two pounds a
week. After a month or so of work, however, the physical toll of the
labor begins to affect her health and Adah suffers a breakdown. As a
result, she’s forced to quit the job and return to eking out an existence
on the dole alone. Adah’s experience with unskilled labor thus demon-
strates the fallacy of assuming that jobs for poor people offer a living
wage or the economic security necessary to constitute a viable alterna-
tive to dependency on state aid.53
In addition, Adah’s narrative also highlights the anger generated
among poor women by the state’s paternalistic regulations. As if the
supplicatory pose that life in the ditch imposes were not enough, wel-
fare authorities also prohibit women such as Adah from engaging in an
active sexual and emotional life. As Adah quickly learns, “The women
not only had to be poor, but they had to be sex-starved too” (60). The
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regulation of poor women’s sexuality is not, however, simply grounded
on an economic rationale. In addition, the proscription of “fancy men”
also has an underlying eugenic consideration: the state intends to pre-
vent poor women from reproducing. As Adah points out, such regula-
tions are absurd given the widespread availability of birth control and
abortion in contemporary Britain (61). Faced with this seemingly gratu-
itous discipline, poor women rebel in a variety of ways: 
Living in the ditch had its own consolations and advantages. There
were always warm and natural friends. Friends who took delight in
›outing society’s laws. Some women indulged in having more and
more children, a way of making the society that forced them into
the ditch suffer. Some enjoyed taking it out on the welfare of‹cers
of the Ministry of Social Security, others took to drink. (54)
The state’s transparently classist and racist proscriptions on poor
women’s sexuality turns childbearing into a right to be struggled for
rather than a burden to be avoided, as the pro-choice rhetoric of mid-
dle-class feminism tends to imply. Emecheta’s explanation of women’s
rebellion highlights the extent to which forms of behavior that are per-
ceived by state authorities as dysfunctional are instead a rebellion
against oppressive regulation and social marginalization. The forms of
putative ghetto pathology singled out by conservative critics are, in
other words, often insurrectionary acts by women whom society keeps
in an immiserated state and whose lives the state attempts to regulate
down to the most intimate details. 
As Emecheta suggests in the preceding quotation, poor women also
cultivate strong bonds of solidarity despite their social marginalization.
Women like her gregarious neighbor Mrs. Cox remind Adah of
“African matrons” who “have that sense of mutual aid that is ingrained
in people who have known a communal rather than an individualistic
way of life” (65).54 This sense of solidarity is expressed not simply in the
bonds of affection that develop among the women living at Pussy Cat
Mansions. In addition, mutual aid extends to collective action against
the bullying bureaucrats of the welfare state. In one particularly power-
ful scene, Adah’s friend Whoopey rallies her when she’s scolded for rent
arrears. Adah’s long-standing insecurity emerges in her exchange with
the of‹cial, whose attempts to extract rent lead her to re›ect, “It is a
curse to be an orphan, a double curse to be a black one in a white coun-
114 MONGREL NATION
try, an unforgivable calamity to be a woman with ‹ve kids but without
a husband” (71). Just as Adah is about to cave in and hand over the
money, however, Whoopey and another neighbor intervene and
demand that the council clean up her apartment before she pays rent.
While class solidarity does not overcome racism among all her neigh-
bors, the bonds forged through resistance to poverty and oppression
teach Adah a great deal about the need to challenge authority. Adah is
frequently encouraged by her neighbors to engage in rent strikes in
response to the appalling conditions she must endure in public housing.
In addition, she participates as the women organize a protest march in
response to the supercilious behavior of Carol, the complex’s social
worker. As Adah comments, “Women in the ditch were always too
ignorant or too frightened to ask for what they were entitled to. People
like Carol were employed to let them know their rights, but the trouble
was that Carol handed them their rights, as if she was giving out char-
ity” (98).55 The solidarity Adah witnesses in response to this sort of con-
descending behavior has a dramatic impact on the hobbling insecurity
that she carried with her following her childhood as an orphan and her
damaging marriage to Francis.
Adah’s increasing strength is most apparent in her reaction to
expressions of racism from some of her neighbors in the ditch. When
she ‹rst arrives at Pussy Cat Mansions, she attempts to placate her
aggressively bigoted neighbors by playing dumb. Her assumption is that
British people all believe that Africans are ignorant savages, and that the
path of least resistance is to play along with this stereotype in order to
solicit their condescending aid (18). This strategy is self-defeating, how-
ever, for it simply leads to expressions of weakness that encourage
increasing abuse. Yet by the end of her stint at Pussy Cat Mansions,
Adah has developed the strength to stand up to such bigotry. When a
crabby woman tells her to go back to her own country during a con›ict
in the washroom, for example, Adah shoots back that she doesn’t look
English herself (110). The woman sputters racist attacks in response, but
is defeated and humiliated by Adah’s quick comeback. 
The gradual development of Adah from insecurity to strength logi-
cally culminates in her departure from Pussy Cat Mansions. Yet this
transition is by no means an easy one. Adah ironically fails to apply for
rehousing for quite some time as a result of her fear of losing the forms
of friendship and solidarity that life in the ditch helps foster (91). Para-
doxically, then, Adah’s life among what she initially perceives as the
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degraded recipients of state aid becomes highly attractive because of the
comradeship it affords in the midst of material deprivation. One ‹nal
encounter with Carol nevertheless convinces Adah that she is being
used by the social worker rather than vice versa. This perception, aug-
mented by Adah’s gradually increasing strength, leads her to ultimately
overcome her fear of isolation and climb out of the ditch. The novel
concludes with Adah relocating to an apartment in a new complex situ-
ated in an af›uent London neighborhood. As Emecheta documents in
her autobiography, this was the beginning of the transition that lead to
her degree in sociology and to her successful career as an author. From
this increasingly autonomous and ful‹lled perspective, Adah is able to
regard with suitable skepticism her apparently strong friend Whoopey’s
pipe dreams for social mobility through the arrival of a wealthy suitor
(131). In the Ditch thus traces Adah’s journey not only from poverty to
increasing economic self-suf‹ciency, but also from emotional insecu-
rity to growing autonomy and resiliency in the face of the systemic
racism and classism that characterized British society during the 1960s.
Conclusion
In the powerful introduction to her collection of essays by black British
women authors, then-exiled South African author Lauretta Ngcobo
writes:
White Britons want to forget this [imperialist] past, to forget that
we once lived in close proximity with them, in their kitchens, caring
for their children, being raped by their men and then bearing those
tainted babies. It is not surprising that our appearance in the front
garden of Britain causes embarrassment. We bring back to life for-
gotten crimes and immense guilt. This amnesia is the unacknowl-
edged admission that British society still has not come to terms with
our presence. We linger in a kind of social limbo and consequently
suffer a state of invisibility.56
If Ngcobo’s analysis of Britain’s imperial amnesia suggests that the
invisibility of black women was no accident, the last thirty years have
witnessed a sustained battle by such women to escape the forms of
invisibility to which they were consigned. Such activism led to the artic-
116 MONGREL NATION
ulation of stinging critiques of racism. The feminist movement in
Britain was not spared from these critical salvos. Indeed, a great deal of
the energy of black British feminism during its initial period of ef›ores-
cence was consumed with carving out a space for black women within
the broader feminist movement. In works such as Hazel Carby’s “White
Women Listen!” black feminists drew attention to the myopia of the
dominant traditions of feminism, which called for universal solidarity
between women while ignoring the very real inequalities fostered by
class and race difference. Carby’s work, like that of other black femi-
nists, introduced important traditions of transnational cultural and
political practice to Britain. 
Take the feminist discussion of the family ethic. During the post-
1945 period, the terms of debate about women’s labor hinged on the
impact of work outside the home on British family life. Yet, as Carby
points out, little attention was devoted to the effect of large-scale labor
force participation among colonized women throughout the century.57
Indeed, black women were employed in great numbers in Britain’s
reserve army of labor in the colonies with absolutely no consideration of
the impact on the families of colonized subjects. When black women
migrated to Britain, these traditions of working a double shift under
highly exploitative conditions traveled with them. Rather that striving
to protect black families, the state reproduced commonsense beliefs
about their inherent pathology. “Black women,” Carby argues, “were
seen to fail as mothers precisely because of their position as workers.”58
Thus, the pathologization of black families by the state in Britain during
the postimperial period has a strong colonial genealogy. For many black
feminists, as a result, discussions of women’s emancipation unfolded
under dramatically different terms from those adopted by the main-
stream feminist movement. The consensus view among many white,
middle-class feminists that the family was purely a site of oppression
could not be adopted by many black women, who had to ‹ght for the
right to have children and who often turned to their families for shelter
from racist hostility.
As the ‹rst successful black woman novelist living in Britain after
1948, Buchi Emecheta clearly is a pioneering ‹gure in overcoming the
invisibility to which black British women were relegated. The autobio-
graphically based documentary ‹ction of her London novels, the ‹rst
works she published, encompasses three important stages that are often
cited as the classic path toward women’s empowerment: discovering
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voice; establishing forms of collective solidarity; and engaging in politi-
cal activism. Yet the progress of Emecheta’s protagonist Adah along this
path is marked by signi‹cant differences from those which would
obtain for the majority of British women. She must, for example, navi-
gate an extended kin system as an orphan, her identity reduced essen-
tially to that of a commodity. Her marriage continues this relation. Yet
when she ‹nally breaks out of her suffocating subordination to her hus-
band, she ‹nds herself, as a poor black woman, locked in another form
of dependency. Emecheta’s depiction of her struggle to survive in the
ditch offers a powerful instance of the pathologization discussed by
Hazel Carby, even if her portrait of Adah’s dependency on Francis in
Second-Class Citizen seems to challenge some of Carby’s assertions
about the distinctions between black and white feminism. In her Lon-
don trilogy, Emecheta thus evokes many of the central issues around
black women’s struggle to forge and maintain identity in Britain that
would concern groups like OWAAD in subsequent years.
In addition to anticipating many of the important issues for black
feminist organizing, Buchi Emecheta’s London trilogy offers important
historical perspective on the present. Far from improving, the sexist and
racist devaluation of black women’s identity and labor depicted by
Emecheta intensi‹ed in the last decades of the century. If black workers
were recruited to facilitate white upward mobility while accepting
wages at a level unpalatable to the indigenous working class, the end of
the postwar economic boom and the imposition of spiraling rounds of
austerity after the 1970s has disproportionately affected black people.
High unemployment and the downsizing of the Keynesian welfare state
made jobs attractive to white workers who previously regarded such
labor as beneath them. As Amina Mama explains, black women are pre-
dominantly concentrated in those areas of the British economy that
have been most affected by post-Fordist downsizing, including caring
professions such as nursing, teaching, community and social work, and
service labor.59 Consigned to such roles by oppressive notions of “femi-
ninity” and by racist practices in education and elsewhere, black women
have born the brunt of neoliberal downsizing policies in these areas. In
addition, since they are more often heads of families and are more likely
to have unemployed domestic partners, assaults on black woman’s
wages have a disproportionately damaging impact on the black com-
munity as a whole. As neoliberal structural adjustment policies have
ripped through the British economy over the last decades, the plight of
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poor black women such as the protagonist of Buchi Emecheta’s London
novels can only have worsened.60 Indeed, from the vantage point of the
present, Adah’s heroic effort to pull herself ‹rst out of her abusive mar-
riage and then out of the ditch of welfare dependency is particularly
poignant. Tragically, the story of Adah’s journey toward autonomy is
even harder to imagine today than when it was originally told.
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5
Heritage Politics of the Soul
Immigration and Identity in Salman Rushdie’s
The Satanic Verses
On 27 March 1989 a large protest of twenty thousand or more
Muslims from around Britain and the rest of Europe marched through
central London to condemn Salman Rushdie’s affront to Islam in his
recently published novel The Satanic Verses and to call for the book’s
banning. This demonstration was one of the most important protests in
a season of discontent among British Muslims, whose anger at the
shortcomings of British multiculturalism had been brewing for most of
the decade. Lofting banners calling for “Equal Rights for Muslims,”
demonstrators congregated outside the Houses of Parliament to burn
Salman Rushdie in ef‹gy. Here, a multiracial clutch of activists from the
recently formed group Women Against Fundamentalism (WAF) had
set up a picket.1 Their placards called for the repeal rather than the
extension of the Blasphemy Law and voiced support for Salman
Rushdie’s freedom of expression. Arguments quickly ›ared up over the
women’s avowed solidarity with Rushdie. Soon, the WAF picket was
being attacked by young men from the march as well as by a group of
white neofascists, who had accompanied the protest march to express
their support for the integrity of Muslim culture. The ensuing melee, in
which riot police had to intervene to protect the WAF activists from the
enraged crowd, underlined the incendiary quality of con›icts around
religion and identity in Britain.
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The WAF picket attracted controversy even before the march.
Members of the Anti-Fascist League had decided to march alongside the
Muslim protesters in order to support the rights of ethnic minorities to
resist racism. WAF’s picket seemed to ›y in the face of this stance of
antiracist solidarity. Indeed, by coming out in opposition to what lead-
ers were representing as the common voice of the British Muslim com-
munity, WAF was challenging a long-standing tenet of antiracist poli-
tics in Britain. Throughout the 1970s and the ‹rst half of the 1980s,
antiracist politics had pivoted on internal solidarity in the face of the
institutional and quotidian manifestations of racism in Britain. It was
consequently taboo for Asian and black women to express criticism of
gender relations within their communities outside closed community
forums.2 In tandem with such models of defensive solidarity, antiracist
leaders lionized the street-‹ghting prowess of local youth groups, who
were seen as defending Asian and black communities from the hostile
incursions of neofascist hooligans.3 Leftist groups such as the Anti-Fas-
cist League echoed this analysis of the militant, largely male youth
groups as the authentic voice of Asian and black communities. Yet, by
embracing the street-‹ghting machismo of militant antiracist groups,
radical intellectuals had to avert their eyes from the role of many youth
groups in colluding with the most conservative elements of communi-
ties by policing the conduct of women.4 In championing black nation-
alism in such uncritical terms, in other words, theorists of black British
social movements reproduced the problematic gender politics of anti-
colonial nationalism.5 WAF’s picket against the anti-Rushdie demon-
stration therefore challenged not simply religious fundamentalism but
also the essentialism of many progressives in Britain’s antiracist move-
ment. For many radical Asian and black women in Britain, holding
one’s tongue in the name of antiracist solidarity had come by the late
1980s to be analogous to the traditional injunction to preserve commu-
nity honor or izzat by staying silent in the face of gender oppression.6
In addition to challenging antiracist models of communal solidar-
ity, however, the WAF picket also ›ew in the face of dominant media
representations of Muslim communities in Britain as homogeneous
and extremist. The day after the demonstration, for instance, the Sun-
day Times Magazine ran a major article whose introduction is obviously
connected to the events of the preceding day: “For several decades
Islamic militancy existed for Britons only as indignantly reported out-
breaks in far-off countries of which we knew nothing. The past few
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months have shown that it is now a potent, living organism in the body
of Britain itself, impossible to wish away or assimilate or suppress.”7
Like much of the rhetoric that circulated in Britain during the Rushdie
Affair, the Times article tells us more about (non-Muslim) British fears
of Muslims than it does about British Muslims themselves. Protests
against The Satanic Verses suggest to the author that the once hale body
of British society has been penetrated by an alien presence, a virus or
parasite whose virility explains the alarmed tone of the article’s title: “Is
Rushdie Just the Beginning?” The article’s rhetoric of contamination
testi‹es to a deeply racist conception of the nation as a homogeneous,
organic community. Yet it is ironically the presence of the perceived
Islamic pathogen that facilitates the retroactive construction of the
national body as a sanitary space. The racism inscribed within these
metaphors of pollution is one that, in other words, is dependent upon
the exaggeration of cultural differences, despite the ostensibly somatic
rhetoric of disease. As Étienne Balibar argues, this is a racism “whose
dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of
cultural differences, a racism which, at ‹rst sight, does not postulate the
superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but ‘only’
the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles
and traditions.”8 The image of the nation as diseased site, a once healthy
body invaded by a malign cultural virus, legitimates discourses of polit-
ical prophylaxis designed to reestablish an imaginary healthy state.9
As the Times article suggests, the Rushdie affair was an opening
salvo in what Samuel Huntington, in a much-cited 1993 essay in Foreign
Affairs, subsequently called a “clash of civilizations” between Islam and
the West.10 Anticipating Huntington’s approach, commentators on the
Rushdie affair tended to depict Britain as a progressive, secular society
whose multicultural, pluralistic values were threatened by bellicose
Muslim fundamentalism. This neo-Orientalist binarism is novel to the
extent that the Islamic Other is now internal to Europe, rather than, as
the Times article has it, in far-off countries. Such geographical proxim-
ity generates intense anxiety about border crossing and pollution.
Indeed, warnings by scholars such as Huntington about the inherently
irrational and belligerent character of Islam serve as an a priori
justi‹cation for preemptive measures.11 These self-ful‹lling xenophobic
discourses are dependent upon the diminution of both the similarities
between “host” and “alien” and the differences within each group. For
instance, assertions of British secularism conveniently ignore the fact
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that Britain retains a Blasphemy Law whose solely Christian provenance
makes explicit both the racial formation and the nonsecularity of the
state. Despite the fact that they were habitually described as benighted
medievalists, British Muslims calling for the equitable application of the
Blasphemy Law were in fact appealing to Enlightenment conceptions of
an egalitarian legal system. The similarity between protesters’ concep-
tions of religious offense and those of the establishment in Britain was
underlined when Dr. Rubert Runcie, the archbishop of Canterbury,
called for the extension of the law against blasphemy to cover religions
other than Christianity.12
The WAF picket in Whitehall was also established with con›icts
around rising fundamentalism in South Asia in mind, and, like those
con›icts, suggested that the constitutive contradictions of both multi-
cultural state policy and religious fundamentalism are most evident
around questions of gender. Feminists working on the interface
between nationalism and gender power have long argued that women
play crucial roles, both materially and symbolically, in sustaining com-
munities; characteristically, gender difference is used symbolically to
de‹ne the bounds of national or communal identity.13 These observa-
tions are even more apt in relation to transnational movements such as
religious fundamentalism. Fundamentalist movements of all denomi-
nations take this reduction of women to the role of icons of collective
integrity to an extreme.14 As WAF de‹nes them, such movements tend
to be organized as vanguardist hierarchies that attempt to take over
state power in order to enforce a supposedly divinely mandated moral-
ity. This morality typically centers on the control of women’s sexuality
and behavior as a means to preserve collective identity in the face of var-
ious pressures.15 Women are reduced under such circumstances to vehi-
cles for collective honor and theological orthodoxy.
It is no coincidence that WAF’s picket was construed as an assault
on community honor during a demonstration against a novel that was
itself taken as an affront to izzat. As Marina Warner has argued, there is
a historical homology between control of the word and control of
women in religious movements.16 Indeed, it was precisely these two
aspects of Salman Rushdie’s novel that were cited as giving offense and
legitimating the subsequent fatwa against the author. Yet Rushdie’s
depiction of the Koran’s fallibility and his de‹ling of the honor of
Muhammad’s wives take place within dream sequences experienced by
his protagonist Gibreel Farishta. These dreams are a response to the
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unstable social conditions Gibreel encounters in India and Britain dur-
ing the 1980s. Thus, although the novel has often been seen as sparking
a Manichaean clash of civilizations, it in fact simply ‹ctionalizes and
critiques the unfolding social con›icts in contemporary Britain and
India. Moreover, The Satanic Verses suggests that forms of symbolic
border policing that turn on representations of feminine purity are cen-
tral to these con›icts. Thus, although Rushdie has often been taken for
a doyen of cosmopolitan hybridity, The Satanic Verses explores the con-
ditions that generate fundamentalist assertions of identity, suggesting
that diasporic experience generates forms of political bifocality that are
just as often con›ictual as they are hybrid.17 Rushdie’s focus on the
homosocial rivalry that develops between his two male protagonists
dramatizes the way in which women’s identity and rights have fre-
quently been displaced in the internecine struggles of racialized com-
munities within both Britain and India over the course of the last
decades.
After the publication of The Satanic Verses, Salman Rushdie was
attacked not simply by Islamic fundamentalists but also by many pro-
gressive intellectuals who saw his work as complicit with Orientalist
representations of Islam.18 Yet, as Rushdie was quick to point out, his
novel is just as critical of British racism as it is of Islamism, and in fact
sees the two as intertwined in signi‹cant ways. While Islamophobia has
only escalated in the West since the publication of The Satanic Verses,
young Muslim men and women have begun forging a European Islam
by developing the tradition of ijtihad, or independent reasoning.19
Despite the controversy that it elicited, The Satanic Verses needs to be
seen as a pioneering attempt to develop this tradition of ijtihad. The
work of Women Against Fundamentalism marks a similarly early and
important initiative whose critical stance in relation to both British
multiculturalism and religious fundamentalism breaks down the facile
binaries of culture clash theories. By engaging with communal con›ict
in South Asia and the racialization of diasporic subjects in Britain,
Rushdie’s novel highlights the extent to which the control of women
and their sexuality is a logical outcome of monolithic, exclusionary rep-
resentations of identity among both dominant and subordinate groups.
Through its analysis of this gendered heritage politics, The Satanic
Verses, like the protests of WAF activists, underlines the reductive char-
acter of the culture clash theories that have occupied an increasingly
prominent place in the public sphere since the Rushdie affair.
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Of Migrations and Metamorphoses
Migration to Britain is an undeniably violent process, a chaotic birth
into newness, for Saladin Chamcha and Gibreel Farishta, the twin pro-
tagonists of The Satanic Verses.20 Blown out of their plane by a Sikh sep-
aratist from Canada, the two fall to earth in a big bang that exposes the
fragmented lives of contemporary migrants.21 For migrants drawn from
underdeveloped nations to ‹ll the most menial positions in the labor
force of metropolitan countries, international travel involves the fearful
negotiation of border controls established precisely in order to regulate
the ›ow of this new industrial reserve army.22 As Rushdie’s narrator sug-
gests, women and children are the primary objects of the inquisitorial
gaze of this state bureaucracy. Indeed, this surveillance apparatus pene-
trates into the most private spaces and, in doing so, makes citizenship
rights hinge upon questions of gender. The immigration checks that The
Satanic Verses itemizes force women to document their marital status
through detailed description of their husbands’ genitals, underlining the
state’s recognition of their identity solely as legal appendages to their
husbands. In addition, such checks suggest the homosocial bonds and
animosities of the nation-state, for, despite the increasing exploitation
of immigrant women’s labor within the metropolis, it is the absent phal-
lus of the male immigrant that is the ultimate object of the state’s atten-
tion. The paranoid gaze that seeks out these disseminatory objects is, of
course, animated by fear of the growth of Britain’s nonwhite population
as a result of the reunion and propagation of Asian and black families.23
Finally, such prying examinations emphasize the assumed alterity and
illegality of all nonwhite migrants: the “reasonable” facade of the immi-
gration control apparatus obscures the systematic forms of racialization
that it effects upon both immigrants and citizens.
Discussing the British Nationality Act of 1981, Louise London and
Nira Yuval-Davis argue that the act’s implementation of a two-tiered
system that distinguishes between “Patrial UK” and “Commonwealth”
citizens has underlined the gendered nature of access to the rights of a
British subject. The act’s increased emphasis on women as reproducers
of the national collectivity—women now being transmitters of citizen-
ship to their children—has gone hand in hand with a campaign involv-
ing the racialized delimitation of the rights of belonging within that col-
lectivity.24 The Nationality Act culminates a succession of measures that
reframed rights of belonging by limiting citizenship to already estab-
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lished resident citizens and to the descendants of white British citizens.
As commentators have pointed out, Britain thus aligned itself with the
European gastarbeiter model, in which the costs of reproducing migrant
labor were displaced onto underdeveloped nations through the host
country’s refusal to grant citizenship rights to the immigrant labor
force.25 Under such conditions, the ethnic and gendered speci‹city of
nationalist ideology becomes ever more apparent.26
Having thus shorn itself of its legal responsibilities for its former
colonial subjects, Britain had by the Thatcher era become decisively
postcolonial. The “debris of the soul”—empty signi‹ers such as belong-
ing and home—that plummet down from the shredded fuselage of the
Bostan jetliner in the opening pages of The Satanic Verses are the speci‹c
products in the ‹rst instance of separatist terrorism. Behind this initial
explosion, however, lie the increasingly racist de‹nitions of national
belonging codi‹ed as Britain’s postwar economic boom wound down,
emptying words such as belonging and home of meaning for members of
the Asian diaspora in Britain. Fragmentation and double consciousness
result, in other words, from the intertwined patterns of globalization
and renationalization that Britain has undergone rather than from
some vague ontological condition of exile. While this denial of statutory
rights does not legally affect the bulk of the postwar immigrant popula-
tion of Britain, the tendency is for all those who do not appear “British”
or, worse still, “English,” to be treated as possible aliens.
Such state-sanctioned ethnic absolutism brings its institutional
power to bear very differently on men and on women. Women, in par-
ticular, are frequently represented as the reproducers of threatening
forms of internal difference. Indeed, British feminists have expressed
fears that, despite the relatively egalitarian postwar state provisioning of
reproductive consultation and services, abuses of minority women’s
reproductive rights may become more widespread given the ongoing
moral panic over the pollution of the racial stock of the nation.27 Con-
temporary politicians continue to employ the racist rhetoric of national
reproduction characteristic of the imperial epoch, despite the exit of
Margaret Thatcher and her infamous fear of “swamping.”28
Notwithstanding the racism Asian and black Britons are likely to
encounter within this context, Rushdie’s narrator refuses to see migra-
tion simply as a condition of deracination. Diaspora in the novel
involves not just the discontinuous experience suggested by the Bostan’s
“debris of the soul,” but also processes of mutation that generate “new-
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ness.” These processes raise the question of whether a notion of essen-
tial identity is possible in light of such transformations, and of what atti-
tudes the translated will assume in order to make sense of their disjunc-
tive experience. Rushdie’s narrator poses such questions explicitly:
“How does newness come into the world? How is it born? Of what
fusions, translations, conjoinings is it made?” (8). Rushdie asks here not
only what forms of hybridity are generated by diaspora experience, but
also, crucially, what sorts of heritage politics and ethnic absolutism such
displacements give rise to. Despite the dissemination associated with
diaspora, the politics of identity consolidation operate in a tense, dialec-
tical relation to those of hybridization.29 In the context of the highly
›uid conditions of today’s global cultural economy, the assertion of
transcultural af‹liation by diaspora populations has become an impor-
tant strategy for proclaiming the solidarity of racialized national
minorities with transnational communities and their wider horizons
and histories of struggle.30 Such practices do not, however, necessarily
lead to an embrace of self-consciously hybrid cultural practices and
identities. These changes also antagonize groups intent on consolidat-
ing the boundaries between imagined communities using various forms
of ethnic absolutism.
Crashing to earth in the middle of the Bostan’s welter of exploded
hopes, Gibreel and Saladin undergo a metamorphosis that suggests the
impact of this new cartography of social space. The pair is initially posed
as antithetical through the songs they sing as they drop toward the
English Channel. Gibreel croons a ghazal of reincarnation that embraces
discontinuity and death as well as a ditty from an old Bombay ‹lm in cel-
ebration of the hybridity of Indian national identity; the assimilated Sal-
adin, by contrast, stolidly replies with the British national anthem. A
polyglot Indian actor ›oats toward an Anglophile NRI ventriloquist
through the clouds as two diametrically opposed responses to postcolo-
nial experience and migration meet and mix. Despite his Anglophile
resistance to Gibreel’s embraces, Saladin ‹nds his identity growing ›uid
like that of his companion. The mutation that he feels himself undergo-
ing undermines the English identity he has so carefully constructed for
himself during his years as an expatriate. Saladin is ushered through this
metamorphosis into the double consciousness of the trans-lated, of the
migrant whose physical peregrinations establish the possibility of multi-
ple sites of af‹liation. Saladin’s celestial mutation fuses him, reluctantly,
with the self-conscious hybridity of Gibreel, the Bombay cinema star.
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This scene draws attention to the particularly gendered form of
such postcolonial hybridization by pointing to the strains placed upon
homosocial bonds within such a context. For Rushdie’s twin protago-
nists fall toward the English Channel in a position whose homoeroti-
cism dramatizes the fear of unmanning associated with cultural trans-
lation. If, as Robert Young’s work has emphasized, hybridity is a
fundamentally heterosexual category marked by trepidations over mis-
cegenation, then this opening scene of the novel highlights the homo-
social site of bonding normally left unmarked by discourses of hybrid-
ity.31 Just as the turn-of-the-century equation of sexual “deviancy” with
racial degeneration marked the instabilities in colonial technologies of
sexuality by multiplying the quali‹ers for whiteness, so this moment of
metamorphosis in Rushdie’s text suggests a crisis in the identity of his
two protagonists.32 This crisis turns upon the ambivalence of the
homosocial bond that links them. In this scene, the foundational bond
that anchors national identity and communal solidarity tips over into a
homoerotic relation, one that offers the two protagonists intertwined in
an embrace that is traditionally identi‹ed with a threat to rather than a
pillar of the homosocial order. The sliding of the mimetic desire that
marks the homosocial continuum into same-sex desire marks a danger-
ous supplement to the thematic of doubling traced in Gibreel and Sal-
adin’s descent. This errant form of hybridity is connected to a particu-
lar set of phobias associated with globalization and migrancy. The
product of a mutability that threatens homosocial community, this
degenerate hybridity is produced by an experience that disrupts stable
frontiers, internal and external, personal and political. Resistance to the
disseminatory impact of contemporary cultural ›ows thus tends to take
a peculiarly gendered form, one in which fears of the erosion of male
identity bring to light the aggression that undergirds the homosocial
continuum.
Religious Communalism and the Rupturing of
National Allegory
Gibreel’s ghazal-chanting during his drop toward the drink may be
more charismatic than Saladin’s rigid mimicry of British nationalism,
but it is no less ›awed a response to the traumas of migration. For his
celebration of the hybridity of the Indian everyman is predicated on an
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increasingly hollow representation of national reality. Indeed, in
Gibreel’s reaction to the Bostan disaster, Rushdie is satirizing one of the
most powerful representations available of Indian national identity: the
Bollywood hero. The song Gibreel sings is, in fact, lifted from a famous
Bollywood ‹lm that emphasized the adaptive capacity of Indians. As
Sumita Chakravarty’s work on Indian popular cinema suggests, the
malleable persona of the male ‹lm protagonist serves as an allegory of
the successful fusion of the multiple forms of difference, from class and
caste to region and religion, that characterizes the Indian nation.33 Con-
sciously exploiting the resources of male masquerade and imperson-
ation, the Bombay ‹lm star reconciles national binarisms such as the
Hindu-Muslim split by suggesting that such differences are merely
super‹cial, that difference is, after all, only skin deep. Drawing on Bom-
bay cinema’s textual practice of male masquerade, Rushdie’s work ini-
tially intimates that such hybridity may serve as an allegory for the iden-
tity of the migrant. Yet while the mutability of the hero’s body in
Bombay cinema may suggest the potential resolution of the intractable
contradictions of national identity, it nonetheless also intimates the fear
of the disjunction and dissolution that animates essentialist reassertions
of communal identity. As recent cultural theory has emphasized, the
performative aspect of masquerade underlines the nonessential charac-
ter of gendered being.34 While this constructivist approach might pro-
vide a convenient unifying allegory for an increasingly fragmented
polity, it also makes explicit the experience of instability that affects cul-
ture and identity within a globalized world and often acts as the catalyst
to various forms of ethnic and cultural absolutism. If Gibreel’s celebra-
tion of hybrid identity allegorizes Indian national identity, it is a con-
sciousness that is ultimately not marked by the easy reconciliations
imagined by the cinematic tradition.35
But of course the Bombay ‹lm industry has been kind to Gibreel,
and so it behooves him to embrace the form of hybridity that it purveys.
Born of a poor dabbawalla (porter) who wears himself out catering to
the bloated bellies of ‹lm industry moguls, Gibreel climbs to stardom
by impersonating the myriad deities of India (17). Rushdie casts Gibreel
in the role of the ultimate reconciler, the chameleon onto whom the
incredibly various population of India can project its greatest hopes and
most intimate desires. By literally incarnating the various belief systems
that animate much of the nation’s populace, Gibreel becomes a
metaphorical embodiment of national identity. In fact, the “theologi-
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cal” genre that Rushdie invents for Gibreel to star in is based on one of
the perennial and de‹ning forms of Indian cinematography: the mytho-
logical.36 One of the pioneer genres in early Indian ‹lmmaking, the
mythological quickly came to signify the fundamentally independent
nature of the national imaginary, for it was on this “interior” ground
that India’s autonomy from the West could be asserted. As the work of
the subaltern studies historians has made clear, it was in the religious
and cultural spheres that Indian nationalists found alternative prin-
ciples of autonomy and national integrity to the British-dominated
public, administrative sphere.37 Indeed, the Indian ‹lm industry can be
said to have played a pivotal role in integrating the popular classes into
the project of nation-building through appropriating forms of folk
belief and expression in order to suture the former to the anticolonial,
nationalist project. In contributing to the representation of the spiritual
realm, Indian popular cinema thus asserted its claim as one of the pri-
mary representational forms of the imagined community of the nation.
In addition, it presented itself as the facilitating form behind the “pas-
sive revolution” through which subaltern opinion was mobilized within
the anticolonial struggle.
Gibreel’s complete identi‹cation with the national imaginary turns
his misadventures into an allegory of the breakdown of the secular
de‹nition of the state, and, ultimately, of the partial, contradictory
nature of nationalist ideology. Despite his success at impersonating the
various avatars of India’s multiple sects, a “Phantom Bug” that has par-
ticularly gruesome effects strikes him down at the height of his fame.
Adopting the role of amanuensis of national consciousness, Gibreel’s
body becomes the locus upon which the violent, sectarian disharmony
of national reality is written. The symmetry between Gibreel’s imper-
sonation of religious ‹gures and popular belief in this incarnation
allows Rushdie to analyze the communal violence that tore apart the
national fabric during the 1980s. In addition, this symmetry testi‹es to
the intense contradictions always implicit within the project of nation-
formation, to the lack of absolute hegemony of the bourgeois, secular
class over the other popular elements swept up in the national struggle
for self-determination.
The phantom bug that nearly kills Gibreel ‹nds its corollary in the
unraveling hegemony of the nationalist project over the various sects
and communal groups that together constitute the Indian polity. This
crisis became increasingly prominent during the 1980s with the decline
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of state commitment to the values that facilitated modernization,
among which secularism, equal opportunity, and social welfare ‹gured
most prominently. Spurred by its ›agging electoral prospects, the Con-
gress Party under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi attempted to make
concessions both to the rising forces of Hindu nationalism and to the
more militantly fundamentalist elements within the Muslim commu-
nity.38 This strategy of conciliating ethnic absolutism appeared to offer
an easy resolution to the crisis of the secular Indian state through allow-
ing these two groups to be played off against one another. However, the
Shah Bano controversy of the mid-1980s dramatized the impracticality
of such a strategy. The Bano affair highlighted the centrality of the ques-
tion of gender in con›icts over the secular identity of the state and its
guarantees of rights to religious minorities. Bano’s case turned upon the
Indian Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of a destitute Muslim woman
who sued her husband for support after he divorced her. Muslim lead-
ers interpreted this ruling as a threat to the autonomy of the Muslim
community’s so-called Personal Laws, which, since independence, have
accorded a separate civil code to the Muslim minority. In mobilizing
around the question of minority rights, Muslim leaders chose to
sacri‹ce the right of Muslim women to restitution in the name of pre-
serving communal identity. The Indian government’s subsequent vali-
dation of this position furthered the resulting rei‹cation of the question
of minority rights by accepting the hard-line fundamentalism of the
ulema as the sole representative voice of the minority community. In
response to the government ruling, Hindu rightists seized on the notion
of “equality” to attack the Muslim community, challenging what they
perceived as the government’s appeasement of the Muslim leadership.
While there was some truth to Hindu rightists’ claims that the Personal
Laws abrogate the universalistic reach of the constitution by exempting
Muslims from the provisions for marriage and divorce codi‹ed in the
Hindu Code Bill of 1956, these criticisms were hardly made with the
good of Muslim women in mind. Con›ict between increasingly rigidly
de‹ned communal groups thus intensi‹ed a form of identity politics in
which the question of women’s rights was introduced and debated with
no concern for ameliorating the conditions of women. Instead, women
functioned as pawns in sectarian struggles between incommensurable
patriarchies.
In the context of this crisis of the secular nation-state, the status of
religion as a folk form that can be appropriated by hegemonic media
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such as the cinema is put into question. Religion becomes, instead, a
“phantom bug” capable of destroying the body politic. If Gibreel’s
internal hemorrhaging may be said to represent the increasingly violent
communal con›icts within India during this period, then his subse-
quent crisis of faith is a product of the political exploitation of religion.
Indeed, Gibreel’s crisis is predicated on the hollowing out of spirituality
as a result of such exploitation. Not only do Gibreel’s prayers for mercy
during his sickness go unanswered, but he gets better as soon as it
becomes evident to him that there will be no response to his supplica-
tions. The departure of God from Gibreel’s universe is signi‹cant in that
it introduces him for the ‹rst time to the idea of living a life not only
without divine sanction, but without the kind of security and clarity
that such sanction introduced. This revelation of his loneliness in the
world opens Gibreel to a terrifying and exhilarating world of possibili-
ties and complexities. A heady one for Gibreel: he has momentarily seen
through the Manichaean divisions of the social body imposed by ortho-
doxy. This epiphany prompts him to fall in love with a white woman
and decamp to Britain. The resulting mutations and nightmares situate
the crisis of the national body in a transnational framework. The seam-
less ideological interpellation between Gibreel, Bollywood cinema, and
popular elements of the nation thus allows Rushdie to analyze the dou-
ble consciousness of diasporic communities.
The Textual Politics of Fundamentalist Discourse
In his well-known discussion of nationalism, Benedict Anderson asserts
that a sacred community such as Christianity or Islam depends upon a
notion of the nonarbitrariness of the sign, of the uniquely sacred char-
acter of a particular truth-language, to bind radically different cultures
into a whole.39 While Anderson argues that historical sacral kingdoms
were fragmented and territorialized during the formation of the nation-
state, the rise of various forms of religious fundamentalism around the
world suggests that it is secular nationalism rather than religious dog-
matism that is in crisis.40 In fact, fundamentalist movements often ani-
mate antihegemonic nationalisms today. Yet fundamentalist move-
ments are extremely heterogeneous, of course, and are just as often
complicit with forms of neocolonialism—as the example of Saudi Ara-
bia makes evident—as they are with anti-imperialism. In addition, fun-
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damentalist movements manifest themselves among dominant majori-
ties within states as well as in the form of minority movements seeking
to promote their beliefs within speci‹c, often ethnically de‹ned con-
stituencies.41 Finally, although they always repudiate pluralist systems of
thought, fundamentalist movements may draw either on experiential
values articulated by a charismatic leadership or on the supposedly
incontrovertible authority of a sacred text. Ironically, appeals to sacred
texts have been an important resource historically for movements seek-
ing to challenge the authority of orthodox religious authorities.42 In
fundamentalism, however, authority lies not in the sacred text itself,
despite frequent protestations by leaders to that effect, but rather in the
highly authoritarian and almost exclusively male religious ‹gures who
claim the right to interpret the text and do so in a selective manner that
legitimates their power.43
In exercising such interpretive authority, fundamentalist leaders
not only evade community sanction through the notion of a God-given
interpretive mandate. In addition, leaders’ exegetical authority stems
from wrenching sacred texts out of the historical continuum in which
they were composed and downplaying the complicated generic and aes-
thetic characteristics of such texts in the name of simpli‹ed moral max-
ims.44 This co-optation of the text ›ies in the face of the long-standing
interpretive practices that characterize established religious traditions
such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. In this sense, fundamentalism
is not a return to tradition, as it is often presented as being, but is instead
an abrogation of established bodies of textual knowledge and practice.
In addition, fundamentalist reading strategies attempt to arrest the
mutability of meaning that characterizes language. As Bakhtin argues,
individual consciousness is constituted in language, a social and histor-
ical form that is, crucially, an arena of class struggle.45 Indeed, Bakhtin
stressed that the inner dialectical quality of the sign becomes most evi-
dent at times of social crisis, when the attempts of socially dominant
groups to impart stable interpretations of the sign break down and
emergent discourses assert themselves. In other words, the antagonism
that prevents any ‹nal suturing of the social proliferates during
moments of organic crisis in which hegemony is challenged on many
levels and in many sites, including through con›icting interpretations
of sacred texts.46
In the polarized social climate of Salman Rushdie’s Ellowen Dee-
owen (London) during the mid-1980s, hegemonic discourse becomes
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subject to slippages and inversions that fully dramatize the Janus-faced
quality of the sign. As his transformation of the British capital’s name
suggests, Rushdie’s text is ‹lled with puns, double entendres, and other
word games that defamiliarize and undermine the claims of hegemonic
language to authenticity and authority.47 While Rushdie’s novel delves
deeply into the refashioning of the postcolonial metropolis by diasporic
residents, it also concerns itself with the disassociation of sensibility
experienced by migrants to the metropolis.48 For many of these
migrants, the fetishized authority of the sacred text compensates for the
deracinating experiences of migration.49 In response to what in many
instances can be an oppressive textual orthodoxy, The Satanic Verses
deconstructs the authority of the sacred text of Islam. In highlighting
the ambiguity that inheres in the enunciation of divine revelation,
Rushdie’s ‹ction hinges not simply on an awareness of language’s dis-
seminatory tendencies, but also on the power plays inherent in claims to
textual authority.50 Indeed, Gibreel is quite literally driven mad by the
uncontainable heteroglossia of language.51 The dreams that begin to
wrack him shortly after his repudiation of his faith carry Gibreel back to
the genesis of Islam. His awareness of the sectarian animus of religion
and of the legitimation crisis of national ideology throws Gibreel into an
emotional ferment in which he reenacts the Prophet Muhammad’s
encounter with the angel Gabriel. In rewriting the history of Islam,
thereby introducing the Koran’s Satanic Verses as well as the pragmatic
considerations that impinge upon divine revelation, Rushdie sets out to
excavate the forms of difference that inhere within the foundation myths
of a sacred community.52 Implicit in this reworking is a critique of the
centripetal, hierarchical social structure that the sacred text authorizes.
As he had done previously in relation to the nation-state, that is,
Rushdie seeks in The Satanic Verses to foreground the plural and frag-
mentary character of a community conceived of, this time, as a transna-
tional sodality.53
The central moment within the founding text of a great religion is
that of revelation, when the prophet is given the sacred Word that will
orient the faithful. Gibreel’s dreams on the highjacked airliner Bostan,
dreams that reenact this moment, raise profound questions concerning
the nature of revelation. Gibreel ‹nds himself transformed from the pas-
sive witness of the prophet Mahound’s experiences to a participant in
the drama of revelation as he becomes the angel Gabriel. Faced with the
temptation of acknowledging a triumvirate of matriarchal goddesses in
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order to gain recognition for Islam, Mahound ascends Mount Cone to
consult the archangel. Gibreel is understandably unnerved to ‹nd him-
self thrust into this role of divine intermediary (108). Despite having to
adopt an unusually active role during this reenactment of Islamic his-
tory, Gibreel ‹nds himself ultimately subservient to the prophet’s ‹erce
will. In addition to forcing Gibreel to reject the prescripted roles he has
taken up in Bombay “theologicals,” the novel suggests that revelation is
animated by the prophet’s own hunger for divine illumination. The
moment of epiphany is not, then, a passive one in which truth is
imparted like writing on stone tablets, but one in which the prophet’s
voracious desire for illumination plays a vital, shaping part. In Rushdie’s
version of the mystical experience, human beings take on a high degree
of agency. While such an interpretation of the mystical experience might
constitute a refreshingly anthropocentric view of human interactions
with the divine, it does raise questions concerning the fungibility of rev-
elation, particularly given fundamentalist movements’ typical emphasis
on the nonnegotiable veracity of the Word.
Such questions are brought to the fore when the prophet, whom
Rushdie names Mahound, recants on the acceptance of the city of
Jahilia’s matriarchal goddesses that his preceding ‹t of revelation
licensed. Having learned of Hind and her goddess’s implacable opposi-
tion to Allah, Mahound scales Mount Cone again to ‹nd out whether
his original compromise and the resulting henotheistic doctrine is truly
God’s will. Gibreel is once again forced to play the role of the archangel,
wrestling the prophet to the ground before imparting the truth.
Mahound’s second revelation succeeds both in coping with the changed
political situation revealed by Hind and in retaining the absolute
authenticity of the Word. In order to sanction this shift, however,
Mahound is led to adopt a Manichaean perspective that attributes the
former revelation to satanic insurgency. Yet, as Gibreel states, he was
present at both revelations (123). In addition, it was Mahound’s desire
for revelation that animated the angel’s words in both instances.
Mahound’s clean separation of good and evil is, in other words, a con-
venient ‹ction. The active role played by Mahound in both revelations
undermines such neat binarisms by suggesting that he himself harbors
both good and evil, both the will to compromise and the adamant
monotheism that comes to de‹ne Islam. The absolute categories of
Manichaean thought offer Mahound an escape from the complexity
and contingency that Gibreel’s version of the revelation insists on.
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In his anthropocentric description of the satanic verses, Rushdie
casts his lot with those who would interpret and reinterpret divine writ
for human ends. Rather than seeing revelation as some ‹nal pro-
nouncement of the truth, this approach opts for a theology alive to the
implications of the hermeneutic circle of interpretation through which
meaning and truth are constituted. Such an approach of course chal-
lenges the agents of textual and political orthodoxy within Islam. This
con›ict is ‹gured nowhere more prominently than in Mahound’s disci-
ple Salman, who rewrites the verses of the Koran as they are dictated to
him by the prophet. In yet another of Gibreel’s dreams, Salman returns
to Jahilia and tells the aging poet Baal of his loss of faith. Acting as scribe
for the increasingly powerful Mahound, Salman has become suspicious
of the businessman-like acumen displayed by the archangel’s pro-
nouncements (364). These suspicions are heightened when he ‹nds the
sacred text con‹rming Mahound’s policy of dispossessing women of the
prerogatives that adhered to them in the matriarchal society of Jahilia
(366). Remembering the incident of the satanic verses from years
before, Salman decides to submit Islam to a test by selectively rewriting
bits of Mahound’s dictation. Like the satanic verses, Salman’s substitu-
tions challenge the infallible status of the sacred text. Not only, then,
does the site of enunciation shape religious revelation; Gibreel’s dreams
also depict the proliferation of divinely ordained rules whose role as
instruments of Mahound’s personal ends is covered by the thinnest of
veils. Within this context, the doctrine of infallibility—which once
guaranteed the purity of Koranic doctrine when Mahound was tempted
by compromise—is quickly translated into a mechanism for policing
orthodoxy. Salman’s subversion of the sacred verses therefore consti-
tutes an example of what Bakhtin called the Rabelaisian chronotope: the
purging of a transcendental worldview, of a unitary language of truth,
through a parodic inversion that casts light upon the dialogic quality of
language.54 Of course, Rushdie intended this section of the novel to
indict the textual fundamentalism of militant Islamist groups, whose
claims of scriptural authority further their control of the public
sphere.55
Although he was much criticized during the Rushdie affair for
advancing models of postmodern doubt that held little appeal for
oppressed members of diasporic cultures, the necessity of challenging
authority claims made by patriarchal community leaders was echoed at
the time by groups such as Women Against Fundamentalism.56 Despite
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the elements of misogyny that surface in his previous novels, in The
Satanic Verses Rushdie foregrounds the homology between control of
the Word and control of women that characterizes fundamentalist
movements. Rushdie’s strategy of parodic inversion therefore culmi-
nates in the poet Baal’s confrontation with Mahound. Faced with the
unstoppable rise of Islam to power, Baal underlines the prophet’s
hypocrisy by elaborating a profane antithesis to the increasingly dei‹ed
speci‹cs of Mahound’s life. The private life of the prophet is rendered
glaringly public when Baal suggests that the whores who have given him
sanctuary during Mahound’s reign each take on the identity of one of
the prophet’s wives. The bordello’s business booms as a result, the titil-
lation of blasphemous prostitution being all the stronger given the
severity of Islamic doctrine (380). The brothel becomes a mirror image
of Islam, with Baal taking on the role of the prophet by marrying each
of the twelve whores and writing verse inspired by the sensual delights
of the resulting life (385). When Mahound eventually discovers Baal’s
subversive strategy, the tale of this ribald parody breaks the faithful up
into uncontrollable laughter. As Baal asserts while conceiving his satiri-
cal stratagem, “No imperium is absolute, no victory complete” (378).
Baal’s inversion of the prophet’s life draws attention to the unruly
desires that emerge from the popular body to disrupt monolithic
de‹nitions of the social.57 Rushdie thereby suggests that fragmentary,
nonsynchronous forms of temporality have been implicit not only
within modernity and the nation-state, but also within the sacred
empires that preceded them.
The danger inherent in Rushdie’s parodic approach lies in the fact
that, in underlining the fallibility of Islam’s sacred language, the author
may not be articulating the speci‹c resistant forms of difference inher-
ent within Islam. Indeed, his work is less a recuperation of subaltern
knowledge than a satire of a particular grand narrative, one that fore-
grounds the agency of the lone creative spirit—embodied in the poet
Baal—rather than that of subaltern movements.58 As a result, the set of
binary differences Rushdie establishes in this section of the novel pro-
vides a highly schematic contrast between a centralized and monologic
form of language and a parodic, deconstructive language that questions
all forms of power.59 In addition, Baal achieves his satirical triumph
over Mahound using the bodies of the Curtain’s whores. Both men, that
is, turn women into relatively passive objects who, as the narrator states,
“wished to turn themselves into the oldest male fantasy of all” (384).
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The novel’s parody of the monologic nature of sacred language thus is
achieved through the subordination of women ‹gures, who serve, in
stereotypical fashion, as allegories of a form of arti‹ce that undermines
stable identity and exacerbates textual indeterminacy.60 Such forms of
instability are a calculated affront to the many religious revival groups
that have asserted themselves as secular ideologies have become bank-
rupt. As one of Rushdie’s characters says during a discussion later in the
novel: “In India, the development of a corrupt and closed state appara-
tus had ‘excluded the masses of the people from the ethical project.’ As
a result, they sought ethical satisfactions in the oldest of the grand nar-
ratives, that is, religious faith” (537). Contemporary Islamicist move-
ments appeal to the premodern notion of a transnational community
uni‹ed by a sacred language and text in order to justify the assertion of
sub- and supranationalisms of various forms using eminently modern
means such as the Internet.61 Such dissenting movements bring to the
fore the contradictions within secular nationalism, the necessarily hege-
monizing, comprador nature of its project. As in Rushdie’s earlier
works of ‹ction, such movements are represented as attempting to
mobilize the subaltern elements that have resisted interpellation within
the grand narrative of the nation. Despite the polarized positions that
emerged during the Rushdie affair, however, it should be evident that
few Islamic groups subscribe to the monolithic antirationalism with
which they are associated in the Western media. Various movements
are engaged in complex struggles for hegemony over de‹nitions of
Islam in vastly different Arab-speaking nations. Rushdie’s use of the
Rabelaisian chronotope simpli‹es this complexity, presenting a battle
for control of the public sphere entirely based on an abstract textual
politics.
This ahistorical opposition of two different models of reading fails
to connect to the conjunctural political con›icts that are driving the rise
of various fundamentalist movements.62 Within a speci‹cally diasporic
context, Rushdie’s work is easily construed as a challenge to the ties that
bind a heterodox community whose power may derive from the very
fragmentation of established forms of the social—foremost among
which is the nation—taking place today. Ambiguity inevitably infects
the site of enunciation in Rushdie’s work. Yet it is just such ambiguity
and fragmentation that Islamic movements seek to address. As Aziz Al-
Azmeh has stressed, the material grounds of the culturalism that is
becoming the dominant mode of discourse of racialized minorities in
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metropolitan societies lie in processes of structural and spatial segrega-
tion, social involution and ghetto formation. A reaction formation to
the European racism that helps animate such processes, “Religion
under conditions of migration proffers a fetishism of the collective
self.”63 Religion, in other words, takes on the role of a subaltern nation-
alism in search of a prenational utopia.
(En)gendering Heritage Politics
As Rushdie was quick to remind his antagonists following the publica-
tion of The Satanic Verses, his novel’s deconstruction of Islamic revela-
tion takes place within the dreams of Gibreel, a man who is torn by
doubts concerning the nature of good and evil. The parodic subversion
of authority that takes place in these dreams may therefore be construed
as a re›ection of Gibreel’s own traumatic lack of moral clarity. A prod-
uct of the culture industry, Gibreel is all too aware of the unsettling
effects of traditional culture’s hybridization. Indeed, the temporal dis-
continuity in›icted on Gibreel by his serial dreams aptly dramatizes the
ideological crisis of the nation.64 Sacred past, profane present, and
future Armageddon become completely jumbled up, divorcing Gibreel
from the normative linear temporality of the nation. In addition,
Gibreel’s pro›igate past haunts him throughout the novel in the form of
apparitions by Reka Merchant, a former lover and suicide. Reka’s ghost,
moreover, works her revenge on Gibreel through undermining the
‹xed moral distinctions characteristic of Islam (323). Faced with this
disruption of his moral bearings, Gibreel turns to increasingly
Manichaean visions of the world to gain a sense of identity through
opposition: “Clarity, clarity, at all costs clarity!—This Shaitan was no
fallen angel”(353). Gibreel’s frantic moral absolutism is founded on a
rejection of complexity, a willful attempt to separate the world into
binary terms. Such an attempt to demarcate a ‹rm boundary is predi-
cated on an unsettling awareness of a lack of self-identity and of coher-
ence in the social. For example, Gibreel’s attempt to redeem London by
turning its weather tropical suggests a form of willful ethnic absolutism
on the part of this nomad who is unable to accept the muggy, ambigu-
ous cultural climate of the diaspora.65 As such, this transformation
re›ects the tendencies toward polarization along racialized lines that
has characterized Britain during the post-Fordist era. Gibreel’s meteo-
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rological machinations offer a powerful symbol of the embattled reac-
tions often produced by the overlapping, disjunctive global order that
migrants must inhabit. Ironically, Gibreel’s imposition of Manichaean
divisions on the world that surrounds him actively produces unsettling
forms of hybridity.66 For instance, his attempts to discern and destroy
his satanic antagonist lead him into a struggle that turns upon mimetic
desire between him and Saladin for Alleluia Cone. Yet the struggle
between these male protagonists over Allie emphasizes their kinship
rather than their differences from one another. Both men are engaged
in a process of projection that hinges upon Allie’s impenetrability. Allie
signi‹es a form of identity for both men that they hope will help them
escape from the crises of diasporic double consciousness. This projec-
tion of imaginary unity and identity onto an Englishwoman is, as was
true of Chamcha’s relationship with Pamela Lovelace, based on a mis-
perception of her identity on the part of both protagonists.
The root of this mutual attraction and anger toward Allie lies in her
ambiguous position vis-à-vis English identity. As a woman, Allie is both
subordinate to the patriarchal social conditions in England, and there-
fore potentially sympathetic to the antiracist struggles of immigrants,
and also in a position of dominance as a result of her race. Indeed,
Rushdie goes to great lengths to demonstrate the instabilities and
uncertainties that plague Allie Cone. Herself a product of the Jewish
diaspora, Allie has been traumatized by the suicide of an older sister vic-
timized by the publicity mill and is, rather like Gibreel, haunted by
apparitions connected to her mountain-climbing avocation. The glacial
bearing that she projects in order to protect herself from intruding eyes
infuriates Gibreel, and is the seed for Saladin’s Iago-like envious strata-
gems. Like Pamela, Allie Cone is an example of the complex and unsta-
ble constitution of the putatively hegemonic elements of metropolitan
society.67 Notwithstanding these weaknesses, Allie and Gibreel’s rela-
tionship represents for Saladin the apogee of cultural identity and dis-
tinction that he has always sought. The humiliation that begins with his
transformation into a satyr culminates in Chamcha’s mistaken percep-
tion of Gibreel’s welcoming party to Britain. It is here that he perceives
Gibreel’s “possession” of Allie as the capping example of his antago-
nist’s ability to insinuate himself into the English society from which
Chamcha himself has been so devastatingly ejected (428). Ironically, it is
at this very party that Gibreel’s sense that ambiguity is overtaking him is
‹rst publicly expressed in the form of violently uncontrollable jealousy.
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Allie, who once seemed to Gibreel to harbor the promise of rebirth into
a secular life, becomes the subject of his violent ‹ts of misogynistic jeal-
ousy. Saladin’s obscene telephone calls, which fan this jealousy, are a
product of his attempt to derail this apparently idyllic relationship. If he
has been denied the middle-class immigrant’s fantasy of perfect assimi-
lation, Chamcha is going to see to it that Gibreel and Allie will not play
the allegorical role of multicultural lovers. For both men, self-de‹nition
involves the instrumentalization of an imagined femininity whose
instability is heightened by the specter of a threatening Other.
As Saladin’s treachery bites deeper, Gibreel begins to associate Allie
with cunning sexual in‹delity. All too quickly, she comes to symbolize
the temporal and cultural displacements characteristic of the dreams
that dislocate his identity. The solidity of Gibreel’s own identity thus
depends upon the forceful delimitation of Allie’s supposed impurity.
Indeed, as he falls ever further into the schizophrenic state in which he
imagines himself as the archangel, Gibreel begins to mouth misogynis-
tic pieties in a parodic version of the patriarchial logic that animates
political Islam (321). Gibreel’s suspicion of Allie reveals a strong anxiety
over women’s power to de‹ne men. This anxiety is connected to the
creation of imaginary homelands. In a diasporic situation in which
points of both arrival and departure are in constant cultural ›ux, estab-
lished traditions are eroded and the desire for continuity is frustrated by
global communication and commodi‹cation.68 As Arjun Appadurai—
picking up on feminist interventions—has argued, under such condi-
tions, “The honor of women becomes a surrogate for the identity of the
embattled communities of males while women, in reality, have to nego-
tiate increasingly harsh conditions of work at home and in the non-
domestic workplace.”69 As cultural traits become an ever more impor-
tant index of group cohesion, increasing pressure is placed upon
women to play the role of icons of communal identity. At a time of
increasingly prominent forms of disjuncture in traditional, spatially 
static identities, constraints upon women and female sexuality become
increasingly evident. Con›icts between differing de‹nitions of commu-
nity and of spatial identity on levels ranging from the corporal through
the local and the national to the transnational play themselves out
through attempts to control the role of women as icons of group iden-
tity. Within this context, not only is women’s self-expression frequently
seen as the passive product of masculine agency, but such expression
can become the speci‹c target of forms of regulation.
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Moreover, in Britain during the 1980s, the multicultural framework
tended to de‹ne women’s demands for equality as outside a poorly
understood “Muslim cultural tradition.” Drawing on concepts of com-
munal, religious identity codi‹ed during the British Raj in order to fur-
ther imperial rule, multicultural models of ethnic minority communi-
ties were predicated on rei‹ed, Orientalist models of identity. As Gita
Saghal and Nira Yuval-Davis argue, despite its antiracist orientation
when compared to the model of assimilation, multiculturalism ironi-
cally conferred authenticity and, perhaps more importantly, state fund-
ing on community leaders who best embodied these rei‹ed models of
collective identity.70 In the name of pluralism, in other words, intoler-
ant identities were often not only accepted as legitimate, but actively
supported through the funding efforts of radical local authorities such
as the Greater London Council. As a result of multicultural policies,
women’s demands for equality were often seen as outside the authentic
“traditions” of particular ethnic minority communities. At the same
time as the state was subsidizing reactionary segments of the Muslim
community, conservative leaders within this community employed
canny appeals to culture and religion to attack women’s autonomous
organizing efforts. Women were seen as the carriers of collective cul-
tural values, and regulation of their behavior, preferably within the
boundaries of the patriarchal family, would ensure that conservative
values would be reproduced both biologically and symbolically.71
Given this symbolic struggle over femininity, it is not entirely sur-
prising that Saladin and Gibreel’s visions of Allie are eventually chan-
neled into a form of mimetic desire that brings them into direct con›ict.
Yet this con›ict is one that underlines their mutual interrelation. As Eve
Sedgwick has emphasized, the homosocial formation of mimetic desire
functions to consolidate the bonds—including antagonistic ones—
between men.72 In The Satanic Verses, this bond turns upon the nature
of identity within the disruptive conditions characteristic of the dias-
pora. It is for this reason that Chamcha and Gibreel’s competition over
Allie ultimately devolves into a battle between two opposite but inter-
woven senses of the self. The battle between Gibreel and Saladin repre-
sents a struggle between two principles: a Manichaean division between
good and evil versus an uncertain, fragmentary grip on identity (426).
This distinction revolves around the question of the attitude of the self
toward change, toward the transformations and hybridizations that
accompany migration. Saladin, the man who has chosen Lucretius’s
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doctrine of the discontinuous self to characterize his metamorphosis of
identity, represents precisely the kind of ambiguity against which
Gibreel is struggling. It is such a tendency toward con›ict that leads
Gibreel to characterize Chamcha in terms of Fanon’s self-hating native,
one of the Janus faces of diaspora experience that Gibreel’s burgeoning
fundamentalism cannot endure (353). Yet the narrator’s characteriza-
tion of the two as conjoined opposites highlights the impossibility of
stressing either pure hybridity or pure identity. The two tendencies exist
in a tense opposition to one another that frequently leads toward
internecine struggle. Gibreel and Saladin thus constitute a speci‹c ver-
sion of the dialectical relation between tradition and translation. While
he engages direct with the models of hybridity advanced by black British
cultural studies during the 1980s, Rushdie suggests that an adequate
conception of diasporic identity must make space for the mobile
identi‹catory strategies of nomadic subjects. Such subjects are not
solely hybrid, but rather inhabit diverse identities, varying from the tra-
ditional to the assimilated, depending on the cultural context.73 It is
Gibreel’s attempt to purify himself of this performative ›uidity of iden-
tity that dooms him to increasing disintegration.
Dropping intertextual references to Ahab and Ishmael, Rushdie
stages a ‹ery conclusion in which the two protagonists meet in a show-
down at the Shandaar Cafe. Gibreel, hallucinating himself as the angel
of the Recitation, bears down on Chamcha, now veritably dripping with
evil, in order to avenge the destruction of his relationship with Allie.
Despite this seemingly victory of the forces of Manichaean difference,
the narrator poses a series of questions that suggest that the self is a het-
erogeneous entity whose moral proclivities cannot be foreseen (467).
Rushdie’s sense of the con›icting selves that inhabit each of us allows
him this one ‹nal moment of grace, a moment in which the trajectories
of both men are momentarily reversed. In saving Chamcha from the
‹res of puri‹cation, Gibreel surrenders his zealotry in recognition of the
complexity of Chamcha’s character. This moment of grace suggests the
ultimate futility of attempting to adjudicate the competing claims of
essentialism and pluralism on a purely theoretical level. It is only by wit-
nessing the speci‹c performative claims asserted within any particular
historical conjuncture that we can clarify our identities and their modes
of constitution. In a world in which accession to power is more than
ever accomplished through, rather than being a precondition of, mak-
ing good on claims to identity, this emphasis on the performative brings
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a salutary speci‹city to bear. Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses documents
the pivotal role played by gender in the delimitation of identity in a
global cultural economy. The increasing pressure placed upon racial-
ized groups to legitimate their claims to ethnic identity necessarily dic-
tates an increasing focus upon the heritage politics of the household.
Within such a context, women face increasing pressure to conform as
icons of communal identity.
Conclusion: Conjunctural Analysis and
Transnational Feminism
The Satanic Verses initially seemed to have consolidated and polarized
communal identities in Britain and elsewhere. For British Muslims in
particular, the Rushdie affair was a disaster, as the Ayatollah Khomeini’s
fatwa against Rushdie led to a dramatic increase in media and popular
stereotyping of Muslims following years of struggle for economic and
social integration.74 In addition, The Satanic Verses catalyzed the emer-
gence of the racially in›ected cultural clash theories that, reanimating
the corpse of Orientalism, have led to serious debates concerning the
place of Islam in contemporary Europe.75 Yet the Rushdie affair also
ultimately forced British policymakers to reckon with the Muslim pres-
ence in Britain more seriously. Galvanized by the bias in British legal
statutes such as the Blasphemy Law that became evident in the course of
the crisis over Rushdie’s novel, British Muslim activists lobbied hard for
reform of the legal system. Although the Blasphemy Law has not yet
been changed, several signi‹cant bills were presented in the wake of the
Rushdie affair that would have recti‹ed the anomalous protections
against religious discrimination that characterize the British state at
present. In addition, the Commission on Racial Equality has called for
the extension of laws against racial discrimination to Muslims, whose
identity as a religious rather than ethnic group has so far held up imple-
mentation of incitement-to-hatred and discrimination laws.76 These
measures and the increasing engagement of British Muslim activists
with the public sphere in general betoken their increasing integration
and conciliation in formal processes, despite the forms of Islamophobia
generated by the Rushdie affair.
The increasing public visibility of Islam in Britain also has a
transnational dimension, however, for, from the 1970s on, the oil-rich
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states of the Persian Gulf began recycling petrodollars into the Muslim
infrastructure in Europe through the ‹nancing of mosques and other
Muslim organizations.77 The Rushdie affair itself was notably trans-
national, with the struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia within the
Islamic world playing a prominent role in the local unfolding of the
con›ict.78 As we have seen, in Britain this transnational aspect of Islamic
identity was most heavily in›uenced, however, by diasporic links to
South Asia, where the rise of Hindu fundamentalism stoked communal
tensions that dated back to the partition. It was, for example, only after
an opposition parliamentarian in India, in an attempt to embarrass the
ruling Congress Party, called for the banning of Rushdie’s novel that the
Bradford Council for Mosques began militating for the expansion of
Britain’s Blasphemy Law. Con›ict around the Personal Laws, the sepa-
rate body of juridical regulations for Muslim domestic affairs, was at the
center of rising communal tensions on the subcontinent during the
1980s. In India as in Britain, feminists brought out the contradictions of
both dominant state policies toward religious minorities and funda-
mentalist assertions of communal identity. As Gita Saghal points out,
when fundamentalist forces cannot control the machinery of state
power, control over women, which helps to cement patriarchal power
over land and inheritance, becomes crucial.79
Perhaps the most signal outcome of The Satanic Verses controversy,
therefore, was the assertion of dissenting voices within Muslim and
other religious communities in Britain. For all the novel’s shortcom-
ings, the project of contesting conservative religious authorities’ control
over the Word and women was clearly a central aim of Rushdie’s work.
During the unfolding of the Rushdie affair, it became all too clear that
this aspect of his work was quite prescient. As evidenced by groups such
as Women Against Fundamentalism, feminist activists played a key role
in articulating critiques of conservative de‹nitions of cultural tradition.
Challenging the right of traditionalist leadership to interpretive author-
ity, intellectuals such as Elizabeth Schustler Fiorenza and Fatima
Mernissi have articulated dissenting, feminist readings of sacred texts
such as the Bible and the Koran. Such exegetical practices provide sup-
port for the work of feminist activists who seek to carve out
autonomous spaces for women. In addition to fostering the traditions
of ijtihad or critical reasoning that are crucial for the articulation of
European Islamic identities, however, groups such as WAF have high-
lighted the contradictions in the British state. While they recognize the
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racial and religious bias of measures such as Britain’s Blasphemy Law,
WAF activists call not for the extension of such legislation to cover pre-
viously marginalized groups, but rather for the creation of a truly secu-
lar, nonracial public sphere in Britain. Through their challenges to
monolithic construction of both majority and ethnic minority identity,
WAF and similar groups are helping blaze the trail toward a truly post-
colonial condition in Britain.80
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6
Genetics, Biotechnology, and the Future of “Race”
in Zadie Smith’s White Teeth
On 12 February 2001, the leaders of two competing teams of sci-
entists stood next to President Clinton at the White House to announce
the results of their history-making research. With a little help from a
private competitor, the multinational Human Genome Project had
achieved its goal years ahead of schedule: the creation of the ‹rst draft
map of the human genome. Few commentators found themselves
immune to the hyperbole that characterized this unveiling. Ever since
James Watson and Francis Crick created their elegant model of DNA’s
double helical structure in 1953, the genome has been seen, in the words
of Watson, as the “ultimate description of life.” According to Crick’s so-
called central dogma, DNA genes have total control over inheritance in
all forms of life. Our genes, in other words, contain the basic molecular
code that determines everything from the number of toes on each of our
feet to the number of points we score on IQ tests. By the time the
Human Genome Project unveiled the draft map of the genome in 2001,
expectations surrounding the bene‹ts to be gained from molecular
biology and biotechnology had become extremely in›ated. For the ‹rst
time, the lay public was told, human beings would not only be able to
read their basic genetic recipe but also begin to make signi‹cant changes
in this recipe. Yet the draft map of the genome also startled many mem-
bers of the scienti‹c community and the public. Even today, the extent
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to which this map challenges the fundamental model of DNA as the
“master molecule” has not been fully digested.
Much to everyone’s surprise, the work of the Human Genome Proj-
ect revealed that people have only about thirty thousand genes. Scien-
tists had long predicted a ‹gure over three times as great based on esti-
mates derived from analysis of the proteins manufactured by DNA. The
signi‹cance of this numerical difference cannot be overstated. Human
beings, it seems, have only 50 percent more genes than the roundworm,
a humble creature with just 959 cells in its entire body.1 We are no more
genetically endowed than some common weeds. Genetically speaking,
there is no more than a whisker of difference between us and our furry
rodent relative, the mouse, which has only three hundred fewer genes
than we do. Although the chimpanzee genome has not yet been
decoded, its successful mapping is expected to deliver an even bigger
thumping to human beings’ in›ated ideas of our unique importance as
a species.
In addition to unsettling our elevated place on the Great Chain of
Being, the mapping of the genome also challenges Crick’s central
dogma. Crick argued for a one-to-one correspondence between the
nucleotide sequence of the genes and the amino acid sequence of the
proteins that genes help produce. Yet if the human gene count is too
low to match the number of proteins and the many inherited traits that
they engender, then there is more to the “ultimate description of life”
than the genes alone.2 Although we are certainly in›uenced by our
genetic inheritance, in no sense can it be said that our lives are deter-
mined solely by these genes. For instance, the isolated genome does not
explain the substantial inherited differences between a person and a
mouse, despite the striking genetic similarities between the two organ-
isms. The biological determinism on which Crick’s central dogma was
predicated cannot be sustained in the face of evidence for the complex
and interwoven relationship between the genome, the particular organ-
ism in which the genome is embedded, and the broader environment
that shapes and is in turn shaped by that organism.
Despite such accumulating evidence against Crick’s central dogma,
biological determinism retains a strong grip on popular imagination as
well as on scienti‹c research. In the guise of sociobiology, in particular,
such determinism has shaped commonsense perceptions of the genetic
causes of intractable contemporary social problems such as crime, mir-
roring the turn toward dysgenics—the study of racial degeneration—as
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an explanation for social breakdown a century ago.3 As Richard Lewon-
tin argues, the mechanistic and atomistic worldview of the central
dogma—in which genes make individuals, individuals make society,
and, as a result, “sel‹sh genes” determine human affairs—has a long
genealogy stretching back through Darwin to Descartes.4 Such reduc-
tionism has long displayed great ideological utility by legitimating the
competitive individualist ethos central to capitalist society.
If the decoding of the human genome has challenged our sense of
the gulf that separates us from other species, what are the implications
for traditional understandings of difference within our species? More
speci‹cally, what is the likely import of these startling revelations con-
cerning the genome for contemporary representations of racial differ-
ence? Critics have recently begun to argue that advances in molecular
biology will help produce a new raciological regime.5 As a result of the
gradual diffusion of this research, discourses around “race” are shifting
away from the model of population plasticity that characterized neo-
Darwinian evolutionary theory during the period after 1945. In place of
this social constructionist perspective, biologists are debating the mean-
ing of “race” on the sub- and supraepidermal level of genetic variations
and similarities within human populations from distinct parts of the
globe.6 Increasingly, “race” is returning as a biological category, one
lodged not in the shape of people’s skulls—as phrenologists argued dur-
ing the nineteenth century—but in the shared intricacies of genetic
code that, for instance, make many Ashkenazi Jews predisposed to
develop Tay-Sachs disease and many people of African descent suscep-
tible to sickle cell anemia.7 All too often, however, these similarities at
the mitochondrial level are confused with commonsense racial designa-
tions that re›ect the sociological, economic, and political disparities
that dis‹gure our culture far more than precise demographic epidemi-
ological classi‹cations.8
To date, there have been relatively few ‹ctional examinations of the
genetic revolution’s social implications.9 A rare exception is Zadie
Smith’s White Teeth. Although White Teeth garnered much critical
acclaim for its lively embodiment of a supposedly “postracial” London,
Smith’s work is perhaps most notable for its powerful quali‹cation of
optimistic readings of the novel forms that biopower is assuming
today.10 White Teeth focuses on the extent to which one’s cultural and
biological pedigree affect identity and belonging in contemporary
Britain. The intersection of genetics and “race” is consequently a con-
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sistent theme throughout the novel. In fact, the success of the novel
attests to the enduring fascination with racial mixing and hybridity that
characterizes our supposedly “postracial” epoch. White Teeth con-
cludes, for instance, with a scene that mirrors the Human Genome
Project’s spectacular announcement at the White House. In this scene,
the many characters who orbit around one another throughout the
novel converge at the Millennial Science Commission to witness the
unveiling of Dr. Marcus Chalfen’s FutureMouse©. Chalfen intends to
use his genetically customized “creation” as a site for experimentation
into heredity. His naive belief in the pristine isolation of his enterprise
from the political and social tensions that permeate the rest of the novel
is brought crashing down to earth in this ‹nal scene, in which Smith
demonstrates the high stakes associated with inheritance and reproduc-
tion. Although explicit racial violence does not ‹gure in White Teeth,
Britain’s colonial past weighs heavily on the novel’s characters, shaping
their sense of identity and ramifying across the generations. The con›ict
that disrupts Marcus Chalfen’s press conference, leading to the escape
of his FutureMouse and the ambiguous resolution of the novel, under-
lines the increasing politicization of biological and social reproduction
in postcolonial Britain.11
Contemporary discourses of biological determinism are gaining
purchase in societies already saturated by forms of biopower.12 Individu-
als make reproductive decisions, for instance, not in isolation but within
the context of national immigration and citizenship legislation that
stringently controls mobility, belonging, and collective identity through
reference to heredity.13 In the case of Britain, such controls have become
more rather than less racialized over the last half-century.14 In addition,
the turn toward a post-Fordist mode of economic regulation since the
1970s has meant not simply the shift of production to the underdevel-
oped world, but also the increasing abandonment of state support for
social reproduction in developed nations.15 Biological determinist con-
structions of racial difference in Britain such as those satirized in White
Teeth therefore take root in a terrain already riven by racialized con›ict.
Within such a context, identi‹cation of the material substrate for speci‹c
forms of difference and inequality among human beings through genetic
research is far more likely to lead to revivi‹ed forms of eugenic discourse
than to the disappearance of “race.” By exploring the contemporary
return of eugenics, Zadie Smith’s White Teeth offers us a timely warning
that the history of “race” is by no means over.
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Raciology and the Eugenic Past
White Teeth begins with an epigraph: “What is past is prologue.” Drawn
from a museum in Washington, D.C., this epigraph highlights the
inescapability of the past, a theme that frequently recurs throughout the
novel. Why would Zadie Smith choose to emphasize the persistence of
history in a novel that devotes much of its attention to the composite
culture of second-generation black and Asian Britons? But White Teeth
does not focus on second-generation youths alone; instead, it offers a
salutary reminder of the intractable character of racial inequality by
tracing the homologies that link the experience of different generations
of black and Asian Britons. This ›ies in the face of accounts of our 
“postracial” moment. Despite the demonstrable intensi‹cation of
strati‹cation and inequality around the world, it has become common-
place for critics to argue that racial difference is no longer a salient social
phenomenon. Such a perspective has gained credibility, ironically, as a
result of the signi‹cant victories won by anticolonial and antiracist
movements around the world over the last half-century.16
In conjunction with this political transformation, massive advances
in molecular biology during the same period have established a new site
for inquiry into human difference. As Paul Gilroy puts it:
When the body becomes absolutely penetrable, and is re‹gured as
the transient epiphenomenon of coded invisible information, the
aesthetic of epidermalization and its regime of power are irrecover-
ably over. The boundaries of “race” have moved across the thresh-
old of skin. They are cellular and molecular, not dermal. If “race” is
to endure, it will be in a new form, estranged from the scales respec-
tively associated with political anatomy and epidermalization.17
According to Gilroy, mainstream genomic research has tended to
reduce the body, the traditional scale at which “race” was de‹ned, to no
more than a lumbering robot whose every action and appearance is
determined by invisible strings of DNA. Despite the reductive character
of this genomic discourse, Gilroy has recently suggested that the
emphasis on identity as code rather than ideological construct may fos-
ter the complete dismantling of racial classi‹cation. Gilroy sees a
utopian outcome in which “at the smaller microscopic scales that open
up the body for scrutiny today, ‘race’ becomes less meaningful, com-
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pelling, or salient to the basic tasks of healing and protecting our-
selves.”18
While genetic code and physical traits do vary among human pop-
ulations, such differences do not constitute a subspecies level of genetic
differentiation, the biological de‹nition of “race.” In fact, ethnic differ-
ence accounts for only 10–15 percent of the genetic variation that char-
acterizes human beings. This means that there tends to be greater
genetic variation between any two individuals of the same “race” than
between people from different continents. There is, in other words, no
empirical biological basis for the view that human beings belong to dif-
ferent “races,” a view that has helped legitimate social hierarchy since
the early nineteenth century.19 Gilroy can therefore draw on signi‹cant
empirical evidence to support his call for a radical non- or postracial
humanism. But “race” thinking has had a long history, one in which
shifting scienti‹c paradigms have all too easily been appropriated by
those wishing to perpetuate social discrimination.20 Zadie Smith’s
White Teeth confronts the dystopian possibilities of current research
into genetics by reminding us of this long history.
Using a variety of comic modes, White Teeth satirizes the insecuri-
ties that beset residents of postcolonial, multiracial Britain near the end
of the millennium, and connects such insecurities to issues of belonging
and “race.” The novel begins, however, during World War II, and sub-
sequently traces the history of its two principal protagonists, Samad
Iqbal and Archie Jones, and their families across the half-century in
which the anticolonial and antiracist movements achieved their great
victories. The novel’s historical setting allows Smith to examine the his-
tory of eugenics, focusing on the moment that seemingly discredited the
movement for good: the Holocaust. Yet by tracing an arc across the fol-
lowing ‹fty years to the present, White Teeth underlines the tenacious
hold that biological determinism has had on the popular imagination.
By the novel’s conclusion, the eugenic culture that the so-called
People’s War seemed to have obliterated makes an unsettling return.
Sparing no one, Zadie Smith satirizes both the ethically obtuse scientists
who are responsible for this reawakened research as well as their fanati-
cally doctrinaire opponents.
Marcus Chalfen’s FutureMouse—the embodiment of the tightly
knit utopian and dystopian possibilities of the new biotechnologies—is
liberated by Archie Jones. While sitting in the audience at the Millennial
Science Commission, this perpetually dithering working-class English-
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man overhears Chalfen thanking his mentor, Dr. Marc-Pierre Perret.
Perret’s name and the sight of his bloody tears, the product of a heredi-
tary diabetic condition, take Archie back half a century to an abandoned
mansion in the war-torn Balkans. World War II has ended while Archie
and his comrade Samad Iqbal sit ignominiously waiting for relief with
their dead comrades in a broken-down Churchill tank. Samad decides to
capture Perret after advancing Soviet troops inform him that the diabetic
Frenchman ironically turns out to have been an important ‹gure in the
Nazi eugenics program. The confrontation with Perret represents not
simply a stab at the glory that has eluded Samad on the battle‹eld but
also a decisive rejection of the Nazis’ attempts to control the future
through racial engineering. Since the Soviet troops have not yet liberated
the “work camps” in Poland, Archie and Samad have no idea of the full
horror of the Holocaust. Despite his ignorance of the lengths to which
the Nazis took their eugenics program, Samad sees Perret’s work as the
ultimate heresy. For Samad, eugenics is predicated on an intrinsically
blasphemous project of wresting control of human destiny away from
Allah.21 Their treatment of Perret, Samad tells Archie, is intimately tied
to the larger moral questions at stake in the war against totalitarianism.
Despite their eccentric geographical location in Bulgaria, Samad
and Archie’s encounter with the man the local villagers call Dr. Sick
raises fundamental questions about European culture. White Teeth’s
focus on eugenics and racial hierarchy reveals the contradictions of the
Allied cause, and thereby troubles the dichotomous distinction between
Allied democracy and Axis totalitarianism. This model, Smith’s novel
suggests, helps obscure the historical complicity of the Allies with the
raciological doctrines implemented by the Nazis. Following the fall of
the Third Reich in 1950, UNESCO issued a now-famous statement
shaped by the Holocaust that declared the invalidity of established con-
ceptions of “race.” Authored by a student of the antiracist ethnographer
Franz Boas, the UNESCO document repudiated a tradition of scienti‹c
thinking developed in Europe since the eighteenth century.22 Yet if the
Nazis’ genocidal policies catalyzed a sweeping rejection of eugenic
thought throughout the Western world, they also concealed the extent
to which such policies had become common sense among many seg-
ments of the population in the United States and Europe. The history of
widespread popular acceptance of eugenics before the war—including
the notion that heredity rather than economic, social, and cultural fac-
tors determine the status of racial groups—has conveniently been
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expunged from collective memory over the last half century.
Most signi‹cantly, Samad and Archie’s encounter with an apostle
of Nazi raciology highlights the return of colonial racial doctrines to the
European heartland that took place in the ‹rst half of the twentieth cen-
tury.23 The prominence of eugenic thought before the Second World
War was intimately related to the imperial ambitions of the European
nations in which raciological science was conducted. As scholars such as
Ann Stoler have argued, dominant forms of nineteenth-century Euro-
pean identity were shaped in an imperial landscape where notions of
racial purity and sexual virtue were paramount.24 These discourses of
imperial propriety linked conceptions of class, “race,” and gendered
identity, generating a series of exclusionary social taxonomies that had
a profound impact on popular consciousness and the metropolitan
state. Fears about the dilution of supposedly pure Aryan bloodlines and
culture led, for example, to the construction of micro-sites of identity
around issues such as parenting, education, and tropical hygiene.25 In
addition, Gobineau’s argument that empires decline because of the
racial mixing that accompanies their expansion was widely dissemi-
nated and helped foster state policies designed to mitigate the degener-
ative impact of ersatz citizen-subjects. In the United States, for example,
thirty states had adopted sterilization laws for the “mentally defective”
by 1924, the year in which Congress passed legislation restricting immi-
gration of “inferior stock” from southern and eastern Europe.26 Britain,
a pioneer in eugenic science during the ‹rst half of the twentieth cen-
tury, only narrowly avoided passing similar measures in the face of
almost uniform support from the scienti‹c and political establish-
ment.27 Such examples of biopower demonstrate the extent to which the
modern nation has been produced in conjunction with forms of racial
discrimination developed on colonial terrain.
Innovations in the biological sciences played a fundamental role in
the advance of eugenics policies during the ‹rst half of the twentieth
century. These innovations were ‹rmly rooted in genetic determinism,
which Richard Lewontin argues has been the baseline ideology within
biology except for the brief period after World War II that produced the
UNESCO statement on “race.”28 The demonstration by geneticists such
as Gregor Mendel and August Weismann of the continuity of the
“germplasm” (the contemporary term for DNA) suggested that inher-
ited traits were immune to environmental in›uences. Consequently,
social Darwinists in both Europe and the United States reasoned that no
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amount of cultural assimilation would eradicate the inherited qualities
of purportedly inferior “races” such as the Jews. If geneticists like Ernst
Haeckel advocated the elimination of undesirable traits through a posi-
tive eugenic program of selective breeding, it was left to the Nazi Party
to implement a negative eugenic policy: the systematic elimination of
degenerate germplasm through genocide. While there were obviously
economic motives behind the expansionism of the Axis powers, doc-
trines of racial superiority played a decisive role in mobilizing popular
support for war. Soldiers from Germany, Italy, and Japan went to war
saturated with eugenicist doctrines concerning racial superiority that
echoed those used by the liberal democratic nations to legitimate their
own colonial projects.
Samad and Archie’s confrontation with Dr. Sick at the tail end of
the war in White Teeth therefore needs to be seen within the context of
the racial doctrines mobilized by both the Allies and the Axis powers. In
World War I, imperial nations such as France and Britain had employed
colonial troops with great reluctance. Military service was equated in
these countries with citizenship and manhood. The prospect of colonial
troops serving side by side with Europeans in the military consequently
threatened to expose and undermine the racial hierarchies that
cemented European power in the colonies. In the circumstances of
labor shortage that attended “total war,” however, colonial workers and
troops were drawn into the military. In both of the wars, military service
helped generate a feeling of entitlement among colonial soldiers, who
saw their sacri‹ces for the mother country as entailing reciprocal obli-
gations that challenged the forms of economic and political subordina-
tion on which colonialism depended.29 In fact, leaders of the Indian
independence movement openly de‹ed colonial authority before
World War II by demanding, before they agreed to support the war, the
application of the Atlantic Charter’s promised “restoration of sover-
eignty, self-government, and national life” to the colonies as well as
Europe.30 In addition, regular contact with European servicemen and
civilians allowed colonial soldiers to trespass the rigid social and sexual
boundaries that helped legitimate hierarchies of “race” and class in the
colonies.
But Zadie Smith’s character Samad is ‹ghting for more than just his
rights as a British subject. As was true for many soldiers from the
colonies, his quest for glory in the European war is motivated primarily
by his desire to sustain family honor.31 Indeed, Samad is driven by a
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sense of inheritance that ironically mimics the genetic determinism that
burgeoned among Europeans in the colonial context. As the great-
grandson of Mangal Pande, the ‹rst upper-caste native soldier in the
Bengal Army to rebel against British authority in what Victorian impe-
rialists called the Sepoy Mutiny, Samad sees himself as the descendent
of the Indian independence movement’s progenitor. Yet despite the fact
that “nothing was closer or meant more to him than his blood” (83)
Samad’s attempts to demonstrate the nobility of his bloodline are
thwarted at every turn in the novel. Unfortunately for Samad, British
colonial historians have represented Mangal Pande in less than the
heroic light he deserves, turning him into an intoxicated and incompe-
tent buffoon who unwittingly got caught up in the sweep of history
(212). Wittily drawing on the analysis of the subaltern studies collective,
Zadie Smith uses the case of Samad’s great-grandfather to demonstrate
the extent to which the historical record can be manipulated to serve the
interests of those in power.32 Samad’s actions throughout the novel are
dictated by the consuming drive to wipe away the stain on his family
honor perpetuated by colonial historiography.
Tied to this humiliating representation of Samad’s forefather as a
coward is his dismay at the failure of his illustrious genealogy to mani-
fest itself in his own life. Indeed, the more uncertain Samad grows of his
genealogical roots, the more fearful he becomes about his own failure
and dissolution. Samad’s wartime experience thus undermines genetic
determinism by demonstrating that intrinsic hereditary identity seldom
triumphs over adverse environmental conditions. After having his hand
blown apart by an incompetent Sikh sapper, Samad ‹nds his promising
career as an aviator quickly aborted. He ends up as a tank radio opera-
tor in the “Buggered Battalion,” a collection of mis‹ts whose homo-
phobic nickname underlines the connection between constructions of
martial masculinity and national identity. Eugenicists historically asso-
ciated both racial hybridity and homosexuality with sterility and degen-
eracy. Samad’s internalization of these values is evident when his failure
to live up to his ancestor’s heroic legacy leaves him feeling like a bastard
whose mixed English and Bengali cultural identity has destroyed his
masculinity.
This fear of cultural bastardization and illegitimacy overwhelms
Samad as he leads the attack on Dr. Sick’s mansion. One of the Bulgar-
ians he and Archie are leading up the hill protests that this is a battle of
the West, something that has nothing to do with him. Samad ›ees into
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the night on hearing this line. When Archie ‹nds him, Samad is con-
templating suicide: “What am I good for, Jones? If I were to pull this
trigger, what will I leave behind? An Indian, a turncoat English Indian
with a limp wrist like a faggot and no medals that they can ship home
with me” (95). Samad has realized that he has become a mimic man, a
colonial subject attempting to conform to the contradictory dictates of
assimilation set out by the empire. As an Indian, he cannot become an
of‹cer in the British army, despite the uniform he has purloined from
his dead CO.33 Furthermore, his attempts to win glory ‹ghting for the
British in Europe are hardly in keeping with the anticolonial efforts of
either his great-grandfather or of the contemporary Indian indepen-
dence movement. Far from ‹nding con‹rmation of his martial blood-
line in the war, Samad is overcome by feelings of displacement and dis-
honor that he immediately equates with the lack of manhood and
sterility traditionally associated with homosexuality. As a result of this
crisis, Samad is unable to execute Dr. Sick himself, and instead pushes
Archie to carry out the act in the name of an aggrieved Europe. This
decision is bitterly ironic given the fact that the Nazis ‹rst experimented
with genocidal policies in their African colonies before deploying these
policies in Europe.34
The idea that blood will tell was a fundamental conceit in nine-
teenth-century novels written under the in›uence of social Darwinism.
Characters like Dickens’s Oliver Twist escape the poorhouse and regain
their rightful place in society as their aristocratic blood triumphs over
the destitution into which they have erroneously fallen.35 Genetic deter-
minism was even more evident in novels written in a colonial context.
European genes alone ultimately redeem the shape-shifting Asian child-
hood of Rudyard Kipling’s Kim, for instance.36 As Kim demonstrates,
the ideology of genetic determinism helped legitimate the European
imperial mission during the nineteenth century, while reassuring colo-
nial functionaries that their exposure to non-European social condi-
tions would have limited impact on them as long as they observed the
correct protocols. Focusing on the impact of such colonial racial beliefs
on the European homeland, White Teeth returns to World War II in
order to underline the pernicious character of such determinist beliefs
and to stress the impact of social inequality on individual identity.
Although the novel does not directly engage the Holocaust, the specter
of genocide lurks in the background of Samad and Archie’s clumsy
attempts at heroism. In addition, Samad’s frustrated belief in the inher-
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ent nobility of his blood and his contradictory indictment of Nazi
eugenics policies dramatize the extent to which notions of genetics and
identity were a force in the recent past. The return of eugenics in White
Teeth suggests that the history of raciology needs to be borne in mind as
new forms of eugenics surface in contemporary culture.
The Pitfalls of Hybridity
Thirty years after this fateful encounter with Dr. Sick, Samad winds up
working as a “curry-shifter” in an Indian restaurant in London’s West
End. Through Samad’s misadventures in multicultural London, Zadie
Smith interrogates current theories of diasporic identity. Black and
Asian cultures in Britain have been taken by prominent postcolonial
critics to exemplify forms of cosmopolitanism that undermine rei‹ed
models of cultural identity.37 The claims of such critics to be representa-
tives of ethnic minorities have, however, been rendered hollow by the
growth of ethnic primordialism within Asian and black communities.38
In addition, although theories of hybridity are intended to challenge
exclusionary models of belonging, they suffer from their own forms of
determinism as a result of their programmatic assertion of diasporic
cosmopolitanism. All too often, this analysis simply inverts the domi-
nant tropes of colonial discourse by representing diasporic populations
as inherently progressive. Such hybridity putatively occurs at the cul-
tural level, but since the approach of critics like Homi Bhabha contains
precious little analysis of differentiating social factors such as class, gen-
der, regional provenance, and religious af‹liation, it often appears that
postcolonial migrants are inherently, even biologically, destined to
adopt antiessentialist, cosmopolitan identities.39 White Teeth self-con-
sciously parodies the biological determinism of much hybridity dis-
course through its depiction of Samad’s transformation in Britain.
The temptation of Samad Iqbal begins in his children’s school.
Nearly a decade into a marriage with a bride—the pugnacious Alsana—
a quarter-century his junior, Samad has become sexually frustrated. His
attempts to conform to divine dictates by resisting the temptation to
masturbate have failed miserably and he has become an apostate
wanker. His body, he con‹des to a fellow waiter, has grown mutinous in
an outward sign of his corruption by England (120). This feeling of con-
tamination by the West worsens once Samad initiates a doomed affair
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with Poppy Burt-Jones, his sons’ music teacher, whose double-barreled
name succinctly communicates her exemplary Englishness. Despite the
ridiculously extravagant Orientalist stereotypes that attract Poppy to
Samad, the affair heightens his sense of corruption to the point that he
becomes haunted by the apparition of his ancestor Mangal Pande,
whom he increasingly sees as a paradigm of cultural nationalist resis-
tance to the colonial destruction of tradition.
Samad’s fear of corruption by the West can be placed within the
context of the increasing racialization of culture that has taken place in
Britain during the postwar period. Despite the persistence of overt
forms of institutional and popular discrimination based on “race,”
commentators have argued that the predominant trend during the
period after 1945 has been toward forms of discrimination based on cul-
tural rather than biological difference.40 As the infamous “cricket test”
that Zadie Smith uses as an epigraph to this section demonstrates,
national belonging tends today to be judged by cultural criteria such as
an individual’s loyalty to the English—as opposed to the Pakistani or
West Indian—cricket team. However, fears such as those articulated by
Margaret Thatcher of “swamping” by “alien cultures” only thinly veil
the underlying concern with national reproduction that has been an
increasingly important factor in debates about immigration and citi-
zenship during the postwar period.41 Widespread revulsion against
state-based eugenic projects following the Holocaust has tended to
occlude the extent to which de‹nitions of national belonging and cul-
ture have been racialized in a manner wholly in keeping with long-
standing models of population control. Such policies have, however,
shifted from a focus on maintaining metropolitan national reproduc-
tion in the context of interimperial rivalries during the ‹rst half of the
twentieth century to one of excluding migration from former colonies
during the postcolonial era. Such restrictive immigration policies have
been accompanied by the criminalization of blackness through dracon-
ian policing strategies.42 Thus, although ethnic minority populations in
Britain after 1945 have not been subjected to of‹cial eugenic measures
such as methodical sterilization campaigns, it is important to note that
their excision from the national body politic has been more than simply
a symbolic one.43
In reaction to such forms of state biopower, ethnic minority groups
have often responded by advancing cultural nationalist counterdis-
courses. Although such defensive moves obviously lack the links with
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institutional racism that characterizes dominant discourses, all too
often such counterdiscourses reproduce the very homogenizing and
essentialist sense of identity they are reacting against. Samad’s fear of
dissolution evokes precisely this replication of dominant values. Indeed,
mirroring classic eugenicist discourse, Samad equates cultural inter-
mixture with corruption and decadence. The failure of his heroic ambi-
tions during the war, the maddeningly humble circumstances of his life
in Britain, and his guilt over the affair with Poppy push Samad to adopt
what Paul Gilroy has termed “ethnic absolutism.” For Gilroy, the nar-
row cultural nationalism of some black antiracist groups fragments
broader de‹nitions of blackness grounded in resistance to racism.44
Like Gilroy, Zadie Smith challenges this trend toward insular construc-
tions of ethnic identity by tracing Samad’s hilariously unsuccessful
attempts to shoehorn himself into the mold of a puri‹ed and essential-
ist cultural identity. Nationalist fears of penetration are, White Teeth
suggests, mild in comparison to the immigrant’s fear of dissolution
(272). As the novel’s narrator comments, Samad’s search for his roots
proves increasingly constricting and ultimately corrupting:
If religion is the opiate of the people, tradition is an even more sin-
ister analgesic, simply because it rarely appears sinister. If religion is
a tight band, a throbbing vein, a needle, tradition is a far homelier
concoction: poppy seeds ground into tea; a sweet cocoa drink laced
with cocaine; the kind of thing your grandmother might have
made. To Samad . . . tradition was culture, and culture led to roots,
and these were good, these were untainted principles. That didn’t
mean he could live by them, abide by them, or grow in the manner
they demanded, but roots were roots and roots were good. You
would get nowhere telling him that weeds too have tubers, or that
the ‹rst sign of loose teeth is something rotten, something degener-
ate, deep within the gums. (161)
Although White Teeth’s comic mode encourages the reader to retain a
sense of wry sympathy for alienated characters like Samad, the novel
also uses his misbegotten essentialism to satirize the currents of reli-
gious and cultural fundamentalism that have polarized the public
sphere in contemporary Britain.45
After beginning his affair with Poppy, Samad’s apprehensions over
impurity increasingly center on his twin sons’ identity. The more he
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feels his own identity fragmenting, the more Samad insists on imposing
a rigidly conceived ethnic and religious identity on his sons. He fears,
for example, that English cultural forms like the “pagan” Harvest Festi-
val organized by Magid and Millat’s school are corrupting his sons.
Worse still, Samad ‹nds out that Magid has been telling his schoolmates
that his name is “Mark Smith,” while Millat dreams of becoming a rock
star like Bruce Springsteen. What Samad misses in his consternation at
this apparent total assimilation of Western culture by his twin sons is
the constant negotiation and code-switching they engage in as ethnic
minorities in Britain.46 Instead of helping them in their struggle to cre-
ate viable composite identities, he decides to free them of the constant
cravings of the West by returning them to the East. Since he cannot
afford airfare for both twins, Samad splits his twins apart, sending the
more intellectually inclined Magid back to Bangladesh, where he hopes
he will become a holy man, while keeping the more rebellious Millat
with him in Britain. Unable to remain halal himself, Samad tries to
determine his sons’ identity through transformation of their environ-
ment. This strategy is ironic given his earlier rebellion against Dr. Sick’s
attempt to control human fate through eugenic engineering. As his wife
notes, Samad frequently declares that Allah alone determines people’s
fate, and yet he himself engages in overweening attempts to control the
lives of others.
The chapter describing the splitting apart of Magid and Millat is
named, appropriately, “Mitosis.” Through the division and replication
of a single cell, Mitosis produces identical genetic material in each of the
new cells. This biological reference highlights the fact that the boys are
identical twins, and are therefore indistinguishable in genetic terms.
Similarities and differences between the two of them as they grow up in
isolation should re›ect the countervailing effects of, respectively, hered-
ity and environment. When he separates his twin sons, Samad is unwit-
tingly engaging in an experiment similar to that used by biologists over
the last half-century to assess the impact of genetic inheritance. Such
experiments were initially undertaken by scientists interested in demon-
strating the cultural construction of identity, a view that had gained
widespread acceptance among social scientists following the turn away
from genetic determinism after World War II. Reacting against the envi-
ronmental determinist dogma of Lysenkoism in the Soviet Union, how-
ever, biologists challenged this model during the development of mole-
cular genetics in the 1960s and 1970s by performing experiments with
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simple organisms whose traits of rapid development tended to minimize
the effects of the environment.47 Although recent trends in biology have
emphasized developmental plasticity and thereby acknowledged the key
role the environment plays in triggering phenotypical variation, the
long-standing repudiation of environmental determinism within the
scienti‹c community has had a strong impact. As the controversy over
The Bell Curve suggested, rigid genetic determinism has regained credi-
bility within the social sciences. Naturally, studies of separated twins are
increasingly seen as providing evidence for the role of the genes in deter-
mining identity, despite the fact that such studies usually measure cul-
tural similarities in the extended families in which such twins are placed
rather than basic genetic determination.48
White Teeth satirizes Samad’s belief in cultural determinism as well
as his dogmatic pride in his lineage by depicting the unexpected matura-
tion of the separated twins. For despite their identical genes, Magid and
Millat become polar opposites, as Samad might have hoped, but in
exactly the opposite way to what he expected. Growing up in the disaster-
prone environment of Bangladesh, Magid is drawn into the orbit of an
Anglophile professor and comes to believe that the West alone is capable
of imposing order on the chaotic world he ‹nds in the East (239). This
transformation upsets Samad’s expectation that Magid would mature
into a submissive disciple of Islam in the putatively pure environment of
the East. As Edward Said has emphasized, imperialism and its postcolo-
nial supplements such as neoliberal globalization have fostered a world of
intermixed identities that run counter to fundamentalist or cultural
nationalist perspectives.49 The absolute separation between East and
West that Samad dreams of is an illusion, and even after he separates
them his sons are constantly constructing new identities based on com-
posites of the interpenetrating cultures of East and West.
If Magid’s transformation into an anglophile dandy undermines
Samad’s illusions of cultural purity, Millat’s metamorphosis into a
hybrid homeboy emphasizes the constant process of negotiation
between different cultures that characterizes second-generation immi-
grants to an even greater extent:
Raggastanis spoke a strange mix of Jamaican patois, Bengali,
Gujarati, and English. Their ethos, their manifesto, if it could be
called that, was equally a hybrid thing: Allah featured, but more as a
collective big brother than a supreme being, a hard-as-fuck geezer
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who would ‹ght in their corner if necessary; kung fu and the works
of Bruce Lee were also central to the philosophy; added to this was
a smattering of Black Power (as embodied by the album Fear of a
Black Planet, Public Enemy); but mainly their mission was to put
the Invincible back in Indian, the Bad-aaaass back in Bengali, the 
P-Funk back in Pakistani. (192)
This bravura description of Millat’s “raggastani” ethos draws on cul-
tural studies analysis of youth subcultures in Britain, which has tradi-
tionally focused on the symbolic resistance of such subcultures to class-
and age-based forms of social hierarchy.50 Subcultures, critics such as
Dick Hebdige argue, challenge hegemonic meanings and ideologies
through acts of bricolage that transform and denature the accepted
meanings of commodities and media images.51 Following this subcul-
tural mode, Millat and his raggastani crew appropriate highly masculin-
ist popular cultural icons such as Bruce Lee and the godfather to articu-
late a militant sense of Asian pride.
However, there is a nagging contradiction within this act of brico-
lage: the extremely cosmopolitan pastiche of cultural in›uences that
constitute “raggastani” identity are used to legitimate an increasingly
essentialist and exclusionary model of ethnic identity. Indeed, despite
their syncretic blend of diasporic cultures, Millat and his friends partic-
ipate in an event that has been taken as a key ›ash point in the rejection
of pluralist values: the burning of Salman Rushdie’s novel The Satanic
Verses in Bradford. As Millat becomes increasingly involved in Islamic
militancy, Zadie Smith dramatizes the clash between the Hollywood
inspiration for his macho identity and the anti-Western orientation of
Islamic fundamentalist doctrine. Millat’s tragicomic cultural bas-
tardization also reproduces his father Samad’s failure to cleave to his
own ideals of purity. Through this satirical portrait of the instabilities in
Millat’s and Magid’s cosmopolitan identities, White Teeth depicts the
unexpected political outcome of diasporic hybridity and thereby under-
mines facile models of both genetic and cultural determinism.
The Clash of Fundamentalisms
How are we to gauge the prominence of racial difference in the “post-
human” future that biotech commentators such as Francis Fukuyama
Genetics, Biotechnology, and the Future of “Race” 165
have begun analyzing?52 One place to start is by examining the enduring
salience of “race” in the supposedly postracial present. White Teeth
comments acidly on the contradictions in contemporary middle-class
discourses of multiculturalism through its portrait of the molecular
biologist Marcus Chalfen and his wife Joyce. Despite being religious and
ethnic minorities, as middle-class intellectuals the Chalfens ironically
offer a paradigm of successful Englishness to Archie and Samad’s sec-
ond-generation kids. For the Chalfens, in turn, Archie and Samad’s
children incarnate titillating forms of cultural, racial, and class differ-
ence that inject spice into their otherwise predictable lives. Rather than
dwelling on the explicit racism of characters like the aged of‹cer and
repugnant bigot J. P. Hamilton, Smith focuses her critique on the far
more subtle bias of bourgeois white Britons such as the Chalfens. For
example, White Teeth pillories Joyce Chalfen’s fashionable interest in
difference—and the sexual voyeurism that underlies this interest—
through the horticultural descriptions in her ‹ctitious book The New
Flower Power:
The fact is, cross-pollination produces more varied offspring, which
are better able to cope with a changed environment. It is said cross-
pollinating plants also tend to produce more and better-quality
seeds. If my one-year-old son is anything to go by (a cross-pollina-
tion between a lapsed-Catholic horticulturalist feminist and an
intellectual Jew!), then I can certainly vouch for the truth of this.
(258)
Using Joyce’s risibly anthropocentric language of cross-pollination,
Zadie Smith mocks postcolonial accounts of hybridity, which The New
Flower Power apes perfectly. As Robert Young has argued, the currency
of hybridity as an antiracist term is quite ironic since it is deeply embed-
ded in precisely the kinds of fetishistic classi‹cation of difference that
characterized nineteenth-century raciology.53 Joyce’s horticultural lan-
guage underlines this link, allowing Smith to satirize modish talk of
racial mixing. In addition, like many recent accounts of hybridity that
promote an ahistorical model of diasporic identity, Joyce’s description
of cross-pollination suggests that hybrid plants have an inherent biolog-
ical superiority over their thoroughbred competitors that makes them
particularly adept at surviving in a rapidly changing environment. As
we have seen, although critique of exclusionary models of identity is
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laudable, sweeping claims for the cosmopolitan and progressive charac-
ter of diasporic communities seem far too simplistic in the wake of
events such as the Rushdie affair.
Because of her interest in cross-pollination and difference, Joyce is
trans‹xed when Millat and Irie Jones, Archie’s mixed-race daughter, are
sent to the Chalfens’ home for tutoring after they misbehave at school.
The fetishistic quality of her fascination with otherness quickly becomes
apparent, however, as Millat and Irie are integrated into the Chalfen
household. Irie is fascinated by the Chalfens’ extrovert intellectualism,
and does her best to adopt the middle-class manners and mores of the
Chalfens. Millat, by contrast, is more interested in gaining access to lazy
bourgeois money than intellectual capital. Predictably, the more Irie
attempts to conform to what the family calls Chalfenism, the less inter-
esting she is to Joyce. By contrast, the more Millat goes off the rails, the
more Joyce becomes fascinated with his problematic identity. As Millat
becomes increasingly embroiled with a blundering but militant Islamic
group that feeds his teenage dreams of righteous rebellion, Joyce treats
his growing cultural nationalism as a curiosity and psychological
conundrum rather than a political stance. Joyce’s myopic support of
Millat offers an implicit comment on the politics of institutional multi-
culturalism in Britain, whose advocates have a history of taking the
most extreme forms of cultural difference to be the most authentic
expressions of collective identity. Multiculturalism has therefore
become a target of criticism in Britain because of its unwitting tendency
to further reactionary currents within ethnic minority communities. As
activists with the British group Women Against Fundamentalism have
argued, conservative religious leaders have been among the greatest
bene‹ciaries of the adoption of multiculturalist norms since these mea-
sures have allowed them to depict challenges to their programs as
racism.54 Joyce’s role in abetting Millat’s turn to militant Islam despite
her putatively progressive outlook underlines the contradictions of
multiculturalist dogma.
Like his wife, Marcus Chalfen is deeply invested in questions of
hybridization and has a Panglossian belief in the progressive outcome of
such processes. As a result, he expresses utter disdain for those who
challenge the ethical prerogatives of his genetic experiments: scienti‹c
and social progress, Marcus believes, are “brothers-in-arms.” Yet White
Teeth introduces a note of sweeping hubris in its description of Mar-
cus’s scienti‹c endeavors:
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He went to the edges of his God’s imagination and made mice Yah-
weh could not conceive of: mice with rabbit genes, mice with
webbed feet (or so Joyce imagined, so didn’t ask), mice who year
after year expressed more and more eloquently Marcus’s designs:
from the hit-or-miss process of selective breeding, to the chimeric
fusion of embryos, and then the rapid developments that lay
beyond Joyce’s ken and in Marcus’s future—DNA microinjection,
retrovirus-mediated transgenesis (for which he came within an inch
of the Nobel, 1987), embryonic stem cell-mediated gene transfer—
all processes by which Marcus manipulated ova, regulated the over-
or under-expression of a gene, planting instructions in the germ
line to be realized in physical characteristics. Creating mice whose
very bodies did exactly what Marcus told them. And always with
humanity in mind—a cure for cancer, cerebral palsy, Parkinson’s—
always with the ‹rm belief in the perfectibility of all life, in the pos-
sibility of making it more ef‹cient, more logical. (259–60)
Marcus’s facile belief in the sanctity of his research skirts the complex
ethical questions that Zadie Smith’s account of his enterprise raises. By
harnessing the awesome but still poorly understood power of recombi-
nant DNA, Marcus is able to engage in forms of cross-pollination that
completely eclipse the hybridization processes described in his wife’s
writing.55 Human beings have been domesticating and breeding plants
and animals for over ten thousand years, but we have always been
restrained in our attempts to hybridize our creations by the natural lim-
its imposed by species boundaries. Recombinant DNA overcomes these
limits by manipulating genes themselves. In his experiments with
mutant mice, Marcus is part of the contemporary attempt to initiate a
new biotechnological era in which all life-forms can be transformed
into factories for the production of commodities. Indeed, the genetic
code of life itself is increasingly being commodi‹ed in what critics such
as Vandana Shiva see as the ‹nal stage of primitive accumulation.56 By
placing himself in this godlike position, Marcus opens a Pandora’s box
of issues relating to the rami‹cations of genetic research.
Yet, like many scientists and entrepreneurs in the booming biotech
industry, Marcus Chalfen refuses to engage in debate concerning the
potential ecological and social perils associated with genetic engineer-
ing.57 Marcus has no time for science studies scholars, who challenge the
ideology of scienti‹c objectivity by insisting on the role played by
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researchers in re›ecting and reinforcing the dominant values of their
society. He similarly spurns activists who question the ethics of his
experiments on animals. His arrogance and insularity are threatened,
however, by a young woman he meets at Heathrow airport while wait-
ing for Magid’s return from Bangladesh. Her identity as an Asian and a
Hindu, she explains to Marcus, make her see some highly dystopian
sides to biotechnology. She goes on to amplify this point by describing
her fears concerning the potential use of pathogenic organisms by the
West against the East, the creation of racial hierarchy through genetic
engineering, and the destruction of the sanctity of life (345). Marcus is
unhinged by what he sees as the lurid neofascist possibilities the young
woman extrapolates from his work. Caught up in the minutiae of sci-
enti‹c research and discovery and in thoughts of the potential medical
bene‹ts to be derived from his work, Marcus is unprepared to submit
himself to ethical scrutiny by the general public.
Yet as critics like Jeremy Rifkin have argued, genetic engineering
technologies are by their very nature eugenics tools.58 Unlike the eugen-
ics movements of the early twentieth century, the new biotechnology is
driven not by totalitarian ideologies of national/racial uplift but by mar-
ket forces and consumer desire. Nevertheless, reproductive technolo-
gies such as prenatal testing that diagnose untreatable genetic disorders
already force decisions on families and individuals that are inherently
eugenic. Parents will face increasing pressure to use new biotechnolo-
gies in order to protect their unborn children from hereditary diseases
as these technologies become more widely available. But these pressures
are inherently social, and their potentially inegalitarian uses will
increase pressure for state intervention.59 What, for example, will con-
stitute a genetic “defect”? As Rifkin notes, disability rights advocates are
already questioning the eugenic implications of such language, wonder-
ing whether people like themselves will be seen simply as errors in the
code.60 Likewise, Francis Fukuyama hypothesizes that a genetic “cure”
for homosexuality would push individuals to engineer heterosexual
children for themselves, leading to greater discrimination against those
born queer and to the eventual elimination of homosexuality.61 The
potential for drastic ampli‹cation of the already wide race-based dis-
parities of life opportunities as a result of privatized eugenics is just as
alarming. In this vein, White Teeth examines Irie Jones’s self-hatred as a
result of her genetic inheritance of kinky hair and a buxom body. Her
painful attempts to straighten her hair and to become a Chalfen high-
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light the dif‹cult questions concerning identity, race, and hegemony
that biotechnology will increasingly place before us.
Stung by the complex ethical questions raised by the young woman
he meets at the airport, Marcus leans increasingly on Magid, who has
arrived in Britain intent on helping him eliminate chaos from the
world. The center of this grandiose project is Marcus’s FutureMouse, a
creature genetically engineered to develop speci‹c cancers in speci‹c
tissues at speci‹c times. As Marcus laconically comments in a moment
of defensive sarcasm, “You eliminate the random, you rule the world”
(283). Notwithstanding such derisive banter, Marcus’s project of total
control is scienti‹cally unfeasible. As we saw earlier, an organism’s envi-
ronment plays a vital role in determining the expression of its genes.
However, even if it were possible to control both the genes of a devel-
oping organism and the complete sequence of its environments, one
could not maintain total control over the organism because of random
variations in the division and growth of cells that occur during develop-
ment.62 This chance element, known as developmental noise, under-
mines the rigid genetic determinism and totalitarian desire for control
implicit in Marcus’s project.
Despite the fact that Marcus’s hubristic experiment is doomed to
fail, the public takes the FutureMouse very seriously. In a slap at the
commodi‹cation of science that has accompanied the biotechnology
boom, White Teeth traces the rise of controversy surrounding the
FutureMouse as a result of Magid’s public relations campaign. In the
press releases he gives to Irie to disseminate, Magid describes the crea-
ture as the herald of a new phase in history in which human beings will
not be “victims of the random but instead directors and arbitrators of
our own fate” (357). Magid’s desire for control over fate should not be
so surprising given his own traumatic life experience. This aspiration,
however, is just as doomed as Marcus’s genetic determinism. In a hilar-
ious depiction of contemporary clashes over biotech, Marcus and
Magid’s joint project to win public support for genetic engineering runs
afoul of groups whose religious and ethical beliefs are challenged by the
FutureMouse.
The press conference at which the mouse was to have made its tri-
umphant debut is disrupted by two such organizations in particular:
Millat’s posse, the Keepers of the Eternal and Vigilant Islamic Nation
(KEVIN), and a militant animal rights group named Fighting Animal
Torture and Exploitation (FATE), to which Marcus’s son Joshua
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belongs. As one might imagine from their ludicrous acronyms, Zadie
Smith satirizes both of these groups mercilessly.63 Joshua seems ani-
mated more by the cleavage of FATE’s sexy female leader than by the
group’s quasi-theological discussions of animal rights, while Millat’s
Islamic militancy is more a product of Scorsese ‹lms than of the Koran.
Nevertheless, despite the personal foibles of both groups’ members,
White Teeth makes FATE and KEVIN the mouthpieces for the two
dominant critiques of biotechnology: the theological and the ethical.
Although the novel does not dwell on the moral objections of either
group in detail, their opposition to the rei‹cation and commodi‹cation
of life represents a potent challenge to the strain of biological determin-
ism evinced most clearly in the FutureMouse. In addition, despite the
fact that the clash between these groups and the scienti‹c establishment
that takes place at the unveiling of the FutureMouse is not resolved, the
renewal of con›ict over the control of genetic inheritance reminds us
that the legacy of eugenics and raciology is very much alive.
Conclusion
Archie’s ›ashback to World War II during the unveiling ceremony for
the FutureMouse underlines the legacy of raciological science that lies at
the heart of contemporary biotechnology. Through this ›ashback, we
learn that Archie was unable to execute Doctor Perret—aka Dr. Sick—
and that this proponent of Nazi eugenics emerged after the war to
become Marcus Chalfen’s mentor and director of the institute at which
the FutureMouse unveiling is taking place. The replication of events
during World War II is explicit in the novel’s ‹nale. Reenacting the
scene in the Balkans, Millat attempts to strike against what he perceives
as a blasphemous scheme to wrest control of human fate away from
God by putting a bullet into Marcus Chalfen. Once again, Archie
chooses clemency, and throws himself in front of Millat’s gun at the last
second. This time, however, the reader understands more clearly what is
at issue in Archie’s action. During Archie’s ›ashback to the war, Perret
describes his con‹dence that human perfection can be achieved if only
hard decisions concerning who will survive and who won’t are made
(446). In saving Marcus Chalfen, Archie therefore acts in a manner that
contradicts Perret’s chilling eugenic philosophy. As he falls to the
ground wounded, Archie sees the FutureMouse escape from his cage
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and, in the midst of the ensuing commotion, head down a nearby
mousehole. Chance and human solidarity thereby disrupt the carefully
scripted life of the FutureMouse.
The Millennial Science Commission, the dramatic setting for these
events, bears more than a passing resemblance to the sensational press
conference organized by the Human Genome Project at the White
House in 2001. Like the concluding scene of Smith’s novel, the White
House ceremony revealed more than just scienti‹c research. The map of
the human genome released by the government-funded research team
was only unveiled at this point as a result of an agreement with their pri-
vate competitors at the Celera Genomics Corporation.64 Having
decoded the mouse genome in 1999 and made the map available by sub-
scription only, the entrepreneurial director of Celera, Dr. J. Craig Ven-
ter, had promised to beat the international public consortium by using
a new method of genetic decoding. Competition with Venter’s private
‹rm obviously pushed the international consortium to complete its
draft far more quickly. However, it also clearly delineated the character
of future con›icts over access to the genetic information that helps
shape all living creatures. For Celera did not intend to make the map of
the human genome available to the public, despite having used infor-
mation published by the international consortium in its research. Like
other companies that are currently engaged in what critics call
biopiracy, Celera’s research is predicated on the privatization and com-
modi‹cation of the genetic sequences of living organisms. The uneasy
truce reached during the unveiling ceremony at the White House in
2001 was thus indicative of future contests over the corporate expropri-
ation of plant, animal, and microbial species.65
A number of critics have complained at Zadie Smith’s refusal to
resolve the ‹nal scene of her novel clearly. Having depicted the return of
the eugenic past, why does she not take a clearer stand on the impact of
this return? Yet this criticism misses the novel’s main point: it is impos-
sible to offer any ‹nal verdict on the impact of biotechnology at this
early date. For while White Teeth can warn us against facile liberal mod-
els of multiculturalism by highlighting the disturbing return of an age of
eugenics, it cannot predict the outcome of this return. How do we bal-
ance the closely interwoven utopian and dystopian potentials of the new
biotechnologies? What will it mean to be a human being in a world
where babies are genetically designed in the womb? How will we retain
the sense of common humanity necessary for viable democracy when
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people are identi‹ed, stereotyped, and discriminated against on the
basis of their genotype? Will the governments of the world allow a mar-
ket-oriented wave of eugenics to deepen the already wide chasm that
divides the rich and the poor and to expand the brutal exploitation of
animals around the world? It is still far too early to answer such ques-
tions. Whatever the future holds, we need to face the ethical dilemmas
that biotechnology will increasingly place before us with a clear aware-
ness of the dystopian history of such technologies. Zadie Smith’s White
Teeth reminds us of this history and hints at its saliency for con›icts to
come.
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Conclusion: “Step Back from the Blow Back”
Asian Hip-Hop and Post-9/11 Britain
The scale of devastation wrought by the German bombardment
of Britain during World War II was immense. During the ‹rst month of
the Blitz, for instance, seven thousand people died and ten thousand
were wounded in London alone. In the face of such devastation, Britons
displayed remarkable fortitude. Noel Coward, for example, coolly
describes the scene at the Savoy Hotel in his diary of 1941, with the
orchestra playing on while the walls of the building bulge as bombs
drop nearby. Compare such sangfroid with the state of hysteria pro-
voked by the suicide attacks during the summer of 2005.1 Although Par-
liament ultimately scaled back Tony Blair’s bid to extend detention
without charge to ninety days, plans for national identity cards, secret
antiterrorism courts, summary extraditions, the muzzling of free
speech, and police “shoot to kill” policies have gone ahead unimpaired
by abundant evidence that such policies will do little or nothing to pre-
vent terrorism. Blair’s de‹ant declaration that the July bombers would
not destroy the “British way of life” was unnecessary, of course, since
the British prime minister, through his increasingly draconian policies,
is doing this work himself, unraveling civil liberties that took centuries
to establish. What explains the discrepancy between the British stiff
upper lip during the Blitz, or, for that matter, during the long years of
IRA terrorism, and behavior in today’s neoimperial Britain? In addi-
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tion, why, despite signi‹cant mass protests against the invasion of Iraq,
have substantial numbers of the British public gone along with Blair’s
hyperbolic response to attacks that were, after all, quite predictable
given Britain’s troop deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq?
The response of the British government to the July bombings was
not simply a product of Tony Blair’s megalomaniacal ambitions, as
most journalists have tended to argue, but rather germinated from the
deeply racialized manner in which British identity has been framed for
the last half-century. While the July bombings and the “war on terror”
in general have helped catalyze particularly unsettling forms of discrim-
ination, there are signi‹cant continuities between the policies of the
Blair government and those of preceding British regimes in the face of
real or perceived threats to national security. Although Blair and the
members of his cabinet admittedly never articulate explicit racial ani-
mus against any groups, their rhetoric and the policies pursued by the
Labour government are driven by a cultural racism that hinges on the
defense of putatively homogeneous national values against an alien
threat. This is not, in other words, simply a matter of the individual
foibles of particular leaders, but rather of an institutional and ideo-
logical racism that is grounded in exclusionary discourses of national
identity disseminated across the political spectrum and deeply inscribed
in British culture. While the speci‹c members of British society sub-
jected to this cultural racism have changed over the last half-century,
the authoritarian populism that it helps catalyze is surprisingly contin-
uous. Not only is this popular authoritarianism unlikely to protect
Britons from future terrorist attacks; it is very likely to spark future
aggression by underlining the injustice and inequality that lie at the
heart of the British body politic.
Four days after the bombings on the London underground and bus
system last summer, Blair attempted to reassure British Muslims in a
statement made before Parliament in which he argued that “fanaticism
is not a state of religion but a state of mind. We will work with you
[British Muslims] to make the moderate and true voice of Islam heard
as it should be. Together, we will ensure that though terrorists can kill,
they will never destroy the way of life we share and which we value.”2
Like George Bush following 9/11, Tony Blair was careful not to suggest
that all Muslims are extremists. Despite this apparently antiracist move,
Blair at the same time establishes a binary opposition between the
enlightened values of “our civilization” and the barbaric behavior of
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“fanatics.” This binary conveniently cloaks the role of Western powers
in catalyzing Islamism. Blair cannot admit that his government has
helped prosecute a nakedly imperialist war in Iraq that has involved
staggering numbers of civilian deaths and regular infractions of the
Geneva Convention. So, instead of framing the July bombings as blow-
back from the imperial adventurism he helped initiate, Blair has
recourse to the Manichaean tropes of neo-Orientalist discourse.
In addition to dampening criticism of British imperialist belliger-
ence abroad, such rhetoric sets up a divide between those domestic (and
domesticated) “good” Muslims who fall into line behind “our values,”
including the new antiterrorist legislation, and the “bad” Muslims who
explicitly attack government measures in their words or actions.3 While
this kind of rhetoric about national unity might have some political
clout for ‹gures like Bush and Blair in the moments of crisis ignited by
their policies, it not only fails to clarify the historical context that cat-
alyzes attacks on the imperial homelands, but actively stamps out such
analysis by labeling virtually all dissent a form of terrorism. The British
government’s de‹nition of terrorism is very broad and includes many
legal political parties at home and abroad; terrorism, in other words,
boils down to pretty much any group the government does not favor.4
Moreover, fanaticism and terrorism are forms of behavior that charac-
terize only the opponents of Western powers, never those powers them-
selves. High-altitude bombing sorties against civilian populations by the
Atlantic powers have never been seen as terror, despite the similar aims
such policies share with those of “terrorists.”5 Given the imperial poli-
cies that his government has pursued and his use of reductive stereo-
types to represent resistance to such policies, Blair’s gestures of inclusion
smack of hypocrisy to many in Britain’s Muslim communities.
Hostility toward British Muslims has increased signi‹cantly over
the last decade and a half. As Afro-Caribbeans preponderantly were
during the 1970s, Muslims, and, by extension, Asians in general are
increasingly seen as an alien threat, the monstrous Other whose pres-
ence helps explain Britain’s postcolonial decline and current vicissi-
tudes. Although what the Runnymede Trust Commission calls Islamo-
phobia was a factor in the wake of the Rushdie affair and the ‹rst Gulf
War, hostility toward Asians has ratcheted up signi‹cantly after 9/11,
with the entire community being reinvented as Muslims of Asian
descent and increasingly portrayed by both mainstream as well as neo-
fascist politicians as a potential ‹fth column. Not surprisingly, this
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trend has helped to generate signi‹cant tensions within Britain’s Asian
community, with some members of other faiths joining in attacks on
Muslims. Moreover, although explicit and even coded racial hatred is
proscribed in Britain by laws for which the antiracist movement fought
long and hard, Muslims are not protected as a group by such legislation.
This is because, unlike religious groups such as Jews or Sikhs, for
instance, Muslims are a multiethnic group, and Islam consequently is
not shielded from incitement to hatred by antiracist legislation.6 Neo-
fascist agitators have been quick to take advantage of this loophole in
the law, with groups like the British National Party running successful
local electoral campaigns organized around overtly xenophobic slogans
such as “Islam out of Britain.”7
The distance between such extreme rhetoric and the nationalist
posturing of mainstream politicians has diminished noticeably since
9/11. Shortly after 9/11, for instance, former prime minister Margaret
Thatcher issued a blanket condemnation of all Muslims everywhere for
the attacks.8 Moreover, British Muslims are now also blamed for the
failure of of‹cial British policies of multiculturalism. The bombings,
according to this logic, are a symptom of Muslims’ failure to integrate
adequately into British culture, a failure licensed by multiculturalism’s
tolerance for diversity. Already in 2002, former chancellor of the exche-
quer Normal Lamont was warning of the dangers of balkanization cre-
ated by New Labour’s multiculturalist model of a “community of com-
munities.” It was quite clear who Lamont was referring to when he
inveigled against the moral relativism fostered by multiculturalism. As
he put it in an editorial, “Multiculturalism can easily degenerate into
moral relativism. Our laws are based on values, and the state has the
right to intervene to protect them. Individuals cannot be left alone in
their chosen communities, if that involves forced marriages, polygamy,
burning books, supporting fatwas or even ‹ghting against our Armed
Forces.”9 Lamont’s diatribe is part of a renewed push to abandon mul-
ticulturalism and enforce assimilation to a homogeneously conceived
normative British identity that is picking up steam despite its anachro-
nistic character. Yet notwithstanding Lamont’s thinly veiled references
to threatening Muslim alterity, the bombers of last July were all seam-
lessly integrated into British society. As A. Sivanandan points out,
Abdullah Jamal, formerly Germaine Lindsay, was married to a white,
English woman; Mohammad Sidique Khan was a graduate who helped
children of all religions; Shehzad Tanweer, also a graduate, often helped
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in his father’s ‹sh-and-chip shop; and Hasib Hussain’s parents sent him
to Pakistan because they felt he had fallen into the English drinking-
and-swearing culture.10 These young men took their own lives and
those of their fellow citizens not because of an irrational urge to self-
destruction but, as Khan stated outright in a video made before he blew
himself up, because of their anger at Britain’s invasion and subsequent
destruction of Iraq.
I obviously do not intend to suggest that concerns about Islamic
militants in Britain and elsewhere in Europe are totally unfounded, any
more than Stuart Hall and his colleagues intended to argue that there
was no criminal behavior taking place when they anatomized racial
scapegoating in pre-Thatcherite Britain.11 In Policing the Crisis, Hall and
his colleagues argued that sensationalist media representations of black
crime combined with invasive U.S.-style saturation policing of black
communities and a politically touchy judiciary during the 1970s to cre-
ate what they called a “moral panic” around the racialized ‹gure of the
mugger. In addition, they stressed that the broader context for this
moral panic was the organic crisis of social democracy in Britain, a cri-
sis most apparent in the failure of the state to provide means of mater-
ial incorporation for the spatially and economically marginalized black
communities in Britain. Under such circumstances, some members of
the black community did indeed turn to the illegal economy, including
predatory behavior such as criminality, but the political and media
‹restorm around mugging was entirely disproportionate to the “real”
phenomenon of mugging. Instead, the moral panic concerning mug-
ging was manipulated by politicians such as Enoch Powell and Margaret
Thatcher to provide an explanation for the various forms of economic,
social, and political dysfunction triggered by the crisis of accumulation
that began in the late 1960s and that ultimately precipitated the disman-
tling of the Fordist-era social contract. Blacks were thus scapegoated for
a much broader crisis; their demonization helped cement white work-
ing-class consent for the evisceration of social democracy in Britain in
the years that followed.
The recent wave of popular authoritarianism regarding British
Muslims shares many structural parallels with the moral panic that took
place during the organic crisis of the 1970s. Very similar forms of eco-
nomic and cultural marginalization in the context of a broader crisis are
at play. Although some British Muslims, notably those exiled from East
Africa during the early 1970s, have done well in economic terms over the
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last thirty years, the majority of the Asian population in Britain arrived
to work in dying industries such as textiles in the Midlands or in the ver-
tiginously downsized service industry. The neoliberal orthodoxy of
both Tory and Labour governments since the Thatcher era has kept
these groups at the bottom of Britain’s economic pile, trapped on run-
down public housing estates with often violently xenophobic members
of the white working class. It is thus not so much the case that these sec-
ond- and third-generation British Asians have failed to assimilate as
that the neoliberal state has refused to grant them signi‹cant access to
mainstream British society.
Equally if not more important than this domestic economic cul-de-
sac, however, is the global crisis of neoliberal ideology. Although the so-
called Washington Consensus has begun to unravel as a result of its own
internal contradictions, it is indisputably from within the Muslim world
that the strongest resistance to neoliberal policies has come. Hegemonic
neoliberal policy during the 1990s took the form of tacit Western sup-
port for authoritarian secular regimes in the Muslim world that
imposed the West’s conditions of structural adjustment and guns-for-
oil on their populations with seeming impunity. As these regimes abdi-
cated any autonomous, popular nationalist role, anti-imperialist upris-
ings such as the Iranian Revolution and the Palestinian intifada, as well
as con›icts in Somalia, Bosnia, Chechnya, and, most of all, Afghanistan,
helped forge a transnational vanguard of young Islamists.12 Media net-
works such as Al Jazeera and the Internet, as well as more low-tech
equivalents like newspapers and videocassettes, helped knit Muslims
around the world together into an emotionally resonant imagined com-
munity. This virtual version of the transnational Arabic community or
umma transmitted abundant evidence of the horrors of the Pax Ameri-
cana over the last decade, from the unending nightmare in Gaza and the
West Bank, to U.S. military bases near the Holy of Holies and Bush Sr.’s
betrayal of the Shiite uprising against Saddam Hussein in 1991. Political
Islam is thus a symptom of and response to an organic crisis that, as
David Harvey has suggested, has obliterated the legitimacy of secular
states in a signi‹cant portion of the postcolonial world and, in tandem,
has shattered U.S. neoliberal ideological hegemony, leaving nothing but
the brutal military power whose bloody overreach we have been wit-
nessing in Iraq.13
It should be no great surprise that the contradictions of these
neoliberal policies and the even more brutal overt imperialism that has
180 MONGREL NATION
followed in their wake have generated signi‹cant ferment within
Britain’s marginalized Muslim communities. If, as critics such as Tricia
Rose and George Lipsitz have argued, hip-hop culture originated in the
United States as a response to the displacement caused by “urban
renewal,” economic recession, and the ‹scal crisis of the state in the
1970s, contemporary Asian hip-hop in Britain similarly offers a critical
counterpoint to contemporary social and political orthodoxies, includ-
ing the explicitly imperialist form of neoliberal culture that emerged
following 9/11.14 Indeed, British Asian youth culture is increasingly a
vector for a radical anti-imperialist politics. Groups like Fun-Da-Men-
tal and Asian Dub Foundation tackle Islamophobia head-on, asserting a
sense of pride in Muslim and Asian identity while also advancing a cul-
tural politics of unity with other racialized ethnic groups in Britain. In
addition, these groups have played an important role in dismantling
of‹cial rhetoric concerning the threat of terrorism following 9/11. Per-
haps most signi‹cant, however, is the sense of critical transnationalism
that emerges from the music of these bands. While tapping into a simi-
lar sense of a transnational community as vanguardist Islamist move-
ments, these bands eschew religious dogmatism, and thereby suggest
the possibility of alternative forms of politicized Islam working in soli-
darity with the global justice movement. Such groups may be read as
harbingers of alternatives to the fratricidal twins of market and religious
fundamentalism.
Fun-Da-Mental is undoubtedly the seminal band in the wave of
politicized post-bhangra Asian dance music that took off in the early
1990s.15 The group released their ‹rst LP, Seize the Time, in 1994.
Although they have often been compared to the United States’ Public
Enemy, such comparisons tend to obscure the complicated local char-
acter of the band’s intervention. Formed round core members Aki
Nawaz (aka Propa-Gandhi) and Dave Watts (aka Impi D), Fun-Da-
Mental appealed to Muslim youths in Britain who were alienated from
mosques as well as of‹cial community leaders by their opposition to
music, dance, and videos, including the popular bhangra music that
had become the soundtrack for Asian youth culture in Britain during
the late 1980s.16 In addition to heading up Fun-Da-Mental, group leader
Aki Nawaz is a cofounder of Nation Records, probably the most impor-
tant independent Asian record label in Britain over the last decade. Fun-
Da-Mental’s music conveys a ‹erce sense of British Muslim pride, con-
structing an identity matrix through references to a pantheon of
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international black and Asian leaders, including, as the group’s ‹rst
album title suggests, the Black Panthers, but, above all, Malcolm X and
the Nation of Islam. These references to the Nation of Islam are partic-
ularly important in forging black-Asian unity, solidarity enacted in the
multiracial composition of the band itself and, more broadly, in the
British tradition of antiessentialist antiracism. With these references to
the Nation of Islam and its incendiary counterreading of Western his-
tory through the lens of white oppression comes a powerful rhetoric of
self-defense that, in the wake of 9/11 and 7/7, seems chillingly prophetic:
Stop the world ’cause we’re living like slaves
God only knows how I’ve been managing
Look at me now, I’ve got them panicking
Blood’ll be dripping from those headless chickens
This is the world of greed like it never was
We’ve had enough, it’s time to get tough
Look who’s afraid, not me or mine
But the devils that worked us in the sunshine
They don’t like anybody like me
X was in the X, Luther King was next
But they’re only two from millions
My people been treated like aliens
Los Angeles was just a rehearsal
First we’ve been looting, next we’ll be shooting
Here comes another Huey P. Newton
Making them angry ’cause they can’t ban me.17
From its opening loping rhythms cut across by an accelerating sample
of Malcolm X’s de‹ant rhetoric, this track oozes anger. Frequent refer-
ences to the pride instilled by militant self-defense alternate with a cat-
alog of the historical wrongs in›icted on people of color, including slav-
ery and the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Malcolm. In
addition, the group also articulates a critique of the West’s domination
by the cash nexus and the moral decadence that such materialism
spawns. Moments of self-defense cited by the group include the Los
Angeles uprising of 1992 following the acquittal of the four white police
of‹cers who beat Rodney King, events that had taken place the year
before Seize the Time was recorded. In addition, the singer’s citation of
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“letting off bombs” suggests a reference to the ‹rst Palestinian intifada,
which was winding down after six years by 1993. The reference to Mal-
colm X’s famous line about the “chickens coming home to roost” fol-
lowing the assassination of Bobby Kennedy could not, in retrospect, be
more ominous an articulation of political Islam’s intent to bring neolib-
eral oppression and militarism home to the imperial heartland.
It is important to note that Fun-Da-Mental’s overheated rhetoric
has cooled noticeably as “clash of civilization” discourse has come to
dominate the public sphere in Britain and the United States. After
releasing the in›ammatorily titled EP Why America Will Go To Hell in
July 1999, the group’s main subsequent release, the October 2001 album
There Shall Be Love, is an entirely instrumental recording, bereft of the
‹ercely condemnatory lyrics of their earlier work. It seems that the
group has determined that the militant rhetoric and, most of all, the
advocacy of violent resistance in their earlier work may be counterpro-
ductive in the struggle for global social justice, a movement in which
they have taken an active role since 2001. Yet it is worth taking their ear-
lier work seriously inasmuch as it articulates a sense of righteous anger
that is carefully justi‹ed in historical terms. This seems signi‹cant given
the ascription of irrationality that tends to characterize media accounts
of Islamism. Such an analysis of Islamism is, of course, part of a long-
established Orientalist tradition, anatomized in devastating detail by
Edward Said, of representing Islam as the benighted, feminized,
unhinged foil for the rational, masculine, and modern West.
It is precisely these stereotypical assumptions that provide an ideo-
logical cover for the current Anglo-American project of bringing
democracy to the Middle East through the military occupation of Iraq.
Yet, as Robert Pape argues in his recent book Dying to Win, suicide
bombing is not, as Orientalist discourse so often represents it, the prod-
uct of an irrational self-destructive urge, but rather is a calculated strate-
gic response by vanguardist groups who often have signi‹cant support
from civilian populations in areas occupied by what appears to them to
be a colonial power.18 Lacking the massive means of military destruction
deployed by powers such as the United States, UK, and Israel in their
campaigns of airborne extermination, suicide bombers resort to low-
tech solutions that purposely target civilian populations. The logic
behind such bloody stratagems is that democratic governments are rel-
atively vulnerable to campaigns that massacre civilian populations and,
in doing so, bring home the violence of imperial policies abroad, sap-
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ping popular support for expansionist policies. Pape’s conclusion that
suicide bombing re›ects classic anticolonial nationalist struggles rather
than the religious fundamentalism to which it is often ascribed is lent
support by Fun-Da-Mental’s lyrics on Seize the Time, all of which refer
to struggles for self-determination such as the African-American civil
rights movement and the Palestinian intifada, as well as more local
black British resistance against neofascist hooligans. It is an index of the
power of neo-Orientalist discourse today that Pape’s ‹ndings and the
anger that smolders throughout Fun-Da-Mental’s Seize the Time should
continue to seem so startling.
If Fun-Da-Mental have backed away from their radical rhetoric to a
certain extent in the post-9/11 period, their confederates in Asian Dub
Foundation (ADF) have grown more militant. ADF was formed when
the organizers of a community music project in London’s predomi-
nantly Bangladeshi East End neighborhood decided to form a band with
some of their star pupils. On early albums of the middle to late 1990s
such as Facts and Fictions and Community Music, ADF focused on
Britain’s imperial history in South Asia and on the ways in which this
history overdetermined contemporary social relations and state legisla-
tion in postcolonial Britain. Recent albums such as Enemy of the Enemy
(2003) and Tank (2005) have, however, seen an increasing awareness of
the international contradictions that characterize neoliberalism as it has
evolved from the multilateral, trade-based mode of exploitation in the
Clinton and early Blair era to the military imperialist formation in con-
temporary Britain and America. While the group has always displayed a
notably composite sense of identity, evident in their syncretic musical
blend of dub, rap, rock, and Asian musical styles such as bhangra, recent
political conditions have pushed their analysis of the nexus of contem-
porary domestic and international social relations to a new level. In
“Blowback,” for example, the group anatomizes the Machiavellian
behavior of imperialist powers like the United States and UK toward
erstwhile client regimes such as that of Saddam Hussein, noting the role
that jingoism plays in legitimating a clamp down on domestic entitle-
ments as well as civil liberties:
Step Back from the Blow Back
Plans that were hatched with the strings still attached
See there’s always a catch
When you’re livin’ thru a blow back
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You’re wonderin’ why you need places to hide
Keep one eye to the sky when you’re waiting for the blowback
Sink into the mud watch out for the scud
Cos oil is thicker than blood in the world of blowback
From ally to madman from client to badman
From Gommorah to Sadaam
Starring in the blowback
Invisible sins Invisible Kings
The shit we’re in gonna drown in the spin
Permanent warfare
Burning up welfare
Add up add up
Their share of the hardware
Rights disposed of
Government gloves off
Flick of the wrist
Summary justice
Feel the kiss of the U.S. ‹st.19
By now this sort of analysis has become relatively conventional on the
Left, with critics such as Frances Fox Piven noting the important func-
tion of neoliberal imperialism in providing domestic legitimation for
the Right’s agenda.20 More original, perhaps, is ADF’s take on Al Qaeda
in “Enemy of the Enemy.” Not only does ADF make the link to blow-
back from the U.S. proxy war in Afghanistan during the 1980s on this
track; in addition, the group evokes the double standards that charac-
terize the behavior of imperialist regimes on the international stage. In
the name of battling Communism and, now, Islamism, powers like the
United States and UK have unleashed campaigns of terror that repeat-
edly put the lie to pious notions of human rights, suggesting, as ADF
puts it, that “what your life is worth depends on where you live.” These
double standards are all too evident today, as imperial powers engage in
devastating saturation bombing campaigns in the name of spreading
democracy while ignoring the “collateral damage” in›icted on civilian
populations, whose lives never register in the Western media—
although they feature prominently in the electronic umma that binds
together contemporary Muslims.
Running parallel to this hypocritical rhetoric of democratization
and human rights abroad are the gaping holes in the political constitu-
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tion of the European Union. While the EU has conveyed remarkable
freedom of mobility and domicile on European nationals and has
arguably helped initiate progressive models of international con›ict
resolution since its consolidation in the early 1990s, it was created with
a cordon sanitaire thrown round it, one that all too glaringly keeps out
the increasingly immiserated and politically oppressed citizens of the
predominantly Muslim nations that surround its southern ›anks. As
Etienne Balibar has pointed out, the exclusionary character of EU citi-
zenship has made the sizable migrant population of the EU, a kind of
twenty-sixth member country with a majority Muslim population, into
a stateless people.21 The result, as Balibar observes, has been a recolo-
nization of social relations, one that affects Muslims who have Euro-
pean citizenship almost as much as it affects those who do not have legal
residency, since they are all increasingly perceived as part of a poten-
tially hostile ‹fth column intent on destroying European civilization.
Politicized Asian youths such as the members of ADF are only too aware
of this new apartheid at the heart of Europe. As the band notes in their
song “Fortress Europe,” this hard-line policy of sealing Europe off to
migrants and the blowback they threat to bring with them ignores the
root of the problem: military neoliberalism. The dystopian future of
overweening computerized state control ADF outlines in “Fortress
Europe” is not that far from being realized; while proclaiming its adher-
ence to a progressive regime of “managed migration,” Blair’s Labour
government has simultaneously normalized policies of long-term
detention, deportation, and dispersion that criminalize unwanted (read
poor, unskilled) immigrants, reneging on the country’s Geneva Con-
vention commitment to rights of political asylum.22 As ADF’s “Fortress
Europe” suggests, the popular authoritarianism, hard-line immigration
tactics, and antiterrorist legislation that have proliferated in the EU only
serve to augment the militancy of young nonwhite Europeans. Recent
measures that would permit the expulsion of foreign nationals to coun-
tries engaging in torture would abrogate Britain’s commitment to the
UN Convention Against Torture, giving contemporary critics cause to
sneer, as Frantz Fanon did in the context of the Algerian War, at the
racialized character of European humanism.23 Indeed, increasingly vir-
ulent attacks on multiculturalism such as those that have saturated the
public sphere in Britain following the July bombings and legislative
moves to allow expulsion of British nationals who express criticism of
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the government that can be construed as “condoning terrorism” seem
calculated to deepen the alienation and anger that economic, social, and
political marginalization have generated among British Asian youths
during the neoliberal era.
The anti-imperialist cultural politics of engaged artists such as Fun-
Da-Mental and Asian Dub Foundation point toward a radically differ-
ent and truly postimperial Britain. Of course, social programs to estab-
lish genuine economic and political equality within Britain are a basic
prerequisite for such a new dispensation. In order for such policies to be
implemented, popular authoritarian ideologies that cemented consent
during the early stages of neoliberalism would have to be rolled back.
But, in tandem with such policies, Britain would need to sever its
dependent relation with the United States in order to forge a genuine
postcolonial politics. Unfortunately, instead of pursuing such an
autonomous direction, Britain’s leaders are playing the role of obedient
lapdogs to U.S. imperial power. As in the United States, such imperial
policies have inevitable and signi‹cant domestic rami‹cations, includ-
ing the attempt to squelch all dissent.
The antisystemic cultural politics of Islamists are not going to go
away by themselves. Indeed, neoliberal imperialism feeds such voices by
generating the conditions of endemic economic deprivation and of
political oppression that stimulate rebellion. The danger of criminaliz-
ing all expressions of political Islam within Britain and Europe more
broadly is that it leaves vanguardist Islamists as the only voices of anti-
imperialism. Indeed, we only need to look at the policies pursued by
Western imperial powers and their indigenous client regimes in the
Koran belt over the last ‹fty years to understand the folly of such a strat-
egy. In addition, as the Blair government’s behavior during the “war on
terror” makes clear, policies that erode civil liberties in the name of
antiterrorism inevitably have wider implications. As George Monbiot
recently argued, restrictions on civil liberties that are passed in name of
combating “terror” almost without fail are used by politicians such as
Blair to silence anyone who questions government policy, no matter
how nonviolent their criticism.24 The popular authoritarianism to
which black and Asian Britons have been subjected over the last half-
century thus inevitably has rami‹cations beyond these so-called ethnic
minority communities. The voices of activist artists such as Asian Dub
Foundation and Fun-Da-Mental offer a potent rebuke to contemporary
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military neoliberalism, one that will be far more conducive to progres-
sive politics in the long term than current of‹cial policies in countries
such as Britain and the United States that increasingly seek to silence all
dissent. The stinging criticism such groups offer of Britain’s imperial
legacy makes them part of the chorus of voices that have sought over the
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and Stefano Harney, Nationalism and Identity: Culture and the Imagination in a
Caribbean Diaspora (New York: Zed, 1996), 91–114. A more sweeping argument con-
cerning the hybridization of Britishness during two hundred–odd years of colonial
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arguments comes from Homi Bhabha, whose The Location of Culture contains seminal
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15. As Anne McClintock puts it in Imperial Leather, “If colonial texts reveal ‹ssures
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and bell hooks, We Real Cool: Black Men and Masculinity (New York: Routledge, 2003).
These critics owe much to Michelle Wallace’s Black Macho and the Myth of the Super-
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2002), 70.
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West Indian literary renaissance, see Harney, Nationalism and Identity. On exile and
nationalism, see Simon Gikandi, Writing in Limbo: Modernism and Caribbean Literature
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992).
27. For a discussion of Selvon’s characters’ transformation of metropolitan space,
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